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On November 11 and 12, 2011, a symposium held at the University of North Carolina in Chapel 
Hill honored John M. Headley, Emeritus Professor of History. The organizers, Professor Melissa 
Bullard—Headley’s colleague in the department of history at that university—along with Professors 
Paul Grendler (University of Toronto) and James Weiss (Boston College), as well as Nancy Gray 
Schoonmaker, coordinator of the Program in Medieval and Early Modern Studies—assembled 
presenters, respondents, and dozens of other participants from Western Europe and North America to 
celebrate the career of their prolific, versatile, and influential colleague whose publications 
challenged and often changed the ways scholars think about Martin Luther, Thomas More, the 
Habsburg empire, early modern Catholicism, globalization, and multiculturalism. 
This special issue contains the major papers delivered at the symposium, revised to take account 
of colleagues’ suggestions at the conference and thereafter. John O’Malley studies the censorship of 
sacred art with special reference to Michelangelo’s famed “Last Judgment” and the Council of Trent. 
John Martin sifts Montaigne’s skepticism about contemporaneous strategies for self-disclosure and 
self-discipline. Stressing the significance of grammar, Constantin Fasolt helps us recapture the 
Renaissance’s and the early modern religious reformations’ disagreements with antiquity. Ronald 
Witt’s reappraisal of humanist historiography probes Petrarch’s perspectives on ancient Rome. John 
McManamon includes tales of theft and market manipulation in his study of the early modern 
collection and circulation of books and manuscripts, the commodification of study. To “nuance” 
John Headley’s conclusions about “the Europeanization of the world,” Jerry Bentley repossesses the 
influence of other than European societies on several European theorists of human rights. Kate 
Lowe’s remarks on the reconstruction of race in the Renaissance explores the effects of a critical 
mistranslation on what being black was taken to mean by Europeans. David Gilmartin introduces 
readers to the shape of democracy in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India, as well as to the 
understandings of popular sovereignty that affected elections, suggesting strides that scholars might 
take “toward a worldwide history of voting”. 
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The remarkable range of these contributions comes close to reflecting the range of Professor 
Headley’s interests and achievements, which James M. Weiss maps in his tribute, identifying 
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Abstract: The great variety of historical figures and themes found in the published 
works of John Headley since 1963 reveal a unity of themes and values. The numerous 
persons whom Headley studied all envisioned a humane universal order even as they 
moved from theoretical reflection to actual political implementation. His more recent 
work holds up the European legacy of human rights, democracy, and freedom that have 
become a Western gift and challenge to non-Western cultures.  
Keywords: Headley; Europeanization; empire; Renaissance humanism; cartography; 
Spanish Empire; globalization 
 
Voltaire famously pronounced that history is nothing but a pack of tricks that we play upon the 
dead. In this essay, I propose an historical interpretation of the work of John Headley, so you might 
say I am playing a pack of tricks on the living—but lest you misunderstand my intent, John, I wish 
you a hearty “Vivas, floreas, crescas.” So let us begin with a little riddle: what do an English 
Chancellor and an Imperial Chancellor have in common? Or, what do the reformer Luther and the 
counter-reformer archbishop of Milan have in common? The answer, of course, is that John Headley 
published books on all of them . . . and more.  
Yet John once fretted to me that he feared his work showed a dilettante’s restlessness: he worried 
that he had moved from one subject to another without consistent focus. His comment marked a rare 
lapse in an otherwise judicious mind, for John’s work shows a deep unity of theme and of moral 
values. I’ll grant him the wide focus of a life spent in archives in Barcelona, Besançon, Brussels, 
Madrid, Naples, Rome, Seville, Turin, Vienna, and more, not to mention in this country the 
Houghton, Beinecke, John Carter Brown, Folger, Newberry, Huntington and other libraries. I’ll also 
grant that stunning array of figures cross the title pages of his works: Martin Luther, Thomas More, 
Mercurino Gattinara, Carlo Borromeo, Tommaso Campanella, as well as the great, often anonymous 
cartographers of the early modern age. Yet despite all their ostensible diversity, they point in unison 
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to themes and values which not only sustained John’s scholarly energy for over half a century  
but which, as he has argued over this last decade, sustained the best of our civilization for over half  
a millennium.  
For these individuals all shared a commitment to the aspirations to a universal order which they 
envisioned as humane and universal, whether under the aegis of church or of empire. Whether John 
studied transgressors against established power like Luther and Campanella, or conservators of an 
emerging new order like Gattinara and Borromeo, or someone in between the two like More, they all 
embodied that struggle at the core of European civilization for (as John phrased it) “a symbiosis 
between the particular and the general, the local and the universal” ([1], p. 12). 
In each of their lives, John held up for us the bedeviling dialectical relationship between Utopian 
visions and political realities—between, if you will, eloquence and efficacy. For as eloquent as all of 
them were in articulating a theoretical vision of universal order, each of them (except Campanella) 
crossed the threshold out from the study and into the council chamber to carry his vision into the 
rough and tumble of swiftly changing political realities. In that dialectic between thought and action, 
these individuals still command our admiration, as John wrote, for “their prodigious work habits and 
their sensitive humanist minds” ([1], p. 142). They all shared a common inheritance of medieval 
legal or theological training that was undergoing a fresh invigoration by the Renaissance humanist 
re-thinking of spiritual, ecclesiastical, and political realities.  
As these men of ideas became men of power, they carried with them what John calls “the 
continuing human urge to transcend the local [community] for a more inclusive [i.e., universalizing] 
order” ([2], p. vii) into a world that was collapsing into religious fragments while at the same time 
expanding into global empires. Again and again, John’s work chronicled how the intractable realities 
of the English court, the Imperial chancery, the archdiocese of Milan, the Lutheran princes, or the 
Spanish empire would force these learned statesmen to settle for modified success. In addition, each 
of them was constrained to come to terms with the perennial struggle between church and state. 
Indeed, as John once declared, “The continuing effort to distinguish the two jurisdictions [church and 
state] without their actual separation, to renegotiate this distinction between the sacred and the 
secular, becomes perhaps the most decisive feature of Western civilization” ([2], p. viii). Indeed, 
John epitomized European civilization when he wrote that, “The interlocking universalisms 
advanced first by the Stoic notion of cosmopolis on the one hand, [then later] reinforced by  
the re-presentation of Christ’s Body on the other, serve to inform the universalizing claims of each  
type of polity [i.e., church and state] in their … permutations throughout the classical/Christian 
development” ([2], p. vii) of European history. Thus it is no wonder that John revitalized our 
appreciation also of Campanella, who “reverted to an extreme statement of universal papal 
theocracy” ([2], p. vi). For, as John has frequently explained, that effort to distinguish church  
and state would become in later centuries the all-out struggle between a sacral world view and 
secularization ([2], p. vii). As he would come to insist in his later work, that universalism laid the 
groundwork for Europe’s highest contribution to world civilization.  
In the midst of these themes, from the mid-1980s on, John’s work turned again and again to Spain 
and the theme of global Empire. Some of his most incisive review essays are about books on empire 
and imperialism that appeared in these decades [3–7]. Spain’s rapid acquisition of a truly worldwide 
dominion and its dynastic link to the Holy Roman Empire made its pursuit of universal order not 
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simply a Utopian dream but a concrete bureaucratic priority. Then, as the years unfolded, John began 
unfolding maps, real ones conserved at the Folger, the Newberry, the John Carter Brown, and 
elsewhere. For, as he would emphasize, maps enshrine both practically and symbolically a vision of 
world order. Indeed, those early modern maps dramatize the dialectic between world order and 
practical political realities.  
Headley’s interest in cartography took wings as it carried him to his recent book of 2008 [8].  
The title of that book—The Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human Rights and 
Democracy—took me and others aback: the habitually reserved, buttoned-down John Headley 
imbued his latest work with an outspokenly political edge and message. John Headley, of all people, 
became engagé. His object in that book was to reaffirm “the uniqueness of the Western tradition  
in the creation of a common humanity” ([8], p. 217) beginning with “the Renaissance [which] 
decisively … prepared the global context for the European engagement of the world’s peoples” ([8], 
p. 1). For “deep within the recesses of the Western tradition,” he descried “a universalizing impulse 
… that surpasses its chief rivals, Islam and China. The West demolished barriers to define geography 
and peoples as well as [to create] intercontinental traffic, [and the] commerce to make a global 
community a necessity ([2], p. x). In this amazing book, John identified two European developments 
as Europe’s definitive gifts to the age of globalization, namely, first, “the idea of a common humanity 
as a single moral, biological totality…. with its program of natural, human rights” ([8], p. 2, phrase in 
re-arranged sequence) and second “the capacity for self-criticism and dissent [with its inherent idea 
of freedom]… which through a long historical process ultimately culminated in constitutional 
democracy … including … a free press, independent judicial review, and respect for the rule of law 
and the rights of minorities” ([8], pp. 2–3, phrase in re-arranged sequence). 
John is aware of the deeper, somewhat darker dialectic of that European legacy, or as he calls it, 
the paradox. He wrote, “Admittedly, much in that [European] tradition did need criticism and 
reformulation” ([8], p. 5). He cited Diderot’s observation of Europe, “the paradox [whereby] the 
most arrogant of civilizations is at the same time the most radically given to criticism of itself” ([8], 
p. 4). Amplifying on Diderot, John wrote that “this paradox is trumped by another, even more 
astonishing—that the civilization that in its colonialism and imperialism gave us the most savage, 
inhuman treatments of indigenous populations, not to mention the ultimate inhumanity of 
Auschwitz, was the same that promoted the idea of a common humanity and programs of human 
rights accompanied subsequently by a myriad of private organizations that continue to address 
poverty, hunger, disease, and multifarious needs throughout the globe” ([8], p. 4). To the extent that 
that these latter benefits are true, the “principle for the universal integration of all human populations 
is the true European legacy” ([5], p. 887; [6], p. 887).  
And yet, how close has the world come to that universal integration? Even as John praised the 
European, or Western,1 legacy of human rights, democracy, and freedom to dissent, he sounds the 
qui vive,2 the alarm at the threats to their viability, not least in the United States in the first decade  
of this century. In the 1990s he sounded notes of hopefulness, such as when he wrote “A more  
                                                 
1  On the distinct usages of European or Western, see [5], ch. 2, esp. pp. 63–102, and fn. 1, p. 227. 
2  This is but one of the memorable and beloved phrases wherewith the learned Professor Headley sprinkles 
his conversations. 
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truly universal inclusive secular reading of earth’s peoples in some viable political community still  
awaits [us]” ([2], p. x). The hopefulness then turned, however, to a pervasive anxiety in the decade just 
ended, as seen especially in his frankly gloomy essay in Hedgehog Review that followed the book on 
Europeanization [9]. 
With the 2008 book on Europeanization, we might say that, at the pinnacle of his years John 
Headley himself has entered the company of the Utopian thinkers like More, Luther, and Campanella 
whom he so ably chronicled. He strains, he hopes, he exhorts, he coaxes his readers, as did they 
theirs, to hasten forward toward that brighter horizon of universal human rights within our grasp. 
Thus, the legacy of Utopian humanism revives itself in a moving, transmuted form in John Headley’s 
latest works. So I would close by adapting for John Headley words taken from W. H. Auden’s poem 
on William Butler Yeats: 
In the nightmare of the dark 
All the dogs of [warfare] bark 
And the living nations wait 
Each sequestered in its hate. 
Follow, [scholar], follow right 
To the bottom of the night 
With your unconstraining voice 
Still persuade us to rejoice . . . 
In the deserts of the heart,  
Let the healing fountain start, 
In the prison of his days 
Teach the free man how to praise ([10], p. 249).3 
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Scholars of Italian humanism have long recognized that the conception of their movement as 
constituting the rebirth of ancient culture had a religious origin ultimately traceable to the Christian 
belief in the rebirth of the sinner in Christ, that is, the recovery of divine acceptance lost for the 
human race by the fall [1,2]. The rebirth that occurred in baptism prefigured the vast majority of 
medieval reform movements in that in one way or another, the latter aimed at restoring the spiritual 
purity that had been lost over the centuries. Although Italian humanists of the Renaissance were 
primarily dedicated to emulating the intellectual, artistic, and moral achievements of the ancient 
world, both they and medieval reformers used similar terms, renovatio, reformatio, reflorere, to 
describe their goals, terms that implied in one way or other a certain perspective on history [3,4] 
The object of all these reform movements was to recover that which over an intervening period of 
time had been lost. 
The humanists, however, differed from medieval reformers in the sharpness with which they 
saw the past. Medieval reformers looked back for guidance to outstanding exemplars of spirituality 
like the primitive church, the Apostles, the Egyptian Desert Fathers, or early Benedictine 
monasticism, but they showed little concern to examine these exemplars as historically conditioned 
phenomena. The Italian humanists too had their exemplars of conduct, the great writers and heroes 
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of ancient pagan Greece and Rome, but at the same time they had a scholarly interest in the ancient 
world apart from its usefulness to the present. In the long run, the clarity with which they came to 
grasp the nature of ancient society gave them a sense of historical perspective that led them (1) to 
an understanding of the past as a time-differentiated series of social, political, religious, and 
intellectual changes; and (2) against that backdrop, to objectify the present with a view to the 
reform of contemporary society and politics. 
The origin of this appreciation of the past can be found in the work of Francesco Petrarca  
(1304–1374), who, appalled by the moral corruption of his own society, looked back to ancient 
Rome as the exemplar of human achievement. As he famously asked: “What else, then, is all 
history if not the praise of Rome?” ([5], p. 417: “Quid est enim aliud omnis historia, quam Romana 
laus”). His question would have been met with incomprehension by the two earlier generations of 
humanists of whom the most outstanding were Lovato de’ Lovati (1240–1309) and Albertino 
Mussato (1261–1329).4 While drawing on ancient Roman sources for their own work, Lovato and 
Mussato showed little interest in investigating the nature of the society that produced them. The 
poetry of Lovato, the founder of humanism, reveals a confused notion of the ancient past where 
Greek and Roman history and mythology mingle without distinction as to their basis in reality. 
Albertino Mussato, Lovato’s major disciple, and Mussato’s younger Veronese contemporary, 
Ferreto dei Ferreti (1294–1337), derived their stylistic techniques from ancient Roman historians, 
primarily from Livy, but the focus of their interest was on contemporary history.5 
At the same time, the effort of the first two generations of humanists to classicize their Latin 
through intensive study of ancient vocabulary and phraseology would lead later humanists to an 
appreciation of the thinking processes of ancient writers and render them approachable as 
personalities, that is, as historically conditioned human beings.  
Besides the historians of modern history at Padua and Verona, a second group of learned 
historians in the two generations before Petrarca, Riccobaldo of Ferrara (1244/45–ca. 1318), 
Giovanni Matociis (Mansionarius) (died 1337), Benzo of Alessandria (died. ca. 1330), and two 
members of the Colonna family, Landolfo (ca. 1250–1331) and Giovanni (ca. 1298–1343/44) were 
authors of universal narratives of the history of the world. With the exception of Giovanni 
Matociis’ work, these narratives ran from Adam and Eve down to their own day.6 In Matociis’s 
case, the author planned to narrate European history from Augustus to Henry VII. The presentation 
of Roman history by these historians manifested a broad acquaintance with Roman historical 
writing but they had no interest in imitating ancient Latin style. Their treatment of ancient Rome 
was presented as part of a continuous flow of events and lost its distinctiveness within a more 
extended narrative. 
                                                 
4  In [6], I argue that Lovato and Mussato, who are generally considered “prehumanists,” are “humanists,” 
and that “prehumanism,” a term that has never been defined clearly, really means “pre-Petrarcaan,” pp. 
19–21. 
5  Mussato’s most important historical writing was entitled De gestis Henrici septimi Cesaris and was 
initially published in [7]. Ferreto’s major historical work, Historia rerum in Italia gestarum, was edited 
by Carlo Cipolla, [8]. 
6  See my discussion of these historians in [6], pp. 112–14, 166–68, and 282–84; on Giovanni Matociis’s 
Historiae imperiales, see [9]. Only the period between Augustus and Charlemagne was completed. 
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The same is true for the version of universal history that took the form of biographies of great 
men from all ages. Petrarca must have known Giovanni Colonna’s De viris illustribus, a series  
of lives of pagans and Christians arranged chronologically down to modern times, written in  
Avignon before Colonna’s departure for Rome in 1338 [10]. Another friend of Petrarca, Guglielmo 
Pastrengo (1290–1352), who visited Avignon the year after Giovanni’s departure, may well have seen  
a copy of Giovanni’s work before composing his own De viris illustribus and De originibus [11]. 
Both of these works, like Giovanni’s, contained biographies of famous pagan and Christian heroes 
and authors.  
With the exception of Benzo of Alexander, historians in both universalistic traditions shared a 
common conception of the ancient texts. The writings of the pagan authors were sacred: contradictions 
in the texts were only apparent and had to be reconciled. Whereas historians of modern history like 
Mussato and Ferreto had to determine what the facts were and order them in their account of recent 
events, these historians accepted the ancient past as given. If direct contact with the ancient past 
was to be established, the ancient historians had to be confronted, interrogated, and their writings 
reworked by the historical imagination. 
Benzo of Alexandria (d. 1337) made a beginning of this process in his Cronica a mundi 
principio usque ad tempora Henrici ([12], 2, pp. 134–136). Despite his Cronica's medieval Latin 
diction and its encyclopedic approach, Benzo developed rigorous techniques in textual criticism.  
He endeavored to find the most reliable witnesses for his account and when they contradicted one 
another, he discussed the disagreements and then chose the most likely position. He also entertained 
the possibility that some of the contradictions were conscious distortions on the part of the writers. 
He did not hesitate to compare readings from different manuscripts and to admit obscurity in his 
sources when he found it. Benzo’s Cronica, however, blended the history of ancient Rome into a 
history that ran from Adam down to the fourteenth century. 
Nevertheless, Petrarca’s focus on ancient Rome was not without precedent. Although he denied 
any influence of Dante on his work, it is more than likely that Petrarca’s historical orientation had 
been affected by Dante’s insistence that ancient Rome had been both the center of a perfect secular 
society and the site where Peter established Christ’s church.7 Moreover, although Dante’s great 
poem represents a lyricization of universal history, the poet’s imaginative recreation of ancient and 
modern personalities as interlocutors may also have inspired Petrarca. Despite the secular character 
of Petrarca’s approach and his pessimism in later life regarding the possibility of Dante’s hoped-for 
restoration of the empire at Rome, nothing earlier in Western literature comes closer to Petrarca’s 
                                                 
7  Referring to the place of the Roman empire in Dante’s poem, Peter Armour, ([13], p. 170), writes: “What 
Dante is seeing is, in the first place, the mystery of the twofold providentiality of Augustus’ perfect 
earthly Monarchy which prepared for Christ and thus of the ideal which, though its paganism was 
superseded, was thereby transmitted into the history of mankind redeemed by Christ and to the Christian 
world.” Although there is no proof that Petrarca read Dante as a young man, he himself acknowledges in 
a letter to Boccaccio in 1359 that in his youth Dante’s writings were easily available to him in Avignon 
(sine difficultate parabili). Defending himself to Boccaccio, who had sent him a copy of Dante’s 
writings, he writes that although eager to collect books as a youth, he did not want to be influenced by 
the poet in his own vernacular work. In this way he sidestepped the question as to whether or not he had 
read Dante ([14], 4, p. 96).  
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conversations with his correspondents than Dante’s poetic re-creation of men of antiquity in  
the Commedia. 
At the very least Dante’s emphasis on Rome would have resonated with the young Petrarca, 
who from the age of eight grew up in the area of Avignon, the ecclesiastical capital of Europe. 
Member of a refugee Florentine family, living in a milieu of papal bureaucrats largely Italian, but 
employed by a clerical hierarchy dominated by Frenchmen, Petrarca likely heard as a boy his father 
lament the desolation of Rome and the humiliation of Italy. Boasts of French superiority only 
sharpened his loyalty to his land of origin and to its Roman heritage.  
Petrarca had longed for years to see Rome and when he finally did in the spring of 1337,  
the remains of the great ancient metropolis exceeded his expectations. As he wrote to his patron, 
Cardinal Giovanni Colonna, just after his arrival in the city, seeing Rome in ruins did not diminish 
his opinion of the city’s greatness, but increased it: 
“In truth, Rome was greater, and greater are its ruins than I imagined. I no longer wonder that the whole 
world was conquered by this city but that it was conquered so late.”8 
Against the background of this experience, Petrarca’s belief that the history of ancient Rome was 
the only history worth knowing makes sense.  
Loathing his own time, he tells us in his autobiography written in the last years of his life, 
“I especially dedicated myself to learning about antiquity, inasmuch as I have always disliked my own 
age, so that, had I not been restrained by the love of dear ones, I would always have wanted to be born in 
any other age. In order to forget my own time, I have always tried to place myself in spirit in other times. 
Therefore I took pleasure in history.”9 
His status as exile belonging nowhere in space might have facilitated the liberation of his 
imagination from his own time that he speaks of here.  
Petrarca’s sense of the historicity of the ancient Roman past, however, developed largely out of 
his humanist inheritance. His dedication to close study and imitation of ancient style, especially 
advanced by his youthful editions of Virgil and Livy, disclosed not only the literary techniques of 
ancient artistry, but the very processes of thought of the great writers. Such a degree of familiarity 
with the ancients awakened Petrarca to the fact that these writers were men of extraordinary talent 
but still men, creatures of history and proper subjects of historical research.  
He granted, as he wrote, that although cities and kingdoms fall, kingdoms are transferred, 
customs vary, and laws are altered, 
  
                                                 
8  “Illa vero, mirum dictu, nichil imminuit, sed auxit omnia. Vere maior fuit Roma, maioresque sunt 
reliquie quam rebar. Iam non orbem ab hac urbe domitum, sed tam sero domitum miror” ([14], 1, p. 81). 
Unless specified all English translations are mine. 
9  “Incubi unice, inter multa, ad notitiam vetustatis, quoniam michi semper etas ista displicuit; ut, nisi me 
amor carorum in diversum traheret, qualibet etate natus esse semper optaverim, et hanc oblivisci, nisus 
animo me aliis semper inserere. Historicis itaque delectatus sum… ([15], p. 6). 
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“those things which are truly innate by nature do not change, and the minds of men and the diseases of 
minds are really the same as they were when Plautus imagined them.”10 
The result was a desacralization of ancient time and grasp of the great men of antiquity as 
human beings. Because of the basic constancy of human nature, not only are the moral teaching of 
ancient writers still valid, but the great men of antiquity can also serve as models of moral conduct 
and achievement for those of Petrarca’s age. 
The consequences of this desacralization were twofold. First of all, in contrast with the Christian 
apologetic tradition represented by Dante and earlier humanists like Mussato who maintained that 
pagan poets such as Virgil and Ovid wrote at points under divine influence, Petrarca steadfastly 
affirmed that what was taken as prophesy in their work was the product of their natural genius and 
that the truths they revealed were reached by natural reason ([18], pp. 540–44). 
Second, his view of the great ancient writers as historically determined beings also affected his 
attitude toward the authority of their work. Ancient history was not frozen in the texts. Petrarca 
recognized that ancient historians like modern ones were liable to error and prejudice. Because of 
the contingent character of the texts, therefore, they were accessible to the critical judgment of the 
modern historian intent on constructing his own version of the past. Benzo of Alexandria, whom 
Petrarca had perhaps read, may have played the pioneering role in the development of textual 
criticism, but little in his works suggests that he viewed the ancients as personalities.  
The intimacy which Petrarca felt for the great men of antiquity is perhaps best illustrated in his 
Letters to Famous Men in which he often pronounces judgments on the lives and works of his  
long-dead correspondents. In a number of cases he makes a point of demonstrating the temporal 
distance between himself and them. As he concludes his letter to Cicero: 
“From the land of the living, on the right bank of the Adige, in the city of Verona, in transpadane Italy, 
on 16 June in the year 1345 from the birth of that God whom you did not know.”11 
In these letters to the ancients Petrarca uses his scholarship to construct imaginatively their 
historical epoch, and by implication articulate the temporal and cultural gap that separates them 
from his own time. Indeed, it is this sense of historical distance that constitutes the basis of our 
modern sense of anachronism, the sense of the historically inappropriate that seems to us in the 
contemporary world as simply part of our mental equipment, but that in fact was one of the great 
contributions of the humanists to modern thought. 
                                                 
10  “Que vero naturaliter insunt, non mutari, et animos hominum et animorum morbos prope omnes eosdem 
esse, qui fuerint, dum Plautus ista fingebat” ([14], 2, pp. 27–28). Petrarca had just cited several 
moralisms of Plautus. Also note: “Mundus idem est qui fuit; item sol, eadem elementa; virtus sola 
decrevit; civitatum nempe manuque congestarum molium alie creverunt, decrevere alie, quedam funditus 
corruerunt, nostris quedam surrexere temporibus: vetus est vicissitudo rerum humanarum” ([14], 3,  
p. 267). The later passage is cited from [16], pp. 404–05. In his important article summarizing Petrarca’s 
political attitudes, Michele Feo, without citing these quotations, illustrates Petrarca’s idea of the 
unchanging nature of human beings over time through examples from the humanist’s actions ([17],  
pp. 116–18). 
11  “Apud superos, ad dextram Athesis ripam, in civitate Verona Transpadene Italie, xvi kalendas Quintiles, 
anno de ortu Dei illius quem tu non noveras” ([14], 4, p. 227). 
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For example, Petrarca’s account of the murder of Caesar from his De gestis Cesaris (post 1366), 
essentially based on Suetonius, takes the form of a dialogue with the ancient historian. Petrarca is 
quick to condemn those among the assassins who had benefitted from Caesar’s generosity. Of the 
omens presaging Caesar’s coming death, he suggests that the finding of a stone in Capua predicting 
the assassination, which Suetonius considers a fact, may only be a legend. As for the other omens, 
even though at that time people believed in them and conducted themselves accordingly, Caesar as 
a cultivated and magnanimous person was right to overlook them.12 The dictator should, however, 
have known what to expect, because the rumor of his coming assassination was public knowledge. 
His failure to read the note warning him of the plot that was handed him as he was going into the 
curia has led rulers since to read immediately what is handed them ([19], p. 316). The sense of 
temporal distance emerging from these passages prevades the De viris.  
At its widest Petrarca’s historical vision of ancient Rome embraced the centuries from the 
foundation of the city to the centuries of its decadence or, to use the phrase of Theodore Mommsen, 
to the beginning of the ‘Dark Ages’.13 Although he frequently identifies two periods of history, 
ancient and modern, without defining the point of demarcation between them, in Africa, his epic 
poem probably begun in 1338 and celebrating the victories of Scipio Africanus, Petrarca has Scipio 
break off his prophesy of the future with the reigns of Vespasian and Titus because “I cannot bear 
to proceed: for strangers of Spanish and African extraction will steal the sceptre and the glory of 
the Empire founded by us with great effort.”14 The earliest edition of his work of historical 
                                                 
12  Coniuratum est in eum a sexaginta sentoribus, Gaio Cassio et Marco ac Decimo Brutis tante cedis 
ducibus, quórum primus atque ultimus e suorum numero erant, medius semper adverse partis extiterat 
sed, venia donatus ac provincia auctus, aut oblata respuere aut profecto ipse quoque suus esse 
debuerat…Potest enim ese res fabulosa, quamvis eam Suetonius Tranquillis affirmet…Omitto suum et 
uxoris sue somnium, et que sunt id genus omnia, que a viro tam docto, tam magnanimo, iure optimo, ni 
fallor, sperni poterant; sed tunc vulgo observari talia, imo et procurari accuratius et caveri mos erat. Illud 
certe sapientissimo duci oculos aperuisse debuerat, quod et fama cedis in vulgus effusa erat…” ([19], pp. 
315–16). 
13  This term is taken from the well-known article of Petrarca’s conception of ancient Roman history by 
Mommsen, [20].  
14  “Ulterius transire piget; nam sceptra decusque/ Imperii tanto nobis fundata labore/ Externi rapient 
Hispane stirpis et Afro” ([21], p. 40 cited from [20], p. 119). For a criticism of Mommsen’s position that 
Petrarca envisaged the early second century C.E. as the beginning of the “dark ages” and of the secular 
character of Petrarca’s conception of Roman history, see [22]. Black cites numerous passages in 
Petrarca’s writings that criticize the Donation of Constantine as destroying the primitive church and 
introducing corruption into the institution. As Black interprets Petrarca, the Donation of Constantine 
constituted the end of antiquity ([22], p. 66). Crucial to his disagreement with Mommsen is a letter of 
Petrarca to Giovanni Colonna, ostensibly written in 1337, describing a walk together through the ruins of 
Rome and listing ancient pagan sites that they have seen followed by a number of Christian sites ([14], 2, 
pp. 55–60). He cites Petrarca’s word: “Multus de historiciis sermo erat, quas ita partiti videbamur, ut in 
novis tu, in antiquis ego viderer expertior, et dicantur antique quecunque ante celebratum Rome et 
veneratum romanis principibus Christi nomen, nove autem ex illo usque ad hanc etatem…([14], 2, p. 58). 
In an effort to give substance to this vaguely phrased division into ancient and modern times, Black adds: 
“This scheme is reinforced by his archaeological picture of ancient Rome: this is presented not in 
topographical but in chronological order—first of the classical, then of Christian sites:  
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biography, De viris illustibus, written in the 1340s, however, includes biographies of Roman 
leaders from Romulus to Titus (d. 81 C.E.), who was born in Spain, while the projected reworking 
of the text at the end of his life was to begin with Romulus and end with Trajan (d. 117 C.E.), 
another emperor of Spanish origin.  
Consequently, at the latest, the great age of Rome ended for Petrarca in the early second century 
A.D. and thereafter began the age of shadows (tenebrae) which presumably endured down to 
Petrarca’s generation. Responding to Agapito Colonna, who was angry when he heard that he was 
not to be included in the De viris illustribus, Petrarca responded: 
“I am unwilling to carry my treatment to such a distance and through so many shadows (tenebrae) for so 
few famous men; for this reason sparing material and labor, I set and determined the limit of my history 
long before our century” ([14], 4, pp. 28–29) 
To his misfortune Petrarca had been born too late or too soon. As he wrote in his Rerum 
memorandarum libri:  
“… I, with so many reasons to lament, have none to console me, placed as I am at the boundary line 
between two peoples and looking, at the same time, behind and ahead.”15 
Nevertheless, although the contribution of Petrarca to the development of the concept of 
historical perspective is undeniable, much in his writing reflects the confusion of myth and history 
that characterized ancient and medieval historiography. In 1890, Pierre de Nolhac announced his 
discovery of a new manuscript of Petrarca’s De viris illustribus that differed significantly from 
manuscripts of the work then known in that it began with a long preface followed by twelve vitae 
of biblical and mythological figures from Adam to Hercules [24,25]. Nolhac and later scholars 
down to the 1940s assumed that the text was the earliest version of the work and that subsequently 
Petrarca had excised the first twelve as his vision of the ancient past evolved.16  
On the contrary, recent scholarship has established that the text beginning with non-Roman 
biographies was written in 1351 or 1352, several years after the first edition that began with 
                                                                                                                                                                 
his account goes up to Sylvester and Constantine and then abruptly breaks off” ([22], p. 66). The passage 
to which Black refers is the following: “Hic Christus profugo vicario fuit obvius; hic Petrus in crucem 
actus; hic truncatus est Paulus; hic assatus Laurentius; hic sepultus venienti Stephano locum fecit. Hic 
sprevit fervens oleum Johannes; hic Agnes post obitum vivens suos flere prohibuit; hic Silvester latuit; 
hic lepram deposuit Constantinus; hic gloriosam Calixtus exercuit Libitinam” ([14], 2, p. 58). The series 
of references, however, are not in fact in chronological order. John the Evangelist (d. ca. 100) is inserted 
between Lawrence, burned in 258, and Agnes, martyred in ca. 304. Contrary to Black’s assertion, the list 
does not “go up to Sylvester and Constantine” but it ends with Calixtus, executed in 222. Accordingly, 
whether Petrarca intended this list as representative of the tour that he and Giovanni took through Rome 
or whether he recalled these sites as they came to mind, Black is in error in asserting that the list is 
chronological and that it proves that for Petrarca antiquity ended not as Mommsen has shown in the 
second century C.E., but with Constantine.  
15  “Ego itaque, cui nec dolendi ratio deest nec ignorantie solamen adest, velut in confinio duorum 
populorum constitutus ac simul ante retroque prospiciens…” ([23], 1, p. 19). 
16  On the chronology of Petrarca’s composition of the De viris illustribus, see [26] and [27]. The earliest 
version of the De viris illustribus included three foreigners among the twenty-three lives, Hannibal, 
Pyrrhus, and Alexander.  
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Romulus.17 It probably reflects Petrarca’s intention to expand his treatment of ancient biographies 
beyond the Roman ones. There is evidence, moreover, that for a period of years in the 1350s, prior 
to the letter to Agapito Colonna cited above, he had contemplated an “all-ages” or a universal 
version of De viris illustribus that included modern heroes ([28], pp. 224–25). 
Each of the twelve lives of the second edition rests on the assumption that the hero was a 
historical being. In the case of the biblical figures, Petrarca has Scripture and the early Church 
Fathers as his evidence. As for the mythological figures Petrarca relies with confidence on pagan as 
well as early Christian sources. In the case of Hercules, for example, he begins by admitting that 
Varro maintained that many men in previous times had been called Hercules because of their 
immense strength. Nonetheless, Petrarca seeks to establish the life of the one real Hercules “by 
depending on the more reliable but rare traces of what has been handed down.”18  
Conflicting sources considered Hercules to have been either a philosopher or a man of 
superhuman strength, but the examples of other exceptional men bear witness to the fact that 
intellectual and physical gifts can be combined in the same person. Among the labors that Petrarca 
believed the historical Hercules actually performed are his conflict with the Amazons, the 
Centaurs, Antaeus, and the Hydra. That Hercules supported the heavens on his shoulders, however, 
appears to Petrarca as an allegorical reference to Hercules’s astronomical knowledge, while feats 
such as the leveling of mountains, the descent into hell, and the chaining of the beast with three 
heads “I pass over as fabulous.”19  
The ascription of superhuman qualities to figures like Jason and Hercules, whom we now 
consider mythological, challenges Petrarca’s own principle of the continuity of human nature that 
is the foundational principle of his concept of historical perspective. The historical existence of 
creatures such as the Hydra and the centaurs, moreover, implies a contradiction to the general 
constancy of nature that underlies his position on human nature. 
The potentialities of human activity within his space-time coordinates are further conditioned by 
divine and demonic intervention. Although omnipresent to human history, God and the Devil seem 
                                                 
17  Martellotti considers this second version the initial portion of an “all-ages” version of De viris illustribus, 
which Petrarca never completed ([26], p. 51). According to my reading of the preface to the twelve lives, 
however, Petrarca still intended to limit the work to ancient heroes, not to heroes of all periods ([27],  
pp. 107–8). The preface specifically refers to the pagan religious beliefs of his heroes: “multa etiam sciens 
apud alios ystoricos interserta vel vetusti moris vel insulse religionis, dicam melius superstitionis, plus 
tedii quam utilitatis aut voluptatis habitura preterii …” ([25], p. 24).  
18  “Id causa est quod de Hercule tam incerta, tam varia scripta sint ut velut laberinthi ambagibus implicitus 
lector exitum non inveniat. Sane quantum ingenii funiculo datum erit, inter caliginosas vetustissime rei 
semitas, vitatis multiplicium perplexitatibus errorum, per certiora tradentium, licet rara, vestigia ad 
verum quam propinquius licebit accedam” ([25], p. 104). Martellottti stresses that in writing these twelve 
lives Petrarca has drawn exhaustively on pagan and Christian writers for his information. For the vita of 
Hercules, see Caterina Malta’s notes, [25], pp. 104–9, and those of Dotti [29], pp. 647–49. Martellotti 
concludes regarding the twelve lives: “Lungi dal rappresentare una sopravvivenza del Medioevo, anche 
quest’opera del Petrarca nasce dai suoi libri ed è una conquista del suo umanesimo…” ([26], pp. 79–80). 
19  “Thesalie fauces et scissa iuga monitum, et emissi amnes, ut fractum Acheloi cornu et copie dedicatum, 
ut descensum ad inferos et iecta trifauci monstro vincula, et cetera, quorum longa narratio est, fabulosa 
pretervehar” ([25], p. 108). 
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to have been especially active in ancient times. By means of Noah, Abraham, Jacob, Joseph and 
Moses, God worked in history toward the time appointed for Christ’s birth. While using their 
natural reason, ancient poets may have written certain truths about the divine, but Petrarca does not 
hesitate to assert that God directly inspired the Erithrean or Cumean Sybil to prophesy Christ’s 
coming ([31], p. 40). Again, despite Petrarca’s conception of the creation of the Roman empire as a 
human achievement, he cannot resist associating the empire with the birth of Christ. While leaving 
the causal relationship ambiguous, he writes: “…at what better time did God, the lover of peace 
and justice, deign to be born of the Virgin and visit the earth?”([31], p. 175: “Quo potissimum 
tempore amator pacis ac iustitie nasci deus ex virgine terrasque visitare dignatus es?”)  
As for demons, the pagan religion began when these evil beings took possession of statues 
erected by grieving relatives for their dead family members. However, although the demons fled 
the idols at the coming of Christ, demons remain an active source of historical causation in that 
they continue to tempt the human race to sinful actions ([30], p. 34).20 
Finally, Petrarca’s secular interpretation of ancient Roman history as demonstrating the height 
of human achievement made it impossible for him to extend his perspective to succeeding 
centuries. He never doubted that the advent of Christ marked the beginning of the era of revealed 
truth, one that exposed the utter falsity of pagan belief. Throughout his work the ascetic theme that 
“nothing endures” served as a counterpoint to his enthusiasm for ancient culture. In the face of the 
eternal, all worldly achievement became worthless, and the secular glory pursued by his ancient 
heroes would seem to have counted least of all. Insistence on the Roman achievement, 
consequently, had to be sealed off from any comparison with early Christianity. Otherwise, he 
would have had to view Jerome and his beloved Augustine as participants in a world in decline. To 
avoid this, perhaps unconsciously, his writings place the Latin Church Fathers in a vague 
spatio-temporal context without continuity with the ancient Roman past. 
Of course, to criticize Petrarca because he was not a modern historian is unfair. It would be too 
much to expect him to have rejected pagan and Christian traditions that accepted as historical 
beings, figures whom we today consider mythological. Nor should we be surprised that among his 
sources of historical causation he recognized occasional interventions of God and the Devil, a view 
still held as the basis of historical explanation by some today. The goal of this paper has rather 
been to credit Petrarca with a pioneering role in developing a concept of historical perspective 
while at the same time qualifying the extent of his modernity by situating his innovative 
conceptions within his complex vision of the past with its strong allegiances to his predecessors. 
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Abstract: This paper examines a key tension in Renaissance culture as reflected in the 
origin and provenance of manuscript books. Were Renaissance manuscripts the private 
property of individual owners or the common wealth of a lettered public? Even an 
officially public library could not escape that tension, whether through abuse of 
borrowing privileges or plundering of vulnerable holdings. Market forces encouraged 
theft, while impoverished scholars used their knowledge to supplement meager 
incomes. Alternatively, a sense of common wealth is reflected in an ex-libris indicating 
that a codex belonged to an individual “and his friends.” Book collecting, finally, 
becomes a helpful clue in discerning to what a scholar is committed. Some Renaissance 
clergymen used culture as a way to promote their ecclesiastical careers, while others 
collected and shared manuscripts as a way to promote tolerance. 
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“Some <scholars> ... may even decide to read <the Iter Italicum>, just as I have enjoyed reading 
catalogues and inventories of manuscripts.”21 
Paul Oskar Kristeller 
Over a period of years in the recent past, I did read Kristeller’s Iter Italicum. I found the 
experience exciting in a way that Carlo Ginzburg might appreciate: the historian as detective who 
unearths clues and follows where they lead ([2], pp. 96–125). Along the way, one encounters a 
tension related to Renaissance manuscripts: should one treat them as private property (res) or a 
                                                 
21  [1], 1, p. xxiv. I am grateful to the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at UCLA and Loyola 
University Chicago for generously supporting my research. 
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common wealth (res publica)? Take the history of Cardinal Bessarion’s books, bequeathed to the 
Venetian Republic for public use. From the start, the Venetian government set conditions for the 
loan of those books: that one be a Venetian resident, provide a valuable item as security for the 
loan and return the book within eight days. Despite such stringent conditions, there were soon 
problems. In 1494, the government decreed a fine of 500 ducats for recalcitrant borrowers. In the 
early sixteenth century, the Procurators of San Marco, custodians of the library, added a new 
condition: the loan would occur only when three-quarters of their number approved. By 1506, the 
Procurators were ordered to stop all lending, get back in one week’s time all books that were out or 
apply the 1494 penalty of 500 ducats. Nonetheless, lending continued, and matters did not improve. 
When Andrea Navagero (1483–1529) served as librarian from 1516 to 1524, he actually 
brandished an apostolic Breve threatening excommunication for those who did not promptly return 
loaned books. The sanction had a precedent in the 1462 bull that Pius II issued to protect the new 
library that the Franciscan Giacomo della Marca (1393–1476) established in Monteprandone ([3],  
p. xxviii). Navagero’s recourse to papal intervention means that he too had problems in getting 
borrowers to return books. And Navagero may have brought problems on himself. A letter that the 
Cretan scholar, Markos Mousouros (ca. 1470–1517), sent to Navagero on 8 May 1517 reveals 
questionable choices by borrowers and the librarian. For at least the second time, Mousouros 
emphasized to Navagero that he had evidence proving that individuals were stealing books from 
the library and selling them for personal gain. For example, the nephew of Venice’s recently 
deceased Grand Chancellor, Francesco Fasiol (d. 1517), had purloined a copy of Apsyrtus’s  
treatise on medicinal remedies for horses and then sold it to the bookseller Francesco Pozzi.  
While browsing in Pozzi’s store, nestled among the apothecary shops selling spices in Venice  
(la spezzeria), Mousouros spotted the book, bought it, took it home and there recognized the clues 
that indicated its true provenance. The margins of the book still had Greek notes in Bessarion’s 
hand, and the leaf where Bessarion often wrote a table of contents had been cut out. When 
Mousouros confronted Pozzi with the evidence, he confessed that he had bought the book from 
Fasiol’s nephew. Mousouros next confronted Chancellor Fasiol, who was indignant and began 
surreptitiously to run down Mousouros’s good name. 
Books stolen from the Marciana not only found their way to Venice’s booksellers but to artisans 
as well. The local barber near the church of Sant’Apollinare returned to Mousouros a copy of 
Bessarion’s own In calumniatorem Platonis, stolen once again by Fasiol’s nephew, who rightly 
assumed that he could sell the manuscript to the barber. Obviously, a barber would want a copy of 
Bessarion’s defense of Plato in order to assist his son’s study of Greek at Mousouros’s school. 
Amid the darkness of the avarice of the human spirit shines the light of a barber’s son, Domenego, 
seeking to become proficient in Greek. Because Mousouros did not have time to attend to the 
recovered books, he ordered that they be put with others he had left for safe keeping with his 
student, Carlo Cappello (1492–1546). Without telling Mousouros, some of his disciples (egline) 
put the books in cloth containers and sent them with Mousouros’s other baggage to Rome. 
Mousouros assured Navagero that he still had the books and that they were “at your disposition” 
(al commando vostro). A diffident Navagero added a note to his copy of the letter, indicating that 
Alberto Pio da Carpi (1475–1531), another former student and lifelong friend of Mousouros, had 
come into possession of those books. Navagero seems to tip us off that Mousouros was currying 
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favor with a patron or making his own profit on Marciana books. 
Other evidence indicates that Mousouros and Navagero respected the Marciana as a public 
institution. While Mousouros conducted negotiations in Rome to obtain for the Marciana the 
library of the Venetian cardinal, Domenico Grimani (1461–1523), Navagero worked to keep its 
books available to the scholarly public even in the absence of a permanent facility for their storage. 
In this exchange, however, both seem engaged in that perennial sport of covering for their actions. 
Mousouros was responding to an inquiry of Navagero about missing books, his explanation for the 
way the books reached Rome seems flimsy and he works to deflect blame by incriminating 
Navagero. Navagero never seemed properly concerned about Mousouros’s repeated warnings that 
Fasiol and his nephew had abused borrowing privileges, and Navagero did nothing during Fasiol’s 
lifetime to end the abuse. The librarian seemed cowed by powerful politicians. When notified of 
the theft of Bessarion’s defense of Plato, Navagero told Mousouros not to worry about that 
particular book because the library had “an infinite number of copies.” Though a bit short of 
infinite, the 1474 inventory of Bessarion’s library listed four Greek copies and seven Latin 
translations of the entire work or portions thereof.22 
What ultimately happened to the two stolen books? The trail has led us to the library of Alberto 
Pio da Carpi and from there might logically lead to the Biblioteca Estense in Modena. But Lotte 
Labowsky has argued that the copy of Apsyrtus cannot be found there or anywhere else, since the 
only copy of Bessarion’s In calumniatorem Platonis presently in Modena and having Alberto Pio’s 
library for its provenance (Est. gr. 125) is missing the marginalia of Bessarion that Mousouros 
described. Labowsky is therefore inclined to identify the copy briefly in the barber’s possession 
with a codex now in the Vatican Library (Vat. gr. 1435) because the Vatican codex does have 
additions and corrections in Bessarion’s hand. I would observe that the precise wording of Mousouros 
is not clear on the extent of Bessarion’s notations: “having recognized some Greek letters of Bessarion 
in the margin” (havendo io recognosciuto certe lettere grece de Bessarione in margine).23 
Alas, the following centuries likewise manifest cases of insiders, who exploited their position to 
pilfer manuscripts or portions thereof, especially as their market value increased. From a Jesuit 
perspective, Cardinal Zelada (1717–1801) brought dishonor on his given name, Francesco Saverio, 
by supporting the suppression of the Society of Jesus and then plundering the Jesuits’ Roman 
residences for books and other valuable objects.24 In the nineteenth century, two Greeks climbed 
to the monastery of Vatopedi on Mount Athos, recognized the importance of a codex there that 
conserved rare texts of early Greek geographers and cut out some folios from the codex. Aubrey 
Diller identified the culprits: the first was Minoides Mynas, who visited Vatopedi in 1841 under 
commission of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and left among his private papers seven leaves 
from Vatopedi 655 that the Bibliothèque Nationale acquired (Suppl. gr. 443A); the second was the 
“notorious Constantine Simonides,” who gained entrée to Athos through an uncle who was  
an abbot there and sold the leaves that he stole from Vatopedi to the British Museum (Add.  
                                                 
22  [4], 6, pp. 306–10; [5], pp. 318–19, 367–70; [6], pp. 63–64, 76–80, 115, 139–42, 486, 490; [7],  
pp. 100–2; and [8], pp. 329–30. All citations from Mousouros’s letter are from [6], pp. 139–41. 
23  [6], p. 79. See also [9], pp. 1–24 (Biblioteca Estense), p. 49 (a copy of Apsyrtus, dated s. XV-XVI,  
in Roma, Biblioteca dell’Accademia dei Lincei, cod. Nic. Ross. 358 [43.D.82]). 
24  [10], pp. 118–20; [11], pp. 64–65, 67–89; and [12], pp. 184, 209, 219–20 n. 23. 
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19391). In a rather understated way, Aubrey Diller describes Vatopedi cod. 655 as “somewhat 
dismembered.”25 Mynas and Simonides had such a fascination with old Greek manuscripts that 
they would forge the ones they could not steal. 
In that same century, Guglielmo Libri (1803–69) deservedly earned the title of “master 
manuscript thief,” exploiting the trust of the Italian and French governments to steal their codices 
and sell them to the earl of Ashburnham. In another classic understatement, Libri wrote his mother 
in 1835 and informed her that “the more I age and work, the more I enjoy old books.”26 From his 
more cautious beginnings in Florence, Libri gradually utilized his eye for valuable antiques and his 
talent for speculating on the book market to quicken his collecting. He eventually convinced the 
French government to catalog all manuscripts in France’s provincial libraries, and he began visiting 
those libraries as a director of the initiative. Libri stole manuscripts from libraries in at least nine 
different cities, including Autun, for which he introduced the seminary library in the first volume 
of the Catalogue générale. When Libri offered manuscripts for sale to the British Museum, the 
Museum’s librarians, while examining his collection in Paris, were tipped off to Libri’s shady 
character, penchant to speculate and rumored theft of codices. Even after receiving that 
information, they still urged the British government to approve funds for the purchase. But the 
government did not feel that it could afford Libri’s asking price. The true hero of the Libri saga, 
Leopold Delisle (1826–1910), concluded: “Enlightened men of all nations should agree to ostracize 
library pirates, who clandestinely carry abroad the fruits of their rapine, and <they> should 
combine to prevent any traffic in such articles” ([19], p. 285). 
There is, at times, a curious disjunction between the quality of manuscript books commissioned 
by the richest patrons and the quality of the written texts conserved in those books. If the d’Este 
family did commission a luxury codex now in the Marciana (Marc. lat. XI.101), they received a 
book richly decorated with white-vine bordering and their own coat of arms and poorly written by 
a scribe whom Pietro Zorzanello (1883–1951) characterized as a “uomo proprio sfigurati,” which 
one might roughly render, “a man truly to be numbered among the morons.” Onto the folios of that 
beautiful container of quality parchment the scribe wrote a text filled with errors in rather crude 
letters (literis crassioribus). Zorzanello perhaps chose his words carefully: humanists of the 
Renaissance coined a diminutive form of crassior, “crassiusculus,” for someone obtuse or 
mediocre ([21], 2, pp. 3 and 7; [22], p. 138). The same dynamic of poor copying probably took a 
few years off the life of Ciriaco d’Ancona (1391–1452). Ciriaco paid a scribe, Domenico di Cassio 
da Narni, to make two luxury copies of his letter on the battle of Ponza as gifts for wealthy patrons. 
At the last minute, due to Domenico’s sloppy work, Ciriaco himself had to correct the texts before 
giving them to his supporters. Perhaps Ciriaco gambled that someone like Cardinal Giordano 
Orsini (ca. 1360–1438) would be happy to put the luxury codex on display in his home and never 
read it closely enough to notice those awkward, fifteenth-century equivalents of the “white out.” 
                                                 
25  [13], pp. 228–29; [14], pp. 177–79; [15], pp. 10–14; and [16], pp. 40–41, with quotation. 
26  [17], pp. 53 n. 2 (letter of 26 May 1835): “... Quanto più invecchio e lavoro mi piacciono i libri antichi e 
sono contento solo quando perduto nei secoli passati oblio il presente e non preveggo l’avvenire.”  
In addition to [17], pp. 59–106, see also [18], pp. 5–21; [19], pp. 279–90; and [20], pp. 161–79, 202–31, 
320–31. 
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Because Ciriaco found himself pressed for time, he failed to catch several errors and could not, 
therefore, assure a text whose accuracy would reflect his esteem for his patrons.27 
Even a zibaldone (family hodgepodge book), at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
luxury parchment codex, might still be plundered as an object of perceived value. During the sack 
of Volterra in 1472, a local humanist notary, Biagio Lisci (ca. 1423-after 10 Dec. 1517), had his 
family journal taken as booty by a soldier named Lisandrino. When the rapacious Lisandrino 
eventually realized that he had not looted an illuminated Dante, he sold the Lisci zibaldone for  
four soldi to the grammarian Luca di Antonio Bernardi da San Gimignano (d. after 1 June 1499).  
Luca was a personal friend of Lisci but at first assuaged any pangs of conscience for the purchase 
by apparently concluding that, in this instance, two wrongs did make a right. At one time, Lisci had 
borrowed Luca’s copy of the Liber de temporibus written by the humanist Matteo Palmieri 
(1406–75), but Lisci had never returned the book and apparently had lost it. There is a clue, 
however, that the grammarian Luca later experienced a moment of authentic remorse: the Lisci 
zibaldone is now part of the manuscript collection of the Biblioteca Comunale Guarnacciana in 
Volterra (cod. 5031). Perhaps Luca gave the journal back to its owner, a lifetime resident of 
Volterra, or perhaps he traded the journal for another book ([23], pp. 240–41; [24], pp. 25–28). 
Down to our own times, scholars have speculated on the value of manuscripts first located 
during their research, utilizing legitimate and black markets. Ludwig Bertalot (1884–1960) had 
such an unstable income that he occasionally had to use his keen knowledge of manuscripts to 
support himself. In 1936, Bertalot recruited his American friend, Dean Lockwood (1883–1965),  
to serve as a go-between with Harvard University, whom Bertalot hoped would buy manuscripts he 
then owned. When Harvard did not do so, Lockwood himself bought one codex in 1946, sold it to 
William H. Allen (1918–97) the following year, and Allen sold it to the University of Pennsylvania 
Library.28 Bertalot’s behavior in the case of the codex Bolleanus seems less above board. After 
Remigio Sabbadini introduced Bertalot to Luigi Cesare Bollea (1877–1933), a Torinese historian, 
Bertalot recognized the value of a Renaissance miscellany that Bollea owned, and, in 1929, 
Bertalot purchased it. When forced by circumstances to sell the codex, Bertalot split it into two 
parts to maximize his profit, selling one piece to the national library in Berlin and another to the 
University Library in Frankfurt. However, until his death in 1960, Bertalot never revealed the 
division. In 1964, Kristeller and Giuseppe Billanovich identified the portion in Berlin and realized 
what Bertalot had done, which Billanovich characterized as a “regrettable, commercial decision” 
(con infelice, commerciale idea). Ursula Jaitner-Hahner had to follow a clue, a note on one of the 
thousands of index cards that comprised Bertalot’s incipit catalogue, in order to identify the second 
                                                 
27  Roma, Biblioteca dell’Accademia dei Lincei, cod. Nic. Rossi 214 (35.E.27) (copied by Domenico di 
Cassio da Narni with autograph additions and corrections); and London, British Library, cod. Harley 
4088 (copied by Domenico di Cassio da Narni with autograph additions). See [23], pp. 236–40; and [24], 
pp. 16–19. 
28  Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania Library, cod. Lat. 7, with a note on fol. 105 that the Milanese 
humanist Lancino Curti (ca. 1460–1512) owned the codex in 1484. On the codex, see [1], 5, p. 372a-b; 
[25], pp. 247–52; [26], p. 83; [27], pp. 107–8; [28], 1, p. 253; and [29], 1, p. 154 (no. 2112). With the 
patronage of Ludovico Sforza (il Moro), the Lombard humanist Curti claimed to have written over 
60,000 works. See [30], 31, pp. 487–88; and [31], pp. 10–11, 137–38, 190–203. 
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piece of the manuscript (“Codex Frankfurt [olim Bollea], fol. 124v”). To assure maximum value 
for both halves, Bertalot cut out the leaf with the fifteenth-century possessors’ notes, cut the leaf in 
two and pasted one possessor’s note into each half.29 
There seems no more eloquent image of the privatization of manuscripts books than the 
coffin-like boxes in which the self-described Vellomaniac, Thomas Phillipps (1792–1872), kept his 
more than 60,000 codices ([32], pp. 119–30; [33], pp. 91–94). As his personal property, the 
manuscripts were certainly dead to the world. By contrast, collective instincts are apparent in the ex 
libris of Renaissance intellectuals like Bartolomeo Fonzio (Della Fonte, 1446–1513), Angelo 
Poliziano (1455–94) and Francesco Pandolfini (1470–1520) in Florence, Giovanni Melzi (d. after 
1482) in Milan and the Hellenophile Arcangelo in Rome. From the start, they labeled their  
books the property of themselves and their friends.30 The Venetian humanist Leonardo Giustiniani  
(ca. 1386–1446) was among the first to employ such an ex libris, crafted in, admittedly, pedantic 
Greek.31 Giustiniani likely knew the proverb that Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, among others, cited 
and that, in 1508, Erasmus awarded the honor of first place among his Adages: “all possessions are 
common to friends.”32 Erasmus appreciated that adages constituted the ideal medium for his 
cherished message of a common intellectual patrimony, both classical and Christian. The adage is a 
literary form that, by nature, can never be private property. 
                                                 
29  [27], pp. 99–111. Bertalot drafted but never sent a letter to Helmut Boese in Berlin, in which he revealed 
the location of the second piece. At about the same time that Jaitner-Hahner found Bertalot’s notes, she 
received an inquiry from the University librarian in Frankfurt about incipits in cod. Lat. octavo 136. Prior 
to the publication of the Iter, vol. 3, Jaitner-Hahner informed Kristeller of her discovery so that he could 
include the information there. 
30  In general, see [34], pp. 87–99. For Fonzio’s formula, “Bartholomaei Fontii et amicorum,” see Caroti 
and Zamponi, 30. Caroti and Zamponi note that Poliziano and Fonzio’s heir, Francesco Pandolfini, used 
a similar formula. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, cod. Sussidio H 52, belonged to Melzi (“Iste liber est 
mei Iohannis Meltii et amicorum”). Ambrosiana Sussidio H 52 is a composite codex dating from the 
mid-fifteenth century, has at least two hands, later entered the library of Count Donato Silva 
(1690–1779) and was purchased by the Ambrosiana from the bookseller Vergani. Melzi was a doctor of 
law and wealthy Sforza courtier, who wrote on ethics and Christian morality. We may know the name of 
one of Melzi’s friends, Giovanni dei Pescatori, who left a borrower’s note in Melzi’s humanist 
miscellany. Apparently, Pescatori had more than one friend who owned manuscripts since other codices 
bear that same borrower’s note written in vernacular dialect. See [1], 1, 347b-48a; [36], pp. 4–5;  
and [37], pp. 229–31, 234, 245–52. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 2936, 
has a bilingual possessor’s note on fol. 1, indicating that the book belonged to Archangelus and his 
friends (“Hic liber est Archangeli  	 
	”). The Vatican codex was written by two hands in the 
first half of the fifteenth century. See [1], 2, p. 357b; [29], 1, p. 202 (no. 2783); and [38], 2, pp. 315–16. 
It has form letters and orations of Antonius de Pizzinis Padovenis and a speech of Antonio Carabello  
(d. after 1436), who taught rhetoric at the University of Padua from 1434–36. On Carabello, see [39],  
pp. 470–74; and [40], 19, pp. 300–1. 
31  [34], p. 93, cites Giustiniani’s bilingual motto: “   Leonardi Iustiniani veneti 	    
	 
	 .” 
32  [34], pp. 93–94; and [41], pp. 4–5, 25–32, 67–68, 76–77, 81–108, 122–30, 138–41, 144–45, 148–52, 
164, 168. For Adagiorum chiliades 1.1.1, see [42], pp. 84–86; English translation, [43], pp. 29–30. 
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Because Kristeller saw the Iter Italicum as a consciously collective enterprise, he dedicated the 
book to the librarians of Italy and the rest of the world. His characterization of the volumes as a 
“cooperative enterprise” was not false modesty. Kristeller did quote a remark that his friend Robert 
Branner made, to the effect that Kristeller’s research team consisted mainly of his right and left 
arms ([1], 1, p. xxv; 3, pp. xviii-xix). Though Kristeller granted that the cataloging demanded 
persistence on his own part, he wanted the volumes to foster a shift from the individual adventure 
of scholarly research to collaboration on a broader scale. He therefore exhaustively acknowledged 
the assistance he received from scholars and institutions and granting agencies and, of course, 
librarians. Kristeller’s emphasis on cooperation explains his dismay for a lack of solidarity among 
a minority of persons with whom he dealt. In the preface to volume 6, Kristeller revealed that 
“there were a few librarians who failed to cooperate, and I prefer not to mention them” ([1], 1,  
p. xxii). In addition, some private individuals who owned manuscripts permitted Kristeller to see 
them but would not allow him to reveal their location. In a choice that would please More and 
Erasmus, Kristeller put those manuscripts in Utopia. 
Scholars of any era might readily give the award for “Exemplary Manuscript Collector” to 
Christopher Columbus’s illegitimate son, Hernando Colón (1488–1539). Generally, when Colón 
bought a book–and he bought many–he recorded the date and place of purchase, the costs to him in 
the local currency and the date(s) on which he consulted the book thereafter [44]. The award for 
“Avid Manuscript Collector” should go, perhaps, to the Venetian Emmanuele Antonio Cicogna 
(1789–1868), who saved as many as 5,000 manuscripts from ruin. While hunting for the surviving 
portions of the library of the librettist Lorenzo Antonio da Ponte (1749–1838), Cicogna tracked 
down an autograph manuscript of Camillo Contarini (1644–1722) that he purchased from a cheese 
and butter vendor and a thick bundle of Arsenal papers from a delicatessen owner. It was not that 
there was a sudden burst of interest among grocers in Venice for early modern texts. Rather, the 
enterprising shopkeepers had discovered that old parchment leaves comprised a sturdy wrapping 
for food items. In fact, stacks of parchment sold for 6 soldi a pound.33 Imagine your due etti of 
prosciutto from San Daniele wrapped in a public letter of Leonardo Bruni. 
Perhaps the best clue for contextualizing a Renaissance manuscript comes by pinning down its 
original owner. Though luxury illuminated codices make for successful exhibits, the majority of 
Renaissance codices are the working miscellanies of students of letters. When we follow the books 
of the students of Giovanni Lamola (ca. 1405–49), a product himself of an excellent rhetorical 
education, we appreciate better that foreigners studying in Italy and books copied for them diffused 
humanism to other parts of Europe, especially the Rhine and Danube regions of the German 
Empire. Lamola had several humanist mentors, including Gasparino Barzizza, Vittorino da Feltre, 
Francesco Filelfo and Guarino. His life unwound in pendular fashion: he moved away from his 
hometown of Bologna to pursue pedagogical opportunities elsewhere only to move back after a 
time and resume his lecturing at the Studium. Late in 1447 and early in 1448, while Lamola was at 
Bologna and not long before he died, he taught the humanities to a small but influential group of 
                                                 
33  [7], pp. 327, 343. For the Da Ponte codices formerly owned by Leopold von Ranke and now at  
Syracuse University, see [45], pp. xi-xiii, 1–109 (codices 2, 3, 7, 15, 20, 47, 50, 63, 65, 70, 72, 73, 76, 
81, 83, 104). 
30 
German students, who then transmitted humanist culture to their native cities. 
Johann Roth (1426–1506) fondly remembered Lamola as praeceptor meus after studying at 
Bologna in the 1440s, and the future prince-bishop first developed his lifelong interest in the 
humanities at Lamola’s lectures ([46], pp. 351–53, 363; [47], pp. 403–405; [48], pp. 415–18).  
Hans Pirckheimer (ca. 1415–92) studied with Lamola, attributed his love for humanism to Lamola 
and began assembling at Bologna under Lamola’s tutelage the massive compilation of texts in 
British Library codex Arundel 70.34 Iohannes Heller (ca. 1414–1475/8) met Lamola in Bologna 
and put together his own compendia of epistolary, poetic and rhetorical models, now München 
Universitätsbibliothek Quarto 768 (terminus ante quem of 1452 and likely finished in Italy in 1450) 
and München Staatsbibliothek Clm 6721 (modeled on the former).35 Hermann Schedel (1410–85) 
made one of Heller’s compendia (Universitätsbibliothek Quarto 768) the nucleus of his own, now 
München Staatsbibliothek Clm 504, and Schedel then added in his hand the writings of Lamola and 
other authors active at Bologna at mid-century (Niccolò Perotti, Nicolò Volpe, Battista da San 
Pietro). Among the texts added, Schedel chose to include Lamola’s panegyric for Jerome delivered 
in 1442.36 Humanist miscellanies resist rigorous taxonomy. Some of the texts copied into them 
perforce reflect serendipity, put there to demonstrate the acquired skills of the redactor himself or 
reflect that redactor’s peculiar interests. However, a core of the works consistently included in 
multiple codices may well represent a sort of evolving textbook of rhetorical pedagogy that traces 
its roots to the teaching of Barzizza and Guarino and early included speeches of Leonardo 
Giustiniani, Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini. 
For example, after studying in Italy for fourteen years, Albrecht von Eyb (1420–75) put together 
a compendium of model texts that quickly found its way into print. By 1459, von Eyb had 
completed a first redaction of his Margarita poetica, whose title has likely misled some scholars. 
He originally went to Italy to study law under Catone Sacco (1394/7–1463) at the University of 
Pavia. When Sacco moved from Pavia to Bologna, von Eyb followed him. In Bologna, von Eyb 
met Lamola and joined the little circle that included Pirckheimer and Heller. The fruits of von 
Eyb’s encounter with Italian humanism appear in the Margarita poetica, which Gianni Zippel has 
characterized as a manual of rhetoric whose model speeches were all fifteenth-century 
compositions, except for one sermon by Jerome. Among the contemporary speeches, von Eyb, like 
Schedel, chose to include Lamola’s panegyric of Jerome.37 So, Italian humanists of the Barzizza 
                                                 
34  [49], pp. 104, 113–14, 236–38 (Lamola’s letter to Pirckheimer from late 1448); and [50], 7, pp. 701–2. 
The grandson of Hans, Willibald Pirckheimer (1475–1530), had Albrecht Dürer design a bookplate for 
him with the inscription “Sibi et amicis”; see [34], pp. 97–98. 
35  [51], 1, pp. 1–75; and [52], pp. 75–76. Belloni questions whether the Iohannes adolescens whom Lamola 
mentions in his letter to Pirckheimer was Heller, given that Heller was ca. 34 years old at the time and 
had earned degrees in arts and in civil and canon law. I concur with scholars who believe that Lamola does 
refer to Heller. Lamola might be using adolescens in a Roman sense or as a way to tease the older Heller. 
36  [53], p. 370; [54], pp. 411–19, 439–58; and [55], pp. 5–7. München, Staatsbibliothek, cod. Clm 504 has 
at least seven orations by Lamola. On humanist pedagogy at Bologna in the second half of the fifteenth 
century, see also [56], pp. 209–10, 216–19. 
37  [53], pp. 378–79; and [57], 1, pp. 182–83, who notes the presence of the autograph in Eichstätt, 
Staatsbibliothek, cod. 633. Sottili remarks that, in the Margarita, von Eyb also acknowledged the impact 
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and Guarino schools taught eloquence based upon contemporary models, and Jerome afforded a 
measure of sacral protection for their rhetorical pedagogy. The sermon of Jerome that von Eyb 
chose to include is an apology for the value of rhetoric for believers. Though Jerome acknowledges 
in the sermon that one can proclaim the Christian Gospel effectively without any formal rhetorical 
training, he proposes that, by using rhetorical skills, one will evangelize in a way that deepens the 
impact of the message and causes it to take lasting root in the hearts of believers. 
Thanks to Albrecht von Eyb, Giovanni Lamola, Pierpaolo Vergerio and other humanists, we 
have acquired a sense of the importance of Jerome as the patron saint of humanist rhetoricians.  
A remote echo of that Renaissance cult may have led Charles William Dyson Perrins (1864–1958) 
to invest the profits from his manufacture of Worcestershire sauce in a luxury Quattrocento Jerome 
codex. The codex illustrates that every manuscript book has its own personal history hinted at by 
clues left therein.38 This particular codex has a collection of Jerome’s letters that the scribe 
Giovanni Grasso di Carpi completed copying in Ferrara on 28 February 1467. No expense was 
spared: Jerome’s letters are written on parchment in an antiqua characterized by its small corpus 
and long descenders. The first folio has an interlacing white vine border on red, blue, green and 
gold background. Key elements like the bordering of green leaves along the bottom and right side 
of that folio are edged in gold ([60], 1, pp. 179–82 and 2, plate 73; [61], 3, pp. 57–61). 
In the midst of a wreath of green leaves, the illuminator of the manuscript placed a coat of arms 
featuring a lion rampant, which leads to a first question: whose coat of arms is it? Sir George 
Warner suggests two possibilities: the Acciaiuoli family or the family of Grasso himself. If the coat 
of arms belongs to the Acciaiuoli family–and Warner sees a clear resemblance to the Acciaiuoli 
arms–then why did Grasso sell the manuscript to someone else two years after he had finished it? 
Logically, it would go to the Acciaiuoli as commissioners. So Warner feels more inclined to 
attribute the coat of arms to the Grasso family because their shield also featured a lion rampant. 
The two-year lag in sale may also be indicative: the Acciaiuoli may have turned down the 
completed work and it took Grasso a while to sell a book decorated with their coat of arms,  
or perhaps, after a time, he decided to turn his labor to profit and could only sell a codex with his 
own family shield to an eager collector like Battista Panetti (ca. 1439–97). 
Mystery 2: why did the notary son of a family with a coat of arms choose to earn a living 
copying luxury manuscripts? We do know that Giovanni Grasso copied other codices: Ovid’s Fasti 
in 1460, Horace and Propertius in 1461, Virgil in 1464, Guarino’s translation of Strabo in 1470  
and a collection of humanist poetry in the codex Bevilacqua (Est. lat. 1080) ([60]; [61]; [62],  
p. 128; [1], 1, pp. 383b–84a, and 4, pp. 180b–81a). We also know a good deal about the copying of 
the Jerome manuscript thanks to Grasso’s subscription. He finished his work in the home of 
Niccolò da Campo, he paid homage to the duke of Ferrara, Borso d’Este (1413–71), he offered an 
invocation to Jesus, Mary, Saints George and Maurelius (patrons of Ferrara) and Saints Jerome and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
of lectures on rhetoric he attended at the University of Pavia; see [58], p. 131. For von Eyb’s thinking on 
women and whether a man should marry, see [59], pp. 734–49. 
38  [32], p. 3: “The bibliographer’s ideal would be to compel each and every volume to tell its own history; 
the clues by which this goal may in many cases be attained would not displease the mind of the modern 
reader of mystery-fiction, and the brain of an ideal bibliographer, tracing the pedigree of a manuscript, 
works not infrequently in the same grooves as the ideal detective of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.” 
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Peter Martyr (patrons of Giovanni) and he ended with a prayer that his heavenly patrons guide him 
on the path of good (iter bonum!), defend his soul from the attack of the ancient enemy and his 
body from a deceitful tongue or a royal assault.39 Giovanni Grasso therefore had a personal 
devotion to Jerome, whose works he copied, flattered the d’Este rulers of Ferrara, where he lived, 
and abused the hospitality of friends, whose study he littered with spilled ink and torn parchment. 
Mystery 3: what king would care enough about a scribe working in the home of Niccolò da Campo 
to attack him there? Mitto in silentium. 
Evidence establishes that, once Giovanni had finished copying the letters, it took him almost 
two years to sell the codex. Text on the flyleaf mentions a cashier’s note (nota de cassa) from  
17 February 1469 recorded in an Argenti bank register, likely bound in red. The evidence indicates 
that Battista Panetti had three days earlier paid Michele Argenti for the purchase of the Jerome 
codex copied by Grasso and for a Suetonius codex copied by another scribe. Anton von Euw and 
Joachim Plotzek suggest the possibility that Grasso used his finished codices to obtain financing 
from the Argenti bank for his copying business and would then deposit a completed codex with the 
bank, which handled the sale as payment on the loans ([61], 3, p. 60). Panetti, in turn, was a Carmelite 
friar and avid book collector, and the codex records the day of his death, 27 March 1497 ([63],  
pp. 183–228). The codex remained in the possession of the Carmelite friars at the convent of San 
Paolo in Ferrara where Francesco Antonio Zaccaria (1714–95) saw it in 1757 during his “iter 
italicum” and mentioned it in print five years later. 
In 1810, according to a possessor’s note on the first flyleaf, the codex had passed into the hands 
of Francesco Mainardi in Ferrara. The next notice of the codex is found in the General Catalogue 
of books offered for sale by Bernard Alexander Christian Quaritch (1818–99) in London in 1868. 
To maximize the market value of the manuscript, Quaritch made the dubious claim that “[i]t may 
be remarked that this voluminous and interesting correspondence of St. Jerome is of very unusual 
occurrence in Manuscript.”40 The book was auctioned by Sotheby’s in 1877 where an unnamed 
Austro-Hungarian nobleman purchased it. The connoisseur-artist Charles Fairfax Murray 
(1849–1919) bought the book in 1900, probably for its illumination. Dyson Perrins then dipped 
into his Worcestershire sauce profits and bought the codex from Fairfax Murray in 1906. Sotheby’s 
auctioned the manuscript a second time in 1959 when Arthur Rau (1898–1972), an English rare 
book dealer operating from Paris, bought it. The codex ultimately retained its appeal to manufacturers 
of foodstuffs since the chocolatiers, Peter Ludwig (1925–96), and his wife Irene (1972–2010) 
purchased the book and kept it for a time in Cologne. In 1983, the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los 
Angeles purchased at Sotheby’s the entire lot of 144 illuminated manuscripts in the Ludwig 
Collection. In our age of indiscretion, of course, there is also a rumored price for the sale, a price 
befitting the Getty of forty million dollars.41 
The final clues worth mentioning are those related to a question that Kristeller posed in his 
introduction to the fourth volume of his Iter: to what were the persons who wrote or collected the 
manuscripts committed ([1], 4, p. xxiii)? Among craftsmen who either copied manuscript books or 
                                                 
39  The phrase “deceitful tongue” (lingua dolosa) occurs in Psalm 120:2 (Vulg. Ps. 119:2). 
40  [64], p. 7 (no. 36). See also [32], pp. 158–68. 
41  [65], p. 246. The expression “age of indiscretion” was coined by Bettini [66]. 
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produced portolan charts, there is an admirable group who preferred to hide their identity and let 
the text or chart speak for itself. They did, at times, supply a clue: their initials. In one subscription, 
the scribe M. C. actually gave voice to Bruni’s translation of Xenophon: “Thus ends Xenophon’s 
book On Tyranny, and M. C. wrote me, whom Leonardo of Arezzo translated from the Greek 
language into Latin.”42 The portolan chartmaker, Jacopo Maggiolo (d. ca. 1605), seems an early 
exponent of “the art of making the best of a difficult situation” (l’arte di arrangiarsi). After a fertile 
career producing charts from 1551 until 1573, Maggiolo gave no further signs of activity at Genoa 
until 1602. Out of nowhere, Jacopo reappeared that year and made a portolan chart conserved 
today in Milan. Corradino Astengo got on the case and noticed signs of scraping by a razor blade 
on the parchment below the date “1602.” Astengo’s deduction: Maggiolo may have pulled an old 
chart off a storage shelf in 1602 and quickly updated it by falsifying the year of its manufacture. If 
Maggiolo—or a subordinate at his request—did counterfeit the chart, he had a motive. Even though 
Maggiolo was likely old and infirm in 1602, he proved to the government of Genoa that he could 
still produce a chart as good as the ones he had made thirty years earlier. And if that was his ruse, it 
worked. The government continued to pay Maggiolo a salary until 1605 ([68], pp. 83–84). 
Numerous members of the Renaissance clergy either wrote works or owned books. For some 
reason, this detective feels drawn to search for the clues that might indicate to what those 
clergymen were committed. A priest like Tommaso Baldinotti (1451–1511) in Florence focused  
on the quality of his handwriting and not the quality of his life. He wrote vernacular and Latin  
elegies in a clear humanist cursive hand, but he was hardly a moral paragon, engaging in bawdy 
discussions and amorous liaisons ([1], 2, p. 110a–b; [69], 5, pp. 493–95). A bishop like Pierre de 
Versailles (1380?–1446) seemed focused on using his noble and clerical status to pile up 
prestigious and remunerative benefices. Pierre accumulated those benefices as apparent rewards for 
services rendered but did little or nothing to provide pastoral assistance to his various flocks. While 
at the Council of Basel, Pierre was accused of backing Pope Eugene IV in order to become a 
cardinal. Eugene did trust Pierre sufficiently to make him part of an embassy to Constantinople 
from 1437–38, where Pierre gave public speeches and negotiated for a Council under papal 
patronage to reunite Catholic and Orthodox churches. Having outmaneuvered a parallel delegation 
from Basel, Pierre accompanied the Greek representatives on their journey to the West. As a 
proven supporter of papal monarchy and papal ambassador to Charles VII of France, Pierre won 
appointment to the bishopric of Meaux in 1439. Someone with noble roots in Versailles seems 
fated for attraction to the most powerful courts of the day. In addition to the discourses in 
Constantinople, Pierre preached on important occasions at the Council of Basel, including Jerome’s 
feast day. Enea Silvio Piccolomini characterized his preaching as having “more chutzpah than 
eloquence.” On another occasion, Pierre was said to have rushed into the midst of a meeting of the 
Council and stirred up “many animated altercations,” suggesting the unseemly possibility of 
fisticuffs between assembled Church dignitaries.43 One cannot help but wonder if the choice to 
have Pierre preach on Jerome was subconscious typecasting. 
                                                 
42  Udine, Biblioteca Arcivescovile, cod. 49, fol. 49, cited by [67], p. 120: “Explicit liber Xenophontis de 
tyrannide et M. C. me scripsit quem Leonardus Aretinus ex greco sermone in latinum convertit.” 
43  [70], pp. 208–66, esp. p. 230, where Coville quotes Piccolomini’s letter of 20 May 1437, “... plus animi 
habens quam eloquentiae.” [70], p. 265, sees Pierre’s commitment similarly: “Il dut être plutôt 
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Other clergymen balance the picture. Bishop Bernhard von Krayburg (1412–77) gathered a 
large and important library at his castle in Chiemsee (Salzburg). He was instrumental, for example, 
as a conduit for Bruni’s letters to Germany, and he also owned codices with the marrow of 
Petrarch’s humanist ideas. From that intersection between humanist and religious cultures, von 
Krayburg developed a personal affection for letters, a profound sense of spirituality and a firm 
commitment to reform the lives of his clergy ([71], p. 95; [38], 1, p. xxxiii). The efforts to study 
classical languages, collect books and reform the clergy that bishops like Bernard von Krayburg 
and Johann Roth made helped to reshape the ideal of episcopal sanctity in German-speaking  
lands ([55], p. 17; [47], pp. 397–98; [72], pp. 43–48). Battista Panetti, the Carmelite professor of 
theology who owned the Jerome codex that Dyson Perrins later acquired, collected humanist 
works, copied ancient inscriptions and probably learned Greek. While working in the scriptorium 
of his convent of San Paolo in Ferrara, Panetti developed his respect for books and his desire to 
protect them as valuable witnesses to the past. In building his collection, the Carmelite would 
gather individual fascicles, organize them in chronological order, bind them together, add a Latin 
epigram on the flyleaf and supply at least a partial table of contents for the new composite volume. 
Panetti’s embrace of humanism led him to assume a public commitment as well, functioning as a 
secret counselor to Duke Ercole I (1431–1505), entering friendships with leading humanists like 
the Duke’s orator, Ludovico Carbone (1435–82), and even giving an occasional speech himself. 
The tolerance of his book collecting is mirrored at least once in the tolerance of his public 
advocacy. When the local Dominican inquisitor, Paolo da Bologna, condemned a scholar to 
burning at the stake for a mistaken interpretation of Scotus, Panetti decried the unjust verdict ([73], 
p. 310; [62], pp. 183–92). 
There are also practitioners of classical philology and humanist rhetoric who later took a serious 
interest in Scriptural study. Agostino Dati (1421–78) accepted an appointment by his bishop to 
lecture on the Scriptures in Siena, and Bartolomeo Fonzio (Della Fonte, 1446–1513) came out of 
retirement in part to do the same at the University of Florence. There may be manuscript books 
somewhere in the Iter that offer clues as to what those two learned humanists said in their lectures 
on sacred letters ([75]; [35], pp. 60–68; [76], pp. 810–13). But the choices speak for themselves, as 
do Panetti’s tolerant choices in collecting books and decrying injustice. Tolerance, moreover, 
seems an appropriate note on which to end a discussion of Renaissance manuscripts as private 
property or common wealth. In the introduction to a translation of Vitruvius, Frank Granger 
observed that Vipsanius Agrippa (ca. 63–12 BCE) by his geography and Asinius Pollio (76 BCE-4 
CE) by his library helped expand the horizons of literate Romans of the age of Augustus. Granger’s 
characterization of the contribution of Asinius Pollio seems germane to this paper, for Granger 
follows Pliny and others in arguing that, because Asinius Pollio assembled the literature and 
science of the time in the first public library at Rome, he “made human genius a common 
possession (res publica)” ([76], p. xvii, citing Pliny N.H. 35.2.10; [77], pp. 244–45). Such an 
endeavor is shot through with tolerance, in the works collected and in the accessibility granted.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
ambitieux: il eut de nombreux benefices....” The “Sermo” for Jerome that Pierre de Versailles delivered 
at Basel in 1435 was conserved in cod. 118, fols. 330v-37v, of the Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek  
in Kaliningrad (Königsberg) but is now lost; see [1], 5, p. 167a–b. 
35 
Even a cursory journey through the vast resources of Kristeller’s six volumes sensitizes one to 
the relevance of the tension between books as private property and books as common wealth. 
Abuse of borrowing privileges from a public library goes on. College professors, myself included, 
may scruple at times about our ability to withdraw a book for an entire semester or academic year, 
especially when we compare the amount of time we consult the book to the amount of time it sits 
idle on our bookshelf where it is unavailable to others. A public ethos might lead us to keep the 
book out of the library for the minimum amount of time. European libraries have long worked to 
develop other creditable solutions, from chaining their books to a reading stand in the Renaissance 
to creating in our own day authentic research libraries where books never leave the premises. 
Individuals still exploit their social prestige to gain special access to valuable books, and 
individuals still steal valuable books and sell them on open and black markets. Manuscript books 
are a marketable commodity, and the marketing of Renaissance manuscripts runs the capitalist 
gamut from crass speculation to responsible entrepreneurship. At its worst, it represents a violation of 
the public trust twice over: the theft of a book in the first place and the sale of the stolen book in 
the second. Moreover, in an effort to acquire resources of use to the public, institutions and 
libraries have had a difficult time resisting the temptation to deal with disreputable sellers. 
There are various ways to measure the value of a manuscript. As a container for words and the 
thought that they express, books are material objects put together from bundles of parchment or 
paper and bound together inside a variety of covers. Some collectors have bought manuscripts 
solely for the quality of their material production. Such manuscripts become luxury items akin to a 
Rolex watch. One can tell the time with a far less expensive Timex watch, and, to the delight of 
John Cameron Swayze (1906–95), the Timex may well be “still ticking.” Most surviving manuscripts 
from the Renaissance, however, originated in the study of the humanities, a curriculum that 
revolutionized adolescent education and held sway for centuries in the Western world. Their value 
was not calculated in terms of cost of production and profit from resale, but in terms of assembly of 
contents and assistance to an education that, thanks to that compendium of texts, should last a 
lifetime. A student who owned such a manuscript book could always consult its particular texts 
whenever professional or personal needs so dictated. When one student shared his compendium 
with another, the educational fruits were multiplied and humanist culture more widely diffused. 
Magnanimous scholars did not hesitate to label a manuscript the common property of themselves 
and their friends. Treating a manuscript as a common wealth fostered a sense of human genius as a 
common possession and a concomitant spirit of tolerance. A good adage, no matter what its source, 
was applicable to the experience of all human beings, and genuine human insight, even by pagan 
authors, had appropriate application to the good and holy living of Christians. Committed bishops 
who had learned the humanities promoted moral reform. 
Given such interrelationships, it was vital that a scribe accurately copy texts into the manuscript. 
Alcuin of York (d. 804) composed a poem that he affixed as an inscription (titulus) in a monastic 
scriptorium to remind copyists of the importance of what they were doing and the accuracy with 
which they did it. For the Carolingian monk, copying books supplied a more valuable service than 
pruning vines, for, while the latter assisted only the physical appetite, the former served the human 
36 
spirit.44 Nonetheless, and ironically, some of the most valuable Renaissance manuscripts from  
a material perspective are among the least valuable from a textual perspective. Perhaps more 
ironically, sloppy copying did not always reduce the value of the manuscript in the eyes of 
prestigious owners, leading one to wonder if they ever read the texts in the book. Ultimately,  
the history of each individual Renaissance manuscript illustrates the tension between private 
property and common wealth, for the book regularly moved from private to public ownership and 
back again. Battista Panetti made the Jerome text copied by Giovanni Grasso available to the 
Carmelite friars of his convent in Ferrara and, presumably, to learned visitors to that convent. After 
all, friars take a vow to hold all property in common. Charles William Dyson Perrins limited the 
circulation of the codex after he had purchased it to enhance his collection of illuminated 
manuscripts. The Getty Research Center, thanks to its vast resources, was once again able to make 
the codex available for wider consultation. Throughout its journey, the manuscript remained a 
container for the words and thought of human intelligence. For that reason, we too provide a 
service to the human spirit when we join Pliny in lionizing Asinius Pollio for establishing a public 
library in Rome. We thereby acknowledge human genius as our common wealth. 
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Abstract: This article investigates the genesis of a linguistic model occasioned by a 
mistranslation that was taken up in the Renaissance, and had an enduring global impact. 
I call this model the “black but…” formulation, and it is to be found in the fifteenth, 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries throughout written texts and reported speech, in 
historical as well as literary works. It was modeled grammatically and ideologically on 
the statement “I am black but beautiful” often attributed to the Queen of Sheba in 1:5 of 
the “Song of Songs”, and had a detrimental effect on how members of the early African 
forced diaspora were viewed by Renaissance Europeans. I argue that the newly 
adversarial nature of the phrase was adopted as a linguistic and cultural formulation, 
and introduced into Western European cultures a whole way of approaching and 
perceiving blackness or looking at black African people. 
Keywords: Black; linguistic formulation; Renaissance; slave; “Song of Songs” 
 
This article investigates the genesis and adoption in Renaissance Europe of a linguistic model 
that was to have an enduring global impact. The adoption of this model, first in Latin, and then in 
the major European vernacular languages, had a detrimental effect on how sub-Saharan Africans 
were viewed in the period 1440–1650, enshrining negative expectations about what black skin 
signified.45 In the article, I examine what I am calling the “black but…” formulation, which is to 
                                                 
45  From the 1440s onwards, Europeans captured or purchased people from West Africa, and brought  
them to Europe as slaves [1]. For further information, see the collected volume by Earle and Lowe.  
My usual disclaimer applies: I am using the phrases “black” and “white,” and “black Africans” and 
“white Europeans,” as constructs. For a sense of the wide range of ways in which black Africans were 
categorised after they arrived in Europe, see [2]. 
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be found in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries throughout written texts and reported 
speech, historical as well as literary works. It must have been modelled grammatically and 
ideologically on a statement often attributed to the Queen of Sheba in 1:5 of the Biblical book 
called the Song of Songs, the Song of Solomon or the Canticle of Canticles (also known by its 
Latin name as the Cantica Canticorum) in the Old Testament of the Bible.46 The Song of Songs is 
a collection of intense love lyrics between a man and a woman, resembling those found in ancient 
Egyptian collections. The propriety of including the Song of Songs in the Bible was questioned 
from the start (and there has been more fuss in the last century) but it has been accepted as 
canonical by both Jews and Christians. There have also been many different theories about how the 
Song of Songs should be interpreted: is it allegorical (the Lord’s love for Israel or Christ’s love  
for his Church), dramatic (the shepherd’s courtship of the Shulammite maid), literal-historical  
(a celebration of human love or a repertoire for weddings), cultic or ritualistic or finally parabolic 
or typological in terms of certain topics of Israelite theology ([4], p. 209)?  
The relevant statement was translated from Hebrew into Latin as “Nigra sum sed formosa”  
(I am black but beautiful [my italics])47 whereas, in fact, this is a mistranslation from the Hebrew, 
and the translation should read: “Nigra sum et formosa” (I am black and beautiful [my italics]).48 
The relevant Hebrew word here is  (vav), which has a slightly larger range than “and,” but 
effectively in this context does just mean “and.” So one word has been changed here, with the 
result that the whole meaning of the phrase has been utterly altered; instead of the descriptive or 
factual “I am black and beautiful,” the Queen of Sheba is made to justify or explain her beauty, as 
though a black skin were in itself a barrier to beauty. What I am going to argue is that not only has 
the whole meaning of this phrase been changed, but that the newly adversarial nature of the phrase 
was adopted as a linguistic and cultural formulation. This act of mistranslation introduced into 
Western Europe cultures a conveniently fixed, but pejorative way of approaching and perceiving 
blackness, and of looking at black people, which effectively enshrined an acceptance of low 
expectations in relation to the attributes and capabilities of sub-Saharan Africans.  
In order to understand the context, it is necessary to investigate in a very summary fashion the 
critical area of biblical translation up to the advent of printing in the fifteenth century, focusing on 
translations of this particular verse from the Song of Songs. The Hebrew Bible has the neutral word 
 which is best translated here by “and.” The Septuagint, which is often abbreviated by the Roman 
numerals LXX, is the Greek translation of the Old Testament; the translation of the Song of Songs 
is usually assumed to have been completed by 100 BC, probably in Alexandria. It is generally 
agreed by Old Testament scholars that the translation aimed to be as literal as possible, prioritising 
the sacrality of the original over fluency or clear understanding ([7], p. 20). The Septuagint has the 
Greek word  (meaning “and” in both classical and patristic Greek, with a larger range in 
classical Greek) in 1:5 ([8], 2, p. 261). I should like to stress again that the semantic range of both  
                                                 
46  On pre-Renaissance interpretations of blackness in relation to the Song of Songs, see [3], pp. 16–22. 
47  ([5], 9, p. 180): “nigra sum sed formonsa [sic].” 
48  For another mistranslation in the Song of Songs relating to skin colour, see [6], p. 20. Braude suggests 
that in the same verse the Hebrew word  (shahor), meaning “black and burnt,” had been incorrectly 
interpreted by ancient Greek, Latin and vernacular translators to be a permanent rather than a temporary 
black skin; he posits that this might have been “an innocent scribal error.” 
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and  is larger than “and,” and both could in certain cases mean other things, but they could not 
mean “but.” So the straightforward meaning of this verse in the Hebrew Bible and the Greek 
Septuagint is clear: “I am black and beautiful.” 
However, the Vulgate, that is the Latin translation of the Bible made by Jerome in the fourth 
century AD, instituted the use of the Latin word sed meaning “but” into the Song of Songs, 1:5. 
Jerome translated the Song of Songs over a few days in 398 AD. There had been previous Latin 
translations of the Bible (known collectively as the Vetus Latina), taken from the Greek Septuagint 
rather than from the Hebrew original, but they had been “piecemeal, inelegant and sometimes 
unreliable” ([9], p. 790). Jerome spent twenty years overall on his version, which was finished in  
405 AD. For his translation of the Old Testament, he went back to the original Hebrew and 
Aramaic, and his proclaimed purpose was to render the sense of a passage rather than to provide a 
literal rendition of the words. Assuming that Jerome’s knowledge of Hebrew was sufficiently good 
for him not to have mistaken the range of the word , for him there must have been an opposition 
between “black” and “beautiful,” so he rendered the phrase: “I am black but beautiful,” and the 
“black but …” formulation entered the Western European repertoire.  
There is one additional point I should like to make here. Before Jerome made his new 
translation direct from the Hebrew, he had also revised the translation of the Song of Songs of the 
Vetus Latina, on the basis of the Greek text. This Latin translation survives in complete form in 
only one manuscript, although according to Peter Dronke “it was also widely known through 
quotations and through its use in the liturgical office and mass of the Virgin Mary” ([9], p. 236).  
In this earlier translation, Jerome rendered the relevant part of Song of Songs 1:5 into Latin as 
“Fusca sum et formosa” (“I am dark and beautiful” [my italics]), a far cry from his later 
translation, both in implicit and explicit meanings ([10], p. 19). Given that Jerome must have made 
a conscious decision to change the meaning of the verse in two ways—in terms of general aspect or 
skin colour from “dark” to “black,” and in terms of sense from “and” to “but”—and given that it is 
certain he was aware of the choice in front of him, it may be that there is an opportunity here to 
hypothesise and maybe even to reconstruct why and how he moved from one translation to the 
other.49 However, it is notoriously difficult to translate the myriad meanings associated with the 
vocabulary of colour between one period and another, and Jerome may not have intended “black” 
to indicate a black skin rather than a dark one. Whatever his intention, these two changes were to 
be momentous in their consequences for Africans in Renaissance Europe and globally.  
Although this is a gross and rushed simplification of the extremely complicated and nuanced 
history of early biblical translation, for the purposes of this article and my argument it seems clear 
that it was Jerome in the fourth century who set up the opposition or contrast between blackness 
and beauty, and that the reasons for its existence should therefore be sought in his attitudes  
and surroundings.  
It would be difficult to overestimate the influence of the Vulgate, which in the course of the 
Middle Ages became the only Latin translation of the Bible to be used. In the fifteenth and 
                                                 
49  This sort of opportunity is relatively rare, but unfortunately it lies outside the scope of my research. 
Compare [11], p. 148: “Colour terminology is another example of how complex it is to ascertain 
referential and associative meanings and then to convey these into another language.” 
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sixteenth centuries, with the advent of printing, the Vulgate’s canonical status, and belief in the 
“truth” of its message, became ever more fixed. This Latin translation of the Bible (known as the 
Gutenberg Bible after its place of publication) was the first book to be printed in Europe, in late 
1455 or early 1456. So the fact that it contained the words “Nigra sum sed formosa” (I am black 
but beautiful) meant that the adversarial opposition of the two words “black” and “beautiful” was 
sanctioned and further enshrined. Perhaps even more damagingly for sub-Saharan Africans in 
Renaissance Europe, the waves of European vernacular biblical translations unleashed by print all 
followed Jerome’s Vulgate and perpetuated the mistranslation.  
Simultaneously, many of these vernacular translations were seen to codify previously fluid 
languages and to become the carriers and transmitters of those languages. For example, although 
there had been a whole swathe of previous German translations of the Bible, starting with one 
issued by Johann Mentelin at Strasbourg before 27 June 1466, it was Martin Luther’s translation 
that set the mould ([12], p. 46). Not only did it follow the Vulgate in its rendition of the Song of 
Songs 1:5: “Ich bin Schwarz, aber gar lieblich,” but it also became one of the foundational texts of 
the German language, and consequently its grammatical constructions and linguistic turns acquired 
classic status ([13], p. 669). The same set of circumstances can be traced in England.50 There were 
several translations of the Vulgate into English before the King James Version of 1611, which is 
still considered by many Protestants to be the standard version. One of the most famous was by the 
translator and Catholic martyr, William Tyndale, but he was killed before he had translated the 
Song of Songs. The King James Version was translated by six teams of Protestant scholars but it 
has not been possible to find out who exactly of the team translated any particular passage. The 
group that translated the Song of Songs was based in Cambridge, and consisted of Edmund Lively, 
Dr. John Richardson, Dr. Laurence Chaderton, Francis Dillingham,Thomas Harrison, Dr. Roger 
Andrewes, Dr. Robert Spalding and Dr. Andrew Byng ([16,17]). The relevant passage reads 
precisely: “I am black but comely” (comely is a slightly old-fashioned word meaning “pleasant to 
look at”), but the translators (of the King James version) have also added a resumé of the main 
points of the chapter at the top, which reads: “1. The church’s love unto Christ. 5. She confesseth 
her deformity.” The twinning of the concepts of blackness and deformity was normal in some 
circles, but this biblical instance seems not to have been noticed by scholars interested in attitudes 
towards sub-Saharan Africans.51 The team of translators was specifically directed to rely upon five 
earlier English translations whenever there was disagreement, one of which was Tyndale’s. The 
King James Version is hailed as a landmark composition in the English language, and was 
extraordinarily influential. Its effect on the language can be observed in a multitude of other texts. 
For example, the English translation of Song of Songs, 1:5 resurfaces in an obviously related  
but upside-down form in the English translation by Paul Isaiah of Sebastian Münster’s work,  
The Messiah of the Christians and the Jewes, of 1655. In “A Disputation of a Christian with an 
Obstinate Jew,” the Christian says: “For you Jewes have a peculiar colour of face, different  
                                                 
50  Although further investigation has been lacking, it has been noticed that the four major Renaissance 
English translations of the Bible all translated  as “but” ([14], p. 50; [15], p. 111). 
51  For the perceived link between blackness and deformity in Renaissance England, see [18], pp. 94–95. 
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from the form and figure of other men; ... for you are black and uncomely, and not white as  
other men” ([19], pp. 1–2).52  
The history of the translation of the Vulgate into the vernaculars of Southern Europe, and their 
printing, is obviously relevant here. The Vulgate was translated into Italian and appeared in print 
very early on, so (for example) there are several printed editions of the whole Bible in Italian from 
the 1470s.53 Almost immediately, printed Latin translations of individual books, accompanied by 
Italian commentaries, also appeared.54 And while a complete translation of the Bible into Spanish 
did not appear in print until 1569 (even though there had been prior printed translations of the Old 
Testament in Spanish),55 individual books of the Bible, including the Song of Songs, were printed 
in Latin, and commented on in Spanish, in the later fifteenth century ([23], p. 127; [24]) However, 
it is worth noting that there was no translation of the whole Bible—or of a testament—into 
Portuguese in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, although at least one individual book, Ecclesiastes, 
is now known to have been translated, so in the case of Portuguese, the linguistic model must have 
come directly from the Latin Vulgate.56  
In my second section, I should like to turn to fifteenth and sixteenth-century non-biblical usages 
of this formulation in historical and literary works. Although I shall concentrate on vernacular 
examples, the oppositional phrasing that contrasted black skin to positive qualities appeared in 
many Renaissance Latin texts, both manuscript and printed. A good example is provided by the 
pen portrait in 1608 of the Congolese ambassador to Pope Paul V which appears in the manuscript 
diary of Giovanni Paolo Mucanzio, one of two papal masters of ceremonies. Ne-Vunda’s 
description opens with a statement about his skin colour (“black of face and skin”), which is then 
contrasted to a long list of excellent qualities (“but noble and seemly in appearance, and of sober 
habits and of great shrewdness and ability in negotiating ... pious, devout and most committed to 
the Catholic faith.” [my italics])57 The “black but ... formulation” worked by insisting that it was 
noteworthy or exceptional, although not impossible, for a black African to be in possession of these 
character traits.  
The greatest concentration of black Africans in fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe was in 
Portugal, and the “black but ...” formulation appears very frequently in Portuguese. Many of these 
non-biblical usages cluster around notions of civilised and noble behaviour, effectively forcing a 
consideration of how black Africans in the Renaissance could be “gentlemen.” Black could be 
                                                 
52  I should like to thank Eva Johanna Holmberg for this reference. 
53  This includes those translated in 1471 and 1477 by Niccolò Mallermi. In [20], the editor Marino de 
Venezia has glossed the relevant verse: “Son negra quanto a lerrore: ma formosa et bella quanto a la 
verita” (sig. Bi r). See also [21], p. 93. 
54  Song of Songs 1:5 appears in Latin in [22], sig. Av.r with Italian commentary (Av.r-v). See also [21], p. 
101.  
55  Wilson, 127. 
56  Tom Earle discovered a printed copy of Damião de Góis’ translation of the book of Ecclesiastes into 
Portuguese ([25], p. 43). 
57  “Nigra facie et carne sed aspectu nobilis et decorus ac moribus gravis et magnae prudentiae ac 
dexteritatis in negotiando et … pius devotus et Catholicas religionis zelantissimus” ([26], p. 649. On 
Ne-Vunda [27], pp. 120–3). 
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juxtaposed successfully with many other normally “white” qualities. Peter Russell has analysed the 
descriptions in two Portuguese chronicles by Rui de Pina (c. 1450–1522) and João de Barros 
(1496–1570) of the 1488 visit by the Wolof prince of Senegambia known in Portuguese as 
“Bemoim” (elsewhere identified as Jelen, the bumi of Jolof) to King João II in Lisbon; they provide 
an excellent example of how a contradictory response to powerful and important sub-Saharan 
Africans could be couched in terms of the “black but …” formulation ([28], p. 198; [29]). Pina was 
present at Bemoim’s visit; Barros had various sources for it. Pina praised Bemoim’s impressive 
appearance and, rather surprisingly—as he had to speak through an interpreter—his oratory, which 
was considered one of the most fundamental Renaissance skills, thereby signalling that the black 
African prince had passed the test of entry to the Renaissance “club.” In fact, therefore, either 
Bemoim’s speech had been written by a Portuguese secretary or Pina was imagining a speech  
that never happened, a sort of symbolic speech that Bemoim would have given had he been able.  
As part of Pina’s remit was to glorify João’s deeds, especially his African deeds, it was necessary 
for him to invent a sophisticated and cultivated African prince who would in his very person reflect 
João’s glory. But Pina revealed his inner struggle to categorise Bemoim when he wrote that “he did 
not seem a black barbarian but a Greek prince brought up in Athens,” [my italics]58 and I believe 
the word “but” here is crucial, marking the contrast between [bad] black barbarian and [good] 
Greek prince, between blackness and nobility. For Pina, the colour of Bemoim’s skin confusingly 
marked him as a barbarian while his oratorical skill induced classical comparisons. João de Barros 
reworded this sentiment and toned it down somewhat, but the message was similar.59  
There are many other examples. The fifteenth-century Portuguese chronicler, Gomes Eanes de 
Zurara, writing of some “Moors” captured in “Guinea” by Antam Gonçalvez in 1441, declared “for 
though they were black, yet had they souls like the others.”60 Francisco Álvares, in his book of his 
journey to Ethiopia in 1520, The Prester John of the Indies, wrote of someone he met, Frey 
Mazqual: “Inspite of his blackness he was a gentleman,” (“frei Mazqual … o qual em sua pretidão 
era gentil-homem”) which is an opposition (black versus gentlemanly or black versus noble) that is 
quite common ([34], 1, p. 65; [35], 1, p. 13; [18], pp. 104–5). Álvares proceeded to elucidate why 
he believed this man was a gentleman, on the grounds of European behaviour, manner of speaking 
and manner of self-presentation: “he came up to us like a well born man, well educated and 
courteous. This gentleman had a very good led horse and a [handsome] mule on which he came, 
and four men on foot,” that is, he spoke and acted in a gentlemanly fashion, and he owned  
the mounts and was surrounded by the servants that identified someone as a gentleman in  
Europe ([34], 1, p. 65). This list effectively meant that, according to Álvares, the “damage” caused 
by being black could be mitigated by the acquisition of the attributes of European civilisation, 
provided by a European education and observance of the conventions of European status 
indicators. The famous North African Muslim traveller and writer, al-Hasan al-Wazzan, renamed 
Leo Africanus after he was enslaved by pirates, given to Pope Leo X and “converted” to 
Christianity, wrote a description of Africa in the 1520s, which was translated into English by John 
                                                 
58  “Non pareciam de negro bárbaro, mas de príncipe grego criado en Athenas” ([30], p. 92). 
59  Barros remarked that Bemoim appeared not as a “principe barbaro … mas como podia ser hum dos 
senhores da Europa” ([31], fols. 30v–31v). 
60  “Ca pero negros fossem assy tijnham almas come os outros” ([32], 1, p. 55; [33], 7, p. 78). 
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Pory and published in London in 1600 ([36,37]). Here too one can find the “black but …” 
formulation effectively used in conjunction with the notion of being “noble” or a gentleman. Pory’s 
translation of the passage on the town of Cabra in the kingdom of Timbuktu on the Niger read:  
“I my selfe am acquainted with Abu Bacr, sirnamed Pargama, the kings brother, who is blacke in 
colour, but most beautifull in minde and conditions” [my italics] ([38], 3, p. 826). This kind of 
statement can be read as a compliment about someone who has confounded normal expectations by 
overcoming the supposed disadvantage of being black. Black skin, according to this view, did not 
exclude other qualities and characteristics, but possession of a black skin certainly made them more 
worthy of comment ([18], p. 105). 
This comment-worthiness was multiplied many times if the person in question were a slave, and 
therefore of lowly status. So in the anonymous Spanish poem Coplas de como una dama ruega a 
un negro que cante en manera de requiebro (Verses of How a Lady Begs a Black Slave to Sing to 
Her) of c. 1520, the slave Jorge remains “proper” even when the talk turns to sex, forcing the lady 
finally to comment that “though bay in colour, you have white manners” [my italics].61 The word 
used is mohíno (black-faced, bay horse) and a recent editor of the poem, Jeremy Lawrance, 
believes that the lady, even though she wants to have sex with her slave, “cannot bring herself to 
call Jorge black” ([39], p. 92). Here it is clear that there are accepted white standards of behaviour, 
and that when black people attain or even (as here) surpass them, white Europeans often approach 
the topic through the “black but …” formulation. 
Interestingly, some texts carried this further by analysing the degrees of gentlemanly behaviour 
displayed by certain sub-Saharan Africans. In the sixteenth-century work in heroic verse by 
Jernimo Corte-Real, detailing the death of the sea-captain Manuel de Sousa de Sepúlveda in 1552, 
entitled Naufragio e Lastimoso Sucesso da Perdiçam de Manoel de Sousa de Sepulveda, & Dona 
Lianor de Sá sua Molher & Filhos, Vindo da India para este Reyno na Nao Chamada o Galião 
Grande S. Ioão (translated into English as The Tragic History of the Sea), published in Lisbon  
in 1594, the author described the bano of Luranga in Natal as being from “a truly noble family.  
They are the best-natured and most gentlemanly blacks [‘negroes’] in all this land” [40].62  
This Portuguese author appears far more open than many other Europeans, but even he felt the 
need to stress the gentlemanly aspects of these particular Africans because their behaviour was 
considered so unusual. 
It is thus not surprising to find the “black but …” formulation—a formulation starting from a 
negative set of assumptions about black skin and what it signified—being employed in a less 
supportive fashion. The sixteenth-century Franciscan lay brother from Sicily known as Benedetto il 
Moro (c. 1524–89), who was created the first black saint in Europe in 1807, was also boxed in by 
these oppositional terms ([43], p. 299). For instance, in a life of him written in 1623 by a fellow 
Franciscan Antonino di Randaczo, the “black but …” formulation was repeatedly used against 
Benedetto. In one paragraph, Randaczo managed three different permutations and I shall mention 
two of them here. In the first Randaczo wrote: “although they [Benedetto and his parents] were 
black, they were well-fed and of good habits (“di buoni costumi”), good Christians and fearful of 
                                                 
61  “Aunque de color mohíno / la plática tienes blanca” ([39], pp. 75 and 92). 
62  Translated into English in [41], p. 283; also see [42] pp. 229–45. 
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God.” This formulation “although he was/they were black” (“benchè fosse/fossero negri”) is to be 
found everywhere in late fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth-century Italian sources. A few lines 
further on, Benedetto’s father Christofaro is described in almost the same terms as the African 
prince Bemoim: “he was not thought of as a black slave but as any respectable and virtuous 
person” [my italics] ([44], p. 125).63 The concern with status makes itself felt again. All these 
examples show that the writer/hagiographer believed that being black was in general an impediment 
to a whole range of good behaviours and esteem indicators, and that to be black and to earn the 
respect of white Europeans was an enormously difficult task only attainable by an exceptional few. 
Randaczo’s biography is a very informative text, which not only details the many indignities and 
insults Benedetto was forced to endure on account of being black, but also displays clearly the 
prejudices of the author.  
Finally I should like to consider for a while the notion of black Africans and beauty/ugliness. In 
literary texts, the “black but ...” formulation can also be found being applied to notions of beauty, 
that is, in a very close manner to the original Vulgate translation ([45], pp. 1–14). So, for example, 
Gomes Eanes de Zurara could comment on a fourteen-year-old black girl: “she had well formed 
limbs, and even reasonable presence, given that she was from Guinea.” ([32], 2, p. 259).64 Of 
course, the sexual overtones of this remark cannot be discounted, especially from a writer who at 
other points is not neutral in his descriptions of Africans. But the reason I originally became 
interested in the “black but ...” formulation is because of the apparent contradiction in fifteenth and 
sixteenth-century documents and texts between writers who decried and disparaged sub-Saharan 
Africans as “ugly” and those who described them as “beautiful.” I feel I should stress that many 
Africans were singled out on account of their beauty—their physical attraction was noticed and 
commented upon, certainly in Italy, the country I work on and know best. A typical example here 
would be the 1487 description of a black slave in Filippo di Matteo Strozzi’s Neapolitan record 
book: “a little black male slave, about 11 years old, who is as beautiful as it is possible to say.”65 
Once again, the possible sexual overtones of this remark cannot be excluded. But appreciative 
comments were made about black men and women, and boys and girls, in an absolutely 
freestanding manner, outside the negative straightjacket of the “black but …” formulation. On the 
other hand, much more common are references of the following, and now very familiar, sort. D. 
Teodósio, the Duke of Bragança in the mid sixteenth-century, had a black jester and musician 
called Jácome Feio. Feio means ugly, and this type of depreciative nickname was very common for 
Africans in Renaissance Europe. Jácome was described as “black but very witty,” [my italics] as 
though it were unlikely that he would or could be witty if he were black ([47], p. 195, number 540).66 
The aim of this article has been to show how a particular linguistic formulation invented by 
Jerome in the fourth century for his new translation of the Song of Songs 1:5 “I am black but 
                                                 
63  “[N]on era reputato come scavo negro ma come qualsivoglia persona respetata et virtuosa.” 
64  The Portuguese reads: “na qual havia assaz boa postura de membros e, ainda, presença razoável para 
guiné [que era],” [33], 2, p. 495. On Zurara, see [46], pp. 261–5. 
65  Florence, Archivio di stato, Carte Strozziane, serie V, 47, Ricordanze verde HH, fol. 76r: “uno schiavotto 
nero d’anni 11 nel circha, lo quale è bellissimo quanto si possa dire”. I should like to thank Amanda 
Lillie for this reference. 
66  “Este charamela era negro, mas muito discreto.” See also [48], p. 188. 
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beautiful” led in Renaissance Europe to a conceptual framework in which there was a formulaic 
antagonism between blackness and positive qualities. The formulation led to an acceptance of low 
expectations in relation to black people, which translated globally into a recipe for misery. The 
commencement of the slave trade from West Africa which brought tens of thousands of enslaved 
sub-Saharan Africans to Europe in a forced diaspora from the 1440s onwards coincided with the 
advent of the printing press, the Vulgate becoming pre-eminent among printed editions of the 
Bible, and the many new vernacular translations of the Bible which codified European languages in 
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. So at a moment when enslaved sub-Saharan Africans 
were arriving in large numbers in Europe for the first time, Jerome’s formulation on blackness 
seemed to offer the literate a clear linguistic model for simultaneously adverting to the 
disadvantages of being black, and for allowing the possibility that a favoured few black Africans 
could, rather surprisingly, have positive attributes. I hope I have shown some of the myriad ways in 
which white writers across Western Europe fixed upon this formulation and tinkered with it, but 
left clear its essential elements. A solitary act of mistranslation centuries before multiplied in the 
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a linguistic commonplace that made normal an 
antagonism between blackness and the accepted goals of European society (such as nobility or 
beauty), raising the stakes for any black African seeking acceptance or integration. And at a stroke, 
the lives of the vast majority of early diasporic enslaved sub-Saharan Africans were made much 
more complicated and difficult.  
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Abstract: Montaigne rarely repented and he viewed confession—both juridical and 
ecclesiastical—with skepticism. Confession, Montaigne believed, forced a mode of  
self-representation onto the speaker that was inevitably distorting. Repentance, 
moreover, made claims about self-transformation that Montaigne found improbable. 
This article traces these themes in the context of Montaigne’s Essays, with particular 
attention to “On Some Verses of Virgil” and argues that, for Montaigne, a primary 
concern was finding a means of describing a self that he refused to reduce, as had 
Augustine and many other writers before and after him, to the homo interior. 
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Montaigne occupies a salient, even a privileged place in the history of the self. His 
Essays—begun in 1571 and revised almost continuously down to the time of his death in 
1592—constituted, after Augustine’s Confessions, the single most important work of introspection 
prior to Descartes and Rousseau.67 Yet, as a form of self-representation, Montaigne’s work is 
particularly complex. The Essays, after all, lack not only the philosophical rigor found in, say, 
Descartes or Locke; they also lack the narrative form familiar to us in the works of Augustine and 
Rousseau. Montaigne insists that he can only make sense of himself through “essais,” efforts at 
developing a portrait of who he is under his different aspects, in various associations, in fluctuating 
moods. Thus, Montaigne does not organize his Essays, despite their autobiographical patina, 
around a central event. He rejects a narrative and places in its stead what might almost appear to be 
a series of discontinuous fragments, moving us not seamlessly but with some puzzlement from 
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topic to topic: from (to give what appears to be an especially random ordering) “Sumptuary Laws” 
to “Sleep” to “The Battle of Dreux” to “Names” to “The Uncertainty of our Judgment” to  
“War Horses.” And so it is with his life as well. There is no (or little) chronology here, only 
different experiences captured in relation to various subjects that enabled Montaigne to explore 
both the world and himself. The Essays, in short, are self-consciously fragmented—a “bundle of so 
many disparate pieces,” as Montaigne describes them ([5], p. 758; [6], p. 574).68  
But what are we to make of this strange, at times meandering self-representation? Oddly, 
despite the strangeness of the form of the Essays, scholars have tended to read his work as a kind of 
bridge from the medieval to the modern self, finding in Montaigne adumbrations of the bourgeois 
individual. If Augustine desired to make himself known to God, then Montaigne struggled to make 
himself known to man. The eminent literary historian Erich Auerbach, for instance, famously 
characterized the Essays as “the first work of lay introspection” ([1], p. 308). And, if Descartes, 
who read Montaigne with great care, would seek to find a defining internal feature of what made 
him who he was and he located this in the res cogitans—the thing within each of us that doubts  
and thinks—Montaigne appears to gesture towards this sense of interiority with his notion of  
“une forme maistresse.” “There is no one,” Montaigne writes in his essay “Of Repentance,”  
“who, if he listens to himself, does not discover in himself a pattern all his own, a ruling pattern, 
which struggles against education and against the tempest of the passions that oppose it” ([5],  
p. 811; [6], p. 615). Much in Montaigne, therefore, seemingly points towards his role in the shaping 
of modern identities. As the philosopher Charles Taylor has written, “Montaigne served as a 
paradigm figure to illustrate another way in which Augustinian inwardness has entered modern life, 
and he helped to constitute our understanding of the self” ([3], p. 184). 
In this essay I examine Montaigne’s notion of the self not in relation to the forms of identity that 
developed over the following centuries but rather in relation to his own time by attending in 
particular to his deeply ambivalent attitude towards confession. For Montaigne’s view of 
confession stood in stark contrast to the predominant views of both Catholics and Protestants in the 
sixteenth century. In general Montaigne’s contemporaries viewed confession—along with the 
attendant practice of repentance—as capable of effecting a transformation or an amelioration of 
self. Yet throughout the Essays Montaigne pushes back against this view. He veers away from 
confessing in a religious sense; he refuses to repent; above all he does not believe he can change 
himself in some fundamental sense, even as he self-consciously develops a different way of telling 
the truth about himself. As a result, the way Montaigne talks about himself offers an ethics of 
identity that challenged the repressive mechanisms of both Church and State in early modern 
Europe. Indeed, as the literary scholars Virginia Krause and Reinier Leushuis have recently argued, 
Montaigne’s ambivalence towards confession constituted a self-conscious rejection of the external 
pressures men and women faced from the late Middle Ages on to reveal themselves to the 
authorities—both secular and religious—through confessing. For Montaigne, so these authors 
argue, self-revelation should not be forced, but voluntary; and they relate Montaigne’s mode of self 
disclosure to parrhesia, the Greco-Roman practice of speaking freely about oneself that Foucault 
examined with great insight in his History of Sexuality [7–9]. There is much about Krause’s and 
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Leushuis’s framing that I find compelling, especially given that Montaigne was explicit in how 
horrified he was by the ways in which confession was a practice of violence, not only in the torture 
chamber ([5], pp. 366–369; [6], pp. 264–266)69 but also in the Wars of Religion that ravaged 
France at his time. At the same time, I wish to suggest that Montaigne’s ambivalence towards 
confession stemmed also from his anthropology: his fundamental belief that we are not easily 
reformed or transformed and, in this sense too, he broke with the Christian idealism of both Protestants 
and Catholics who continued to insist that faith and grace—in various configurations—could 
indeed lead to a transformation of the inner self or a fundamental change in character. Nonetheless, 
Krause and Leushuis are correct to insist that, for Montaigne, the self was not merely subject to 
authority. It was not, that is, something to be disclosed purely in the courtroom or the 
confessional—locations in which it was bound to be distorted. To the contrary, Montaigne’s ability 
to know himself and to describe himself was an exercise in a form of sincerity that did not seek to 
conform to power but rather to challenge it. His basic understanding of his identity and his 
approach to self-revelation were closely connected, in my view, to his compassion and his 
cosmopolitanism as well as to his hatred of torture, of witch-trials, and of the violence unleashed 
by both Catholics and Calvinists over the matter of confession. 
To be sure, there are frequent moments in the Essays in which Montaigne appears to confess, 
albeit in a decidedly secular or lay fashion. After all, at times, Montaigne seems to want to tell 
everything, even at the risk of making his readers uncomfortable. Famously, Montaigne’s book is a 
text (often a polemical text) against masking, against dissimulation, against hypocrisy. And it is 
fitting that Montaigne opens his book with a claim to sincerity: “C’est ici un livre de bonne foy,”  
he writes in his brief address to the reader, adding “I want to be seen here in my simple, natural, 
ordinary fashion, without straining or artifice, for it is myself that I portray” ([5], p. 3; [6], p. 2). 
Montaigne returns frequently to the claim that he has nothing to hide. “I have an open way…I do 
not refrain from saying anything, however grave or burning” ([5], p. 792; [6], p. 600).70  
“A generous heart should not belie its thoughts; it wants to reveal itself even to its inmost depths 
(jusques au dedans)” ([5], p. 647; [6], p. 491).71 “I like to see people speak up bravely among 
gallant men, and to see the words go where the thought goes” ([5], p. 924; [6], p. 705).72 And these 
gestures are confirmed, it seems, by Montaigne’s anti-rhetorical essay “On the Vanity of Words” ([5], 
p. 305–307; [6], pp. 221–223). 
At first, therefore, Montaigne’s language seems to reflect what we might even describe as an 
increasing emphasis placed on expression, on openness, on sincerity [10]—ideals that constituted  
a powerful countercurrent in a culture that was largely characterized by dissimulation [11,12].  
In a fundamental sense this current had been fed by the religious ideals of the Reformation and  
Counter-Reformation. Certainly, the idea that one should either express or be able to express 
openly what one believed or felt in one’s heart had become central to both Protestant and Catholic 
thinkers in this era. “Our talk must be sincere,” Calvin wrote, “that it may be the very image of an 
upright mind” ([13], Psalm 12:3). And, from the late Middle Ages on, the Catholic doctrine of 
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confession had made self-disclosure an essential component of the sacrament of penance and of 
one’s reconciliation with the Church. Moreover, by the late sixteenth century, this confessional 
ideal had taken even deeper roots in Catholic Europe and likely contributed in significant ways to a 
more generalized notion of the value of self-revelation, not merely to one’s priest but also to one’s 
loved-ones, friends, and neighbors. Concern for expression, therefore, was not merely religious;  
it also spilt over into what was an emerging ideal of sincerity in early modern culture—an ideal 
that was frequently evoked in this period to critique a political culture that appeared to many to 
discourage any form of honest speech, especially when addressing one’s prince or superiors or 
even fellow courtiers. Not surprisingly, there are even moments in the Essays in which Montaigne 
uses the language of confession to describe his desire to make himself known to the world. In the 
essay “Of Presumption,” he even refers to his writing itself as a form of confession ([5], p. 653; [6], 
p. 495). Yet, while Montaigne rails against hypocrisy and dissimulation, his view of confession is 
deeply ambivalent; indeed he largely rejects both the act of confession itself and the claim of 
repentance that often accompanied it as incapable of making sense of his experience.  
Confession is a central theme in Montaigne’s essay “On Some Verses of Virgil.” While most 
scholars have attended to the erotic surfaces of this essay, which provides a disarmingly frank 
account of his amours, Montaigne attempted here not only to reflect on his love affairs but also to 
probe the limits of confession itself. He had already signaled a certain skepticism towards the 
notion that prayers could be pure or that repentance could be transformative. “I rarely repent,” 
Montaigne had declared in his essay “Of Repentance” ([5], p. 806; [6], p. 612). But that “On Some 
Verses of Virgil” also constitutes an important discussion of confession becomes clear when,  
early in the essay, he uses the word “confession” or “confess” six times in as many paragraphs ([5],  
p. 845–846; [6], pp. 642–643).  
What Montaigne means by confession in this essay is by no means obvious. Certainly, his 
confession is deeply layered. It is a confession simultaneously of his youthful pursuits of the 
pleasures of the body (forgiven already by Montaigne to himself because they were, he claims, 
pleasures sought under conditions of honesty) and of his now mature, even aging pursuits of the 
memory of pleasure. He is clearly not confessing to reform his youth. He is explicit about this. His 
recollection of his plaisirs is an important solace. He not only does not condemn his thoughts; he 
savors them. They rescue him from his melancholia. They are part of who he is—who we all are, 
even if we deny that this is the case. He had been particularly clear about the fact that confession is 
not transformative in his essay “On Repentance,” where, with considerable irony, he condemns 
those older men who now claim to be pure: “I hate that accidental repentance that age brings. The 
man who said … that he was obliged to the years for having rid him of sensuality had a different 
viewpoint from mine.” “I shall never,” Montaigne adds, “be grateful to impotence for any good it 
may do me…Youth and pleasure in other days did not make me fail to recognize the face of vice in 
voluptuousness; nor does the distaste that the years bring make me fail to recognize the face of 
voluptuousness in vice. Now that I am no longer in that state, I judge it as though I were in it” ([5], 
p. 815; [6], p. 619). 
Furthermore, Montaigne’s views of confession are reflected also in his attitude toward prayer. 
As he tells us at the start of his essay “Of prayers,” he says no prayer more often than “The Lord’s  
Prayer” ([5], p. 318; [6], p. 230). And yet, in his discussion of prayer as in his discussion of 
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repentance, he recognizes that the mere utterance of pious words is no guarantee of the amendment 
of self. Too often he notes, “we pray out of habit and custom…all in all, it is only an act” ([5],  
p. 319; [6], pp. 230–231). And he is distressed that, in the wake of the Reformation, the sacred 
words of prayer have become almost too familiar and are used too coarsely, without a sense of the 
need for the proper internal state of the supplicant. “It seems, in truth,” Montaigne writes at the 
conclusion of the essay, “that we use our prayers as a jargon, and like those who use holy and 
divine words for sorceries and magical effects, and that we count on their effect depending on the 
texture, sound, or sequence of the words, or on our bearing.” The failure here, as in his discussion 
of repentance, is precisely the same: our failure to repent. “For with our souls full of lust, 
untouched by repentance or by any fresh reconciliation with God, we go and offer him these words 
that memory lends to our tongue, and hope from them to derive expiation for our sins” ([5], p. 325; [6], 
p. 236). Perhaps Montaigne, a Roman Catholic, had Calvin in mind. In the Genevan Confession, 
Calvin had written that “prayer is nothing but hypocrisy and fantasy unless it proceed from the 
interior affection of the heart” ([14], p. 29). 
Confession, therefore, is neither a pious nor religious act for Montaigne. Rather it becomes a 
kind of brutal honesty about his own identity. Montaigne has “ordered himself” to dare say all that 
he can. “The diseases of the soul,” he writes, “grow more obscure and stronger…That is why they 
must be handled often in the light of day, with a pitiless hand, be opened up and torn from the 
hollow of our breast” ([5], p. 846; [6], p. 642). Yet the matter is not only one of self-disclosure, it is 
also a matter of frank talk about sex, which is usually disavowed, hidden, disguised. Montaigne is 
perturbed by the hypocrisy of those who “send their conscience to the brothel but keep their 
countenance in good order” ([5], p. 846; [6], p. 643). And he declares in an exquisitely ironic 
passage that he will take a different path: 
In honor of the Huguenots, who condemn our private and auricular confession, I confess myself in 
public, religiously and purely. Saint Augustine, Origen, and Hippocrates have published the errors of 
their opinions; I, besides, those of my conduct. I am hungry to make myself known, and I care not to how 
many, provided it be truly. Or to put it better, I am hungry for nothing, but I have a mortal fear of being 
taken to be other than I am by those who come to know my name. ([5], pp. 846–847; [6], p. 643)73 
Sexuality is a particularly rich field in which to explore the limits of confession as 
transformative; and “On Some Verses of Virgil” derive their importance, in part, from the way they 
illuminate Montaigne’s notion of the self and what can be said about the self. Love-making, as 
Virgil describes it in his account of Venus and Vulcan, is especially arresting to Montaigne because 
it points to an important aspect of how we are in the world. We are overcome by desire and we are 
brought into peace in the embrace of another. The passage that occasioned the essay was from 
Book VIII of the Aeneid:  
Dixerat; et niveis, hinc atque hinc Diva lacertis 
Cunctantem amplexu molli fovet ille repente 
accepit solitam flammam, notusque medullas 
intravit calor, et labefacta per ossa cucurrit 
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non secus atque olim, tonitru cum rupta corusco 
ignea rima micans percurrit lumine nimbus 
…. …. …. … Ea verba loquutus 
Optatos dedit amplexus, placidumque petivit 
Conjugis infusus gremio per membra soporem. 
[The goddess ceased to speak, and snowy arms outflung 
Around him faltering, soft fondling as she clung. 
He quickly caught the wonted flame; the heat well-known 
Entered his marrow, ran through every trembling bone. 
Often a brilliant lightning flash, not otherwise, 
Split by a thunderclap, runs through the cloudy skies. 
…… He spoke, 
Gave the embraces that she craved; then on her breast 
Outpoured at last, gave himself up to sleep and rest.] ([5], p. 849; [6], p. 645) 
But, as Montaigne also notes, Virgil’s verses were also Lucretius’s. In the opening pages of the  
De rerum natura, Lucretius had called upon Venus to bring Mars into a state of peace, lines that 
Montaigne introduces by stating “What Virgil says of Venus and Vulcan, Lucretius had better 
expressed of a stolen enjoyment between her and Mars.” 
Belli fera moenera Mavors 
Armipotens regit, in gremium qui saepe tuum se 
Rejicit, aeterno devinctus vulnere amoris… 
Pascit amore avidos inhians in te Dea visus, 
Eque tuo pendet resupini spiritus ore: 
Hunc tu Diva tuo recubantem corpore sancto 
Circumfusa super, suaveis ex ore loquelas 
Funde 
[He who rules the savage things 
Of war, the mighty Mars, oft to thy bosom flings 
Himself; the eternal wound of love drains all his powers; 
Wide-mouthed, with greedy eyes thy person he devours, 
Head back, his very soul upon thy lips suspended: 
Take him in thy embrace, goddess, let him be blended 
With they holy body as he lies; let sweet words pour 
Out of they mouth.] ([5], p. 872; [6], p. 664) 
Montaigne, who had known Virgil almost his entire life, had first appreciated Lucretius in Dénis 
Lambin’s 1563 edition of the poem (On Montaigne’s readings of Lucretius, see [15]). In reading 
the poem, he recognized at once—so we learn from his own annotations—Virgil’s reliance in his 
description of love-making on Lucretius. Montaigne finds Lucretius’s language especially 
captivating. He praises it for its vividness, its naturalness. In part, his praise of the poem is part of a 
larger anti-rhetorical emphasis we find throughout the Essays. But it is also clear that Montaigne 
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finds in Lucretius something he admires even more. Lucretius’s words are not “of air, but of flesh 
and bone,” Montaigne writes, adding “elles signifient plus qu’elle ne dissent” ([5], p. 873; [6],  
p. 665). What Montaigne values, that is, is a language that is powerful, natural, and descriptive of 
the thing itself—he is not interested, he claims, in the false truths of the rhetoricians. 
For many, of course, the discourse of sexuality in Europe at this time was the discourse of the 
confessional—at least in theory. And, in this sense, Montaigne’s “On Some Verses of Virgil” 
might be read as a kind of counter-confession. He repudiates the idea that sex is in any way 
shameful. “What has the sexual act, so natural, so necessary, and so just, done to mankind, for us 
not to talk about it without shame and for us to exclude it from serious and decent conversation?” ([5], 
p. 847; [6], p. 644). This is an important move. Montaigne’s language about sexuality celebrates its 
naturalness. He will talk frankly about it, because it is a fundamental part of who he is, who we all 
are. And it is not an act that is confined to marriage. “Marriage,” he writes, “has for its share utility, 
justice, honor, and constancy; a flat pleasure, but more universal. Love is founded on pleasure 
alone, and in truth its pleasure is more stimulating, lively, and keen, a pleasure inflamed by 
difficulty” ([5], p. 854; [6], p. 649). But, despite these differences, there is in both cases, as 
Montaigne describes it, something profoundly natural about the body (not the soul) reaching out to 
another body. Montaigne sees this as a matter of balance, of the way he personally is. And he 
rejects the notion that the soul is superior to the body. 
May we not say that there is nothing in us during this earthly imprisonment that is purely either corporeal 
or spiritual, and that we do wrong to tear apart a living man, and that it seems somewhat reasonable that 
we should behave as favorably at least towards the use of pleasure as we do of pain….For it is indeed 
reasonable, as they say, that the body should not follow its appetites to the disadvantage of the mind, but 
why is it not also reasonable that the mind should not pursue its appetites to the disadvantage of the 
body. ([5], p. 893; [6], p. 681)74 
Montaigne had similar misgivings about repentance. To be sure, Montaigne does not reject 
repentance entirely. For those sins that are out of character, by which “we are carried away by 
passion,” one could repent and credibly promise not to commit them again. And in such cases, 
Montaigne adds, “vice leaves repentance in the soul, like an ulcer in the flesh” ([5], p. 806; [6],  
p. 612).75 “But as for these other sins so many times repeated, planned, and premeditated, 
constitutional sins, or even professional or vocational sins, I cannot imagine that they can be 
implanted so long in one and the same heart, without the reason and conscience of their possessor 
constantly willing and intending it to be so. And the repentance which he claims comes to him  
at a certain prescribed moment is a little hard for me to imagine and conceive” ([5], p. 812; [6],  
pp. 616–617).  
Repentance was not possible, that is, for those sins that are constitutional. For these sins, 
Montaigne maintains, the mind and one’s desires have already consented. They are practiced over 
and over again; they are habitual. They are “rooted and anchored in a strong and vigorous will 
[and] cannot be denied.” ([5], p. 808; [6], p. 613) It would be hypocritical to claim that one could 
                                                 
74  “On some verses of Virgil”. 
75  “Of repentance”. 
60 
repent of them, and be changed or reformed. For in such cases, “repentance is nothing but a 
disavowal of our will and an opposition to our fancies, which leads us about in all directions” ([5], 
p. 808; [6], p. 613). 
Although Montaigne does not approve of the notion of repentance as a matter of personal 
reform, he does acknowledge the power of what we might call a social repentance in which a 
person who has transgressed against another seeks to set things right or make them whole again. In 
his essay “On repentance,” Montaigne shares an especially revealing anecdote. While visiting a 
relative at Armagnac, a region just to the southeast of Bordeaux, Montaigne had met a peasant 
whom he calls simply “le larron,” the thief. The peasant’s story points to what we might see as a 
more archaic form of reconciliation, one that possibly predates the Christian emphasis on 
confession and repentance.76 Born into poverty, the peasant found that he had to steal in order to 
survive. And he spent his life stealing from neighboring fields and estates. But now, Montaigne 
writes, “he is rich for a man in his station.” And then Montaigne adds: “And to make his peace 
with God for his acquisitions, he says that he spends his days compensating, by good deeds, the 
successors of the people he robbed….Judging by his description, whether it is true or false, this 
man regards theft as a dishonorable action and hates it, but hates it less than poverty; he indeed 
repents of it in itself, but in so far as it was thus counterbalanced and compensated, he does not 
repent of it” ([5], p. 812; [6], p. 616).77 
Montaigne is not saying that the thief was without guilt. But Montaigne appears to see the ethic 
of compensation exemplified by this peasant’s story as in many ways superior to the ethics of so 
many around him, who confess their sins, even as they continue to slaughter one another. What 
difference do our confessions make, Montaigne seems to be asking, if we are not reformed? And 
how, he wonders, can our confessions reform us? For Montaigne, confession can be a form of 
self-disclosure. But it doesn’t change us.  
In a fundamentals sense, then, Montaigne’s Essays, despite their open character, transcend the 
very practice of confession itself. From Montaigne’s standpoint—and I do not think I am 
exaggerating here—the central problem with confession lay in its insincerity. To confess was to 
enter too easily into a claim of reform. Either this was a cheapened mode of reform—for example 
that of the old man repenting of his youthful excesses—or an unnecessary one. And Montaigne’s 
public reflections on sexuality made this especially clear. For in his reflections on this subject, 
Montaigne was able to capture something of the experience of what it means, in a deep sense, to be 
human. This is the way I am, Montaigne writes. This is the way we all are. Perhaps if we are honest 
about our natures, we shall have less need to reform ourselves; and perhaps if we have less need to 
reform ourselves, we shall have less need to confess; and perhaps if we have less need to confess, 
we can be more generous and accepting of one another. Confession, in Montaigne’s view, was tied 
not to reform of self but rather to self-knowledge.  
This was a powerful lesson during the Wars of Religion in France, the horrifying, seemingly 
ceaseless conflict that haunts the Essays. And in these wars confession was prominent among the 
issues over which Catholics and Calvinists were polarized. For Catholics confession remained the 
                                                 
76  For an interesting perspective on medieval values of reconciliation, see [16]. 
77  “Of repentance”. 
61 
gateway to the sacrament of penance. Christians had been enjoined since the early thirteenth 
century to make an annual confession to their priests. But this was only the first step. They were 
also expected to approach this sacrament in a state of contrition (genuine sorrow for their sins) and 
a desire to reform; and then to carry out the penitential acts of satisfaction that the priest imposed. 
Within this sacrament, repentance was a two-fold process. It involved not only carrying out the 
penitential acts but, even more important, as the Council of Trent proclaimed not long before the 
outbreak of the French Wars of Religion, “sorrow of mind a detestation for sin committed with the 
purpose of not sinning in the future” ([17], Session XIV, Chapter 4). Repentance, in short, assumed 
that the individual Christians were capable of moral change—what Carlo Borromeo, the 
Archbishop of Milan, would call “la vera emendatione della vita” [18]. While rejecting both 
sacerdotal confession and satisfaction, Protestants nonetheless continued to emphasize not only the 
importance of repentance in the sense of contrition and transformation but also the necessity of 
confession, though not to a priest but directly to God. Calvin especially would make repentance 
central to the life of a Christian. To be sure, Calvin saw true repentance as “a special gift of God.” 
Nonetheless, for Calvin and for his followers alike, repentance was understood as “a laying aside 
of the old, put[ting] on a new mind….a transformation not only in external works, but in the soul 
itself” ([19], Book 3, 3.6).  
Another way of grasping Montaigne’s view of confession is to contrast him with St. Augustine ([20], 
pp. 214–219). In his essay “On Presumption,” Montaigne writes: “For the movements of my soul,  
I want to confess here what I am aware of” ([5], p. 633; [6], p. 480). To some degree this is an 
Augustinian gesture, since, for Augustine confession as a form of the recognition of one’s 
shortcomings was the very opposite of presumption, which was a form of vainglorious posturing. 
Moreover, like Augustine, who had commented in his Enarrationes in Psalmos that “vita mea est 
confiteri te, domine,” ([21], Psalm 30) who held in short that his masterpiece The Confessions could 
not be disentangled from his life, Montaigne closely identified his book with his person: “I have no 
more made my book than my book has made me,” he tells us in his essay “On Giving the Lie,” 
adding, “a book consubstantial with its author, concerned with my own self, an integral part of my 
life; not concerned with some third-hand, extraneous purpose, like all other books” ([5], p. 665; [6], 
p. 504). Both authors, in short, were masters of forms of self-writing in which text and life were 
interwoven and at moments indistinguishable. Both were engaged in a form of self-examination. 
Yet, in other ways, Montaigne departs sharply from Augustine. For the Bishop of Hippo as for 
many of his contemporaries confession was not only a focus on one’s sins, it was also a form of 
praising God. And this is most decidedly not the case in Montaigne’s Essays. To be sure, he uses 
the word “confess” frequently, but, apart from one particularly complex passage in which he does 
seem to have an explicitly religious idea in mind, he generally uses it in a legal rather than a 
theological sense. Confession was, for Montaigne, a form of admission to a crime or to a plan or to 
a thought more than a form of seeking amendment or improvement.  
More decisively, Montaigne also rejects the cultivation of the narrative self for which 
Augustine’s Confessions was the preeminent example, though remarkably this was a text that 
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Montaigne (who cites several other works by Augustine in his Essays) may not have known.78  
In the Augustinian narrative life takes on meaning around certain key turning points—conversion 
above all but also moments of contrition—and the individual was seen as a pilgrim on an earthly 
journey, whether one was aided by a priest, as in the Catholic tradition, or made this journey on 
one’s own, as in the Protestant. Fundamentally the Augustinian self is represented within the 
framework of a narrative of grace. The Essays, by contrast, do not assume a narrative form; and 
Montaigne does not share Augustine’s view that reform of self was possible. To the contrary, 
Montaigne believes he can best capture himself through a series of portraits over time, viewing 
himself in different circumstances and from varying perspectives.  
“I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that is my physics” ([5],  
p. 1072; [6], p. 821).79 In the Essays, Montaigne has, in fact, made himself his subject, with the 
curious result that he is both the observer and the observed. But he does not render this subject 
stable. To the contrary, the subject he observes is not constant. He compares his mind to a 
“runaway horse” that “gives birth to so many chimeras and fantastic monsters, one after another, 
without order or purpose, that in order to contemplate their ineptitude and strangeness at my 
pleasure, I have begun to put them in writing” ([5], p. 33; [6], p. 21).80 “Others form man,”  
he writes at the beginning of his essay “Of Repentance,” adding, “I tell of him, and portray a 
particular one, very ill-formed…Now the lines of my painting do not go astray, though they change 
and vary. The world is but a perennial movement….I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along 
befuddled and staggering, with a natural drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the 
moment I give my attention to it. I do not portray being; I portray passing…This is a record of 
various and changeable occurrences, and of irresolute and, when it so befalls, contradictory ideas: 
whether I am different myself, or whether I take hold of my subjects in different circumstances and 
aspects” ([5], p. 805; [6], pp. 610–611).81 But the self is not only changeable, it is complex to 
know. “We are all patchwork, and so shapeless and diverse in composition that each bit, each 
moment, plays its own game. And there is as much difference between us and ourselves as between 
us and others. Consider it a great thing to play the part of one single man [Seneca]… In view of 
this, a sound intellect will refuse to judge men simply by their outward actions; we must probe the 
inside and discover what springs set a man in motion. But since this is an arduous and hazardous 
undertaking, I wish fewer people would meddle with it” ([5], p. 337; [6], p. 244).82 
Yet Montaigne’s decision to write, to take an inventory of himself in different moments and in 
different settings, helps him in the end get at something more fixed: “In modeling this figure upon 
                                                 
78  Several scholars (among them [22,23]) have argued that Montaigne did not know the Confessions, but 
others believe this unlikely. Auerbach’s view that Montaigne must “have been aware at least of the 
existence and character of this famous book” is, in my view, compelling [1].  
79  “Of experience”. 
80  “Of idleness”. 
81  Following Brody [24], Strier, argues that this passage does not imply, as many scholars suggest, that 
Montaigne’s view of the self as fluid or postmodern, but Strier’s reading of “soit que je sois autre 
moymesme, soit que je saissie les subjects par autres circonstances et considerations” flattens the subtle 
interplay of a relatively fluid self embedded in Montaigne’s French ([25], p. 218).  
82  “Of the inconsistency of our actions”. 
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myself,” he writes, “I have had to fashion and compose myself so often to bring myself out, that 
the model (le patron) itself has to some extent grown firm and taken shape. Painting myself for 
others, I have painted my inward self with colors clearer than my original ones….Have I wasted 
my time by taking stock of myself so continually, so carefully? For those who go over themselves 
only in their minds and occasionally in speech do not penetrate to essentials in their examination as 
does a man who makes that his study, his work, and his trade, who binds himself to keep an 
enduring account, with all his faith, with all his strength” ([5], p. 665; [6], p. 504).83 It is in this 
dynamic sense—with a deep consciousness of the mutability, even the fluidity of self—that 
Montaigne claims he is setting forth nature not artifice: “Those of us especially who live a private 
life that is on display only to ourselves must have a pattern established within us by which to test 
our actions and, according to this pattern, now pat ourselves on the back, now punish ourselves.  
I have my own laws and court to judge me, and I address myself to them more than anywhere  
else” ([5], p. 807; [6], p. 613).84  
In early modern Europe the ideas of St. Augustine proved enormously influential. Perhaps they 
resonated with a culture that scholars, ever since Burckhardt, have portrayed as deeply 
duplicitous—a period in which heretics, merchants, courtiers, and rulers learned to conceal their 
thoughts and feelings in the dangerous realm of social interactions that lay before them. In this era, 
as William Bouwsma has argued, “a relaxed and candid self-exposure now became dangerous; 
human intimacy was inhibited by the need for vigilance in masking the true self” ([26], p. 169). 
Moreover, like Augustine Renaissance men and women tended to think that the inner self was the 
more authentic self, and this perspective would enjoy a rich afterlife in the works of such writers as 
Descartes, Locke, and Rousseau. 
Like many of his contemporaries, Montaigne was disturbed by the hypocrisies of his generation, 
and he warned his readers not to let themselves “be taken in by either the face or the words of  
one who takes pride in being always different outside and inside” ([5], p. 648; [6], p. 491).85  
But Montaigne did not believe that confession in the traditional religious sense could close the gap 
between one’s interior and one’s public life. If, that is, sincerity was for most of Montaigne’s 
contemporaries the outward expression or avowal of one’s internal beliefs and feelings—an ethic 
modeled on confession—for Montaigne, sincerity was a far more wrenching process: not the 
expression of one’s beliefs or feelings but rather the portrayal of one’s very being. This was 
Montaigne’s most radical claim: “I want to be seen here in my simple, natural, ordinary fashion, 
without straining or artifice; for it is myself I portray” ([5], p. 3; [6], p. 2).86 The image of 
portraiture, as we have seen, is fundamental. Moreover, even when Montaigne discusses his 
frankness, it is as though he is describing a kind of hydraulic process and not a sense of the need to 
express himself: “But besides the fact that I am made that way, I have not a supple enough mind to 
sidestep a sudden question and escape it by some dodge, or to invent a truth, or a good enough 
memory to retain something thus invented, and certainly not enough assurance to maintain it; and I 
put on a bold face because of weakness. Therefore I give myself up to being candid and always 
                                                 
83  “Of Giving the Lie”. 
84  “Of repentance”. 
85  “Of presumption”. 
86  “To the reader”. 
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saying what I think, by inclination and by reason, leaving it to Fortune to guide the outcome” ([5], 
p. 610; [6], p. 492).87  
Did Montaigne’s self-acknowledged poor memory make Augustine’s solution to 
self-understanding inaccessible to him? For Augustine, it was memory above all that served as the 
reservoir of identity, even when memory failed ([27], Book 10). Perhaps, in the absence of a good 
memory, Montaigne had no choice but to portray rather than to express himself. Perhaps he had no 
choice but to write in order to discover himself. And on the subject of self, Montaigne’s writings are 
strikingly ethnographic [28].88 His gaze upon his self, that is, resembles his gaze upon others, both 
within his own culture and beyond. He reports and he portrays; he does not express in Augustinian 
fashion his thoughts or feelings, and he does not confess. Moreover, it seems that Montaigne’s 
view of the relation of his internal to his external self differed from the views of most of his 
contemporaries. For, well before Montaigne was writing and, indeed, down to our own time, it has 
been a characteristic of many western thinkers to insist on the priority of what we might call the 
inner over the exterior self. We tend to believe, that is, that our thoughts and feelings precede our 
words and that a fundamental characteristic of our individuality lies in our ability to decide what to 
reveal and what to conceal about our inner lives, our “true” selves. Confession and self-expression 
more generally become, within this framework, a privileged site for such self-disclosure. In part, as 
the philosopher Charles Taylor has argued in his important book Sources of the Self, we are able to 
adopt this interpretation because “we think of our thoughts, ideas, or feelings as being ‘within’ us, 
while the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are ‘without’” ([3], p. 111).  
But such a view of the self, as Taylor himself emphasizes, is not a universal one, found in all 
cultures. Rather it is a historical construct. And, indeed within western culture, this localization of 
the self as inward would, Taylor argues, find its inaugural voice in the writings of St. Augustine for 
whom the inner self became—no matter what roles we assume in public—the locus not only of 
moral agency, knowledge, and memory but also of identity ([3], pp. 129–35). But this very 
construct seems at least partially undone in Montaigne. It seems impossible, in Montaigne’s case, 
to view the true self as the interior self alone. Floating outside Montaigne’s inner self is the 
observant “I” of the author. Montaigne’s self is, as Jean Starobinski has observed, a dialectical self, 
at once “le ‘je’ observateur et le moi observé” ([29], p. 65). Scholars disagree about the relation 
between these two aspects of Montaigne’s identity. But it is by no means clear that Montaigne 
would have reduced his true identity to his inner self alone. He was—though this is a matter for 
further exploration—a man who lived most fully in his associations with others, whether he met 
them in books or in person. He was a man of broad associations. His identity was deeply social 
and, as his reflections on his sexuality and on his health make clear, deeply embodied. In the end, 
the way Montaigne was in the world transcended his inner self which, as a consequence, was only 
one aspect of his character. Perhaps this too was why Montaigne refused to confess. Confession, in 
the sixteenth century, was a disciplining strategy, a means of simplifying and sorting identities 
along religious and political lines. Montaigne is explicit that he cannot so simplify. “I give my soul 
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now one face, now another, according to which direction I turn it.” Montaigne writes in his essay 
“Of the Inconsistency of our Actions,” and adds: 
If I speak of myself in different ways, that is because I look at myself in different ways. All 
contradictions may be found in me by some twist and in some fashion. Bashful, insolent; chaste, 
lascivious; talkative, taciturn; tough, delicate; clever, stupid; surly, affable; lying, truthful; learned, 
ignorant; liberal, miserly; and prodigal: all this I see in myself to some extent according to how I turn; 
and whoever studies himself really attentively finds in himself, yes, even in his judgment, this gyration 
and discord. I have nothing to say about myself absolutely, simply, and solidly, without confusion and 
without mixture, or in one word. ([5], p. 335; [6], p. 242) 
Confession, whether in the courtroom or kneeling before a priest, was not a capacious enough 
practice to capture such a self. For Montaigne, confession, therefore, was both an inadequate and 
an overly reductive mode of self-disclosure. Inevitably he feared that he would be misunderstood 
in such a tribunal, just as he knew so many of his contemporaries were either wrongly convicted or 
made wrongfully to feel shame about their deeply human lives.  
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Abstract: Renaissance and Reformation used to serve historians as the main terms  
with which to refer to European history from roughly 1300–1600. Today those terms 
are commonly replaced with early modern history, and the periodization of European 
history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods itself is looking increasingly 
suspect. There are good reasons for those changes. But they obscure both the 
significance of disagreements dividing the living from the dead and the significance of 
grammar, in the fundamental sense of grammar advanced by Wittgenstein, for treating 
such disagreements. Renaissance and Reformation have the advantage of doing just the 
opposite: they confront us with both those disagreements and the significance of 
grammar. That makes them very much worth keeping.  
Keywords: antiquity; Renaissance; Reformation; Humanism; early modern; 
Wittgenstein; grammar; historiography; philosophy of history 
 
There is a peculiarity about the revision of historians that excludes them from the benefit of the common 
law that innocence must be assumed until guilt is proved. The presumption which is favourable to 
makers of history is adverse to writers of history. For history deals considerably with hanging matter, and 
nobody ought to hang on damaged testimony.  
Acton 
1. Introduction 
It seems that we cannot agree on what to call the history of Europe from roughly 1300–1600. 
We used to call it Renaissance and Reformation. Now we are not so certain what that means. Many 
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among us would rather call it early modern history.89 This is more than merely giving a new label 
to a familiar thing. It is true, of course, that we can call a given thing by any word we please—but 
only if the thing is really given. There was an airline once called ValuJet. Then it ran into trouble. 
Now it is called AirTran.90 That was a change in name that worked. But it is different with 
Renaissance and Reformation. The reason why some of us call Renaissance and Reformation early 
modern history is that we do not know exactly what we mean by Renaissance and Reformation 
because it is precisely not a given thing. But if it is not a given thing, it really does not help to 
change what we are calling it. We cannot even tell if we are merely changing labels or changing the 
subject, too. So far from being a matter of mere terminology, the change from Renaissance and 
Reformation to early modern history reveals a basic truth about our state of mind: we are confused 
about the subject we are studying. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. In Sections two to five I will explain what seem to me to 
be the reasons why we are confused. They stem from the desire to turn history into a science.  
In Section six I will make three observations that seem to me to follow from that explanation. One 
is that there are valid reasons for the shift from Renaissance and Reformation to early modern 
history. Another is that the same reasons call for something different from that shift. The third is 
that Renaissance and Reformation confront us directly with the significance of disagreements 
dividing the living from the dead and the significance of grammar for treating such disagreements. 
That makes them very much worth keeping. 
2. Agreement on Criteria 
First, then, what is the source of the confusion? For an answer to this question I think it helps to 
reduce two familiar accounts of Renaissance and Reformation to a bare minimum. One was given 
by the people who lived through Renaissance and Reformation. It is embedded in the very 
terminology of Renaissance (rebirth) and Reformation (reform).91 That terminology refers to some 
kind of revival of antiquity. It places the emphasis on what was or should have been the same in 
Renaissance and Reformation as in antiquity. The other was given in the nineteenth century, most 
famously by Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). 
Burckhardt and Hegel viewed Renaissance and Reformation as the beginning of the modern world 
(see [5,6]). They stressed whatever was the same in Renaissance and Reformation as in modernity.  
Once it is put like that, we seem to face a contradiction. On one account, Renaissance and 
Reformation revived antiquity; on the other, they ushered in modernity. That raises obvious 
questions: which of these two accounts is true and in which sense? Could both of them be true? 
What was the same in Renaissance and Reformation as in antiquity? What was the same as  
in modernity?  
                                                 
89. See the appendix for some historical details about the usage of early modern since the nineteenth century 
and a rough illustration of the growing preference for the term since the end of World War II. 
90. Or was, at least, called AirTran before it was bought out by Southwest Airlines in 2010. I thank William 
Walsh for pointing that out to me. 
91. The literature is all too obviously huge. Standard surveys are by Ferguson [1] and Dickens [2]. For more 
recent work see Martin [3] and Schutte [4]). 
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These are exciting questions. They constitute a great temptation to jump directly into the fray of 
evidence and argument. But the temptation needs to be resisted until we know the answer to a more 
basic question, namely, how can we even tell that anything is the same as anything else in history?  
That question is more difficult to answer than it may seem. The most convincing answer I have 
found was given by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). His answer works not just for history, but 
for any area of knowledge. It is that you can only tell that something is the same as something else 
if you have a criterion of identity, and a criterion of identity is something that you cannot have 
unless you speak a language and understand its grammar ([7], pp. 24–25; [8], nrs. 243–55,  
pp. 95e–98e).92  
Here grammar means something different from syntax and morphology. It concerns the essence 
of what things are. It draws distinctions between things that infants do not know, and that we take 
for granted once we have mastered them as, for example, the distinctions between a color and a 
shape, a number and a sound, a memory and a dream, the present and the past, and “I” and “you.” 
As Wittgenstein put it, “essence is expressed in grammar” and “grammar tells what kind of object 
anything is” ([8], nrs. 371 and 373, p. 123e). If that is true, then without knowing grammar we 
cannot tell what kind of object anything is, let alone whether it is the same kind as another.  
Apart from grammar, talk of identity is meaningless.  
You cannot very well agree with Wittgenstein on this unless you throw out most of the 
conceptual baggage with which scholars and scientists have been traveling for centuries, including 
not a few who made the so-called linguistic turn. Needless to say, that is difficult to do and I do not 
propose to do it here.93 But the point about identity itself is not particularly complicated to explain.  
Take one of Wittgenstein's favorite examples: the sentence “it is 5 o’clock on the sun” ([8], nrs. 
350–1, pp. 118e–19e). On its face, that sentence looks like a straightforward statement of a certain 
fact. The meaning of the statement may not be exactly clear. But one thing seems to be certain: no 
matter what it means, it must be either true or false. Either it is 5 o'clock on the sun, or it is not. 
There seems to be no other possibility. The law of the excluded middle has to hold, no matter  
what we say. 
This is what Wittgenstein denied. He asked, what does it mean to say, “it is 5 o’clock on the 
sun”? Someone might answer, “it means the same as ‘it is 5 o’clock here on earth,’ except that it is 
on the sun.” That is an explanation by identity. It relies on the notion that something is the same as 
something else, namely, time on the sun as time on earth. But the explanation does not work. When 
we say, “it is 5 o’clock here,” we know what we mean. We know because we know how to tell the 
time: by looking at a watch. Our watch is the criterion by which we tell what time it is. Our watch 
is not the only criterion that we could use, nor necessarily the most reliable. We can also use 
cellphones, radio announcements, computer clocks, the frequency with which some atoms oscillate, 
and the position of the sun of course. But the important point is this: regardless of which criterion 
we use, we know what “5 o’clock” means only because we have some criterion on which we  
are agreed.  
                                                 
92. For an introduction to the significance of criteria see ([9], pp. 3–125, and [10], pp. 159–96). 
93. I have found the most effective guidance in [9–15], and the writings of Rush Rhees (1905–89), Norman 
Malcolm (1911–90), Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003), and D. Z. Phillips (1934–2006). 
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That makes a criterion something radically different from data or evidence. It is neither a  
given fact nor something that you can observe. It is established by agreement, and the agreement is 
embedded in the language we have learned to speak. As Wittgenstein put it, “it is in their language 
that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” ([8], nr. 241, 
p. 94e). The criterion we use to tell the time of day is but one tiny and specific part of that 
agreement. Without such an agreement, we could have no criterion. Without such a criterion, we 
could not make sense of “5 o’clock.”  
That is precisely the condition in which we would find ourselves if someone were to say, “it is  
5 o’clock on the sun.” We would not know what sense to make of that expression. We have no 
criterion for the time of day on the sun. We have no idea what “5 o’clock on the sun” is supposed 
to mean—let alone whether it is the same as “5 o’clock on earth.” There is no “same time” on the 
sun. If we say that “5 o’clock on the sun” means the same as “5 o’clock on earth, except that it is 
on the sun,” we are not saying anything at all. We merely beg the question. We have not yet 
explained just what it is that is supposed to be the same. Until we do, the sentence “it is 5 o’clock 
on the sun” merely looks like a statement of some fact with an uncertain meaning. In reality it is  
no statement whatsoever. It is meaningless. You might as well say, “gobbledy is gook.” And 
“gobbledy is gook” is just a funny sound. It does not amount to an assertion. It can be neither true 
nor false. It is not subject to the law of the excluded middle. The law of the excluded middle does 
not apply to funny sounds, no matter how closely they ape the appearance of a sentence.  
3. Disagreements with the Dead 
If Wittgenstein was right on this, and I believe he was, we have a problem in history that is quite 
different from the problems we generally say we have. The problems we generally say we have are 
two. One is to tell what happened in the past. The other is to understand the past in its own terms. 
But these problems are not as great as they are said to be. Solving them of course takes time and 
effort, and the effort may well fail. But that is true in every area of knowledge. It hardly makes 
history more difficult than chemistry or economics. We know a lot that happened in the past. We 
know that Caesar died. We know that medieval knights went on crusade. We know that the first 
cities were built a few thousand years ago. We know that until 1969 none of us had travelled to the 
moon. To doubt such knowledge, not for specific reasons in a specific context, but because the past 
is something of whose existence we cannot be completely sure because it is supposedly no longer 
present, is to abandon history for metaphysics.  
The case is similar with understanding people in their own terms. If we have evidence and know 
their language, we have the means to understand the people. If we do not, we don’t. It makes no 
difference whether the evidence and the language come from the present or the past. What makes a 
difference are the difficulty of the language and the evidence. Take Thomas Pynchon (b. 1937),  
for example. Last time I checked he was among the living. But I do not believe I understand  
him now or ever will, in his own terms or any other terms, as well as William Durant the Younger  
(ca. 1266–1330)—and this in spite of the fact that William Durant the Younger was a medieval 
bishop who died many centuries ago. Don’t get me wrong. I love Gravity's Rainbow (1973). But I 
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find Durant’s Tractatus de modo generalis concilii celebrandi (ca. 1310) much easier to follow 
(see [16–18]). 
The problem, in other words, is neither how to understand the people of the past in their own 
terms nor how to tell what happened. That can be done, up to a very reasonable point. The problem 
is that sometimes doing the one means not doing the other. Sometimes our understanding of the 
people whose history we are writing ends in a disagreement with those people about our 
understanding of what it was that happened. 
We know what we can do where such a disagreement arises among the living. We distinguish 
between understanding what someone says and agreeing with someone that it is true. I have no 
trouble understanding people who say that history is bunk. But I do not agree with them. I say, 
“The past is very much worth knowing.” I understand that in the view of some the world is run by 
a conspiracy of Jews. But I maintain that that is not the case. I say, “You are deluded. No such 
conspiracy exists.” I understand the man who says that he defended a human being’s right to life 
when he killed the abortionist. But I deny what he asserts. I say, “That is not what happened.  
What happened is that you committed murder.” We have a disagreement about criteria of identity.  
We state our disagreement and then take it from there: we talk or fight; we solve our disagreement 
or we keep arguing; we agree to disagree or go our separate ways.  
But what if we run into a disagreement with people in the past? And what if our disagreement 
does not divide us simply over the difference between the truth or falsity of one or another 
statement, but over the criteria we need in order to determine what our disagreement is about? How 
can we tell what people in the past were doing or what was happening to them if they were living, 
not on the sun, but on the historical equivalent of the sun: a place in time where our criteria for 
telling what is the same as something else did not exist? How do we manage that kind of 
disagreement? Shall we use the criteria on which we are agreed today? That would mean taking 
sides with the living and disagreeing with the dead. Shall we then use the criteria used by the 
people whose history we are writing? That would mean switching sides, but not solving the 
disagreement. In either case the disagreement stands. In either case it is uncertain just what the 
disagreement is about, and the uncertainty is threatening to leave us without anything to say or do. 
4. The Problem for Historians 
Disagreements dividing the living from the dead over criteria of judgment and identity, it seems to 
me, confront historians with their most fundamental problem. Happily the problem is never 
all-consuming. There is a lot that has not changed or changed only a little in the entire span of 
human history, from the beginning of the career of Homo sapiens down to the present day. We eat, 
we drink, we sleep, we dream, we laugh, we cry, we sing, we dance, we mate, we live, we die. We 
have that much in common with every human being who lived before our time.  
That is by no means a small thing. It means that we are able to surmount the differences 
between the many different forms of life that have been taken up by different human beings at 
different times in different places as though they were so many different ways to play.94 We can 
                                                 
94  See Huizinga [19] and Geertz [20] for two influential statements of the significance of play in human 
forms of life. 
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learn the different languages and understand the different forms of life. As Wittgenstein put it, 
there is a “system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language,” and  
that system consists of “shared human behavior” ([8], nr. 206, p. 88e). That is a happy teaching.  
If it were otherwise, there would be little for historians to do. 
Unhappily for historians, our profession requires us to concentrate on change. We must confront 
the differences between the present and the past, including differences in criteria, judgments, 
language, and forms of life. We must not be content with taking past people at their word. We are 
obliged to figure out what was the case, even if it turns out to differ from the case past people 
thought it was, or that they lied. We cannot place responsibility for meeting that obligation on any 
evidence. The evidence can only teach us the terms that human beings were using in the past.  
It cannot teach us which terms we are supposed to use today. We have to choose those terms 
ourselves with every word we say. If we use no past terms, we dismiss whatever judgments the 
people of the past were making as though their judgments did not count. If we use no present 
terms—assuming that were possible—we could not even tell what counts as evidence today,  
let alone of what it is supposed to be the evidence.  
We must therefore negotiate between the present and the past. Our relation to the past is 
dialectical: the past talks back. We are obliged to listen, and we must act accordingly. Sometimes 
we must dismiss past forms of thought and action as lying beyond the limits of, not our understanding, 
but our present agreement in a present form of life. Sometimes we must insist on present forms of 
thought and action with which the people of the past might never have agreed. We may not simply 
do as we are told. We have to draw a line where our agreement with the dead comes to an end. 
There are some games we cannot play. But we must also recognize and understand those forms  
of thought and action with which we disagree and render an account of our disagreement. Our 
knowledge of the past has to include the differences by which we are divided from the past. 
Excluding those differences from history would be absurd. Anachronism is our daily bread. 
Whichever way we turn, we find ourselves confronting disagreements between the living and the 
dead, not simply about the difference between true and false, but about different forms of life. 
There is no history without such disagreements. As Arnaldo Momigliano once put it in a 
memorable turn of phrase, “What history-writing without moral judgments would be is difficult for 
me to envisage, because I have not yet seen it” ([21], p. 370). He just ought not to have limited his 
claim to judgments that are “moral” (cf. [22], esp. pp. 403–5). 
That, it seems to me, is the most basic difference between history and science. It constitutes a 
problem that scientists can pretty much ignore. Scientists are not obliged to bother with the terms 
in which past people spoke. They have disagreements with each other, not with the past. They 
study, not human beings, but the phenomena of nature—and nature does not talk back in any 
human language. Criteria that were used in the past are none of their concern—no more than magic, 
final causes, or phlogiston. Science ends where history begins. When scientists make statements 
about the past, as they most definitely do, they do so in terms on which they are presently agreed. 
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They can forget the terms that were used in the past. They know what they are studying.95 
Historians do not enjoy that luxury. Sometimes they act as though they did. But when they do, the 
histories they write obliterate the most characteristically human kinds of change: change in criteria 
of judgment, change in language, and change in form of life. 
5. The Source of the Confusion 
That, I think, explains our confusion about Renaissance and Reformation. When we began to 
treat Renaissance and Reformation as periods in the history of Europe, we replaced what humanists 
and reformers had said about themselves with our judgments. We adopted criteria of identity they 
did not share. We did so because our form of life had changed. We recognized the change we made 
and looked for justification. We thought we found justification in the evidence. The evidence,  
we thought, allowed us to establish precisely what was the same in Renaissance and Reformation 
as in antiquity and in the modern age. But in so doing we forgot the difference between history and 
science. We treated the dead as though they were the same as us. We failed to heed the difference 
between criteria and evidence—between their form of life and ours. We did not notice that our 
evidence contained no reasons with which to justify our criteria or our form of life. We acted as 
though the evidence could do our job for us. We neglected our most interesting and most important 
task. No wonder we never got the knowledge that we sought.  
What we got instead was information. We piled evidence on evidence, kept asking ever subtler 
and more specific questions, and multiplied the criteria with which to tell what is and what is not 
the same as something else in history. We never asked the question that needed to be answered 
first: how did they differ from ourselves, not simply in what they said and did, but in their 
agreement on the criteria that specified just what it was they said and did? Not having asked the 
question, we could not find the answer. The answers we did find gave us no satisfaction. 
Dissatisfied, we could not rest. Instead we have kept going in one and the same direction: more 
questions, more evidence, more information. The further we progressed, the less our answers 
meant. As we increased our knowledge of Renaissance and Reformation, we turned Renaissance 
and Reformation into seemingly useless terms. Instead of proving that Renaissance and 
Reformation were the same as antiquity or as modernity, or both, we cast increasing doubt on the 
possibility of knowing anything about the past at all. Instead of taking responsibility for our 
disagreements with the dead, we dismantled the agreements we had with each other.  
Today we find ourselves divided into factions: those who keep insisting on studying 
Renaissance and Reformation and those who think those terms are vague or meaningless; those 
who believe we can know something about the past and those who believe that we cannot; those 
who look for facts and those who look for understanding; those who treat the dead as though they 
had never really been alive and those who treat them as though they had never really died; those 
who ignore the judgments made in stating facts and those who state no facts so as to make no 
judgments. Our information is superb, our understanding faint. We face a mountain of evidence, a 
                                                 
95. It is worth pointing out that this distinction between history and science is entirely schematic. In practice, 
the boundaries between history and science are always fluid, and sometimes alarmingly so, as 
Wittgenstein [23], Winch [12], and Kuhn [24] have shown in different ways. 
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riot of conflicting criteria, and profound uncertainty about the meaning and extent of our 
knowledge of the past. That is the price we pay for having practiced history as though it were a 
science. No wonder we are confused. 
 
6. Saving Renaissance and Reformation 
Now let me offer the observations that seem to me to follow from this argument. The first is that 
there is an excellent reason for the shift from calling our period Renaissance and Reformation to 
calling it early modern history. The reason is that we have looked for things in Renaissance and 
Reformation that are the same as things today—except, of course, that they took place in Renaissance 
and Reformation, that sun in time where we imagine things to be the same as here except that they 
are on the sun. Trying to find such things has landed us in a dead end.  
I do not mean that things like that cannot be found. One can make a perfectly compelling case 
that things in Renaissance and Reformation were quite the same in this or that regard as things in 
antiquity or in the modern age or, for that matter, in any other age. I mean that making such a case 
reduces the human beings of the past to objects of scientific study. It amounts to treating the dead 
as though they had never been capable of speech. It does violence to them by ruling their 
judgments out of order, as if we had the right to say, “You did not know what you were doing, but 
we do, and we will tell you now.” The desire to refrain from doing such violence, it seems to me, is 
the real source of the attraction of the shift to early modern history. That makes it a welcome change. 
My second observation is that the change is not of the right kind. It is one thing to recognize that 
treating Renaissance and Reformation as the rebirth of antiquity or the beginning of the modern 
world can hardly be the thing to do. But it is quite another to acknowledge our disagreements with 
the dead.  
Stanley Cavell has written that the search for shared criteria amounts to a claim to community ([9], 
p. 20).96 In searching for shared criteria in history, we thus lay claim to a community uniting the 
living with the dead. Precisely because it unites us with the dead, it challenges our humanity to the 
core. We cannot meet that challenge unless we take responsibility for our criteria. To state 
something as true about the past without taking responsibility for the criteria we use in doing so, or 
worse, to stop maintaining anything as true in the belief that the transience of our criteria gives us 
the freedom to stop using them, is to fail our responsibility as human beings both to ourselves and 
to the dead. That failure is the chief reason, I believe, why our knowledge of the past leaves us 
dissatisfied and why we can find no end to disagreements that put our sanity in doubt. It cannot be 
remedied simply by changing terms or turning one’s attention to new subjects of investigation.  
My third observation is that we may have a better chance of meeting our responsibility if we 
preserve the terminology of Renaissance and Reformation. The reason is that disagreements with 
the dead pose problems not only for historians. They pose problems for all human beings who try 
to maintain agreement in a shared form of life.97 Among those human beings the people living in 
                                                 
96. "The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say 
what we say, are claims to community." (Cf. [10], p. 186). 
97. The conflict between Creon and Antigone over the burial of Antigone's rebellious brother Polynices 
makes for a compelling statement of this very point in one of Europe's oldest tragedies; see [25]. 
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Europe during the times of Renaissance and Reformation deserve particular attention. For the 
intensity with which they tried to bring antiquity to life reveals nothing more clearly than the 
problems their disagreements with the dead posed to their form of life. That makes Renaissance 
and Reformation superb examples of the specific form those problems take and the specific manner 
in which they can be addressed.  
The specific form those problems took consisted of a failure to recognize the disagreements 
dividing Europe from antiquity—not unlike the failure I have imputed to historians today. “The 
continuity supposedly uniting Europe with antiquity, it seems to me, is a canard we owe to the 
confusion of history with science. What actually united Europe with antiquity was an ongoing 
dialectic of disagreements about the most fundamental questions that human beings face and that 
could never be concluded because Europe kept making it a point of pride to measure itself against 
the very antiquity from which it had long since departed—a departure nowhere more evident than 
in the growth of the vernaculars and in the transformation of Latin from a language spoken by 
ordinary people into the possession of a literate elite. That was a change in form of life.  
The problems peaked when scholastic theologians, jurists, and philosophers claimed the ability 
to demonstrate the truth about the God of Christianity, the law of ancient Rome, and the philosophy 
of Aristotle with scientific certainty in terms no ancient would have recognized. They peaked 
because the scholastics never recognized the gulf dividing their thinking from the very ancient 
writings on whose authority they based themselves, and never took responsibility for the sheer 
novelty of the criteria on which they came to be agreed. Their confidence divided Europe into 
factions—via moderna and via antiqua, conciliarists and papalists, clergy and laity, Protestants and 
Catholics—fighting each other with increasing passion because they could not tell the difference 
between their disagreements with each other and their disagreements with the dead. 
The specific manner in which those problems were addressed consisted of a turn from science to 
language. That turn was made by humanists and by reformers with very much the same resolve.98 
The significance historians of Renaissance and Reformation have long attributed to that turn thus is 
entirely deserved. But it is difficult to understand the full extent of that significance unless it is 
framed in the terms that Wittgenstein provided in the Philosophical Investigations. In those terms 
“the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” [8], nr. 23, p. 15e) and “giving 
orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat, are as much a part of our natural history as 
walking, eating, drinking, playing” ([8], nr. 25, p. 16e). For “it is in their language that human 
beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” ([8], nr. 241, p. 94e). 
                                                 
98.  That is the reason why this essay pays virtually no attention to the differences between Renaissance and 
Reformation. Needless to say, those differences are great. But what matters for present purposes is that 
humanists and reformers subjected the language of scholastics to equally pointed criticism and treated 
the language of antiquity with equally great respect. That the former lavished their attention on classical 
Greek and Roman writers whereas the latter lavished theirs on the Bible and the Fathers is of secondary 
interest here—particularly since neither humanists nor reformers ever divided their attention between 
ancient pagan, Jewish, and Christian writings nearly as sharply as we tend to imagine. It is solely for the 
sake of simplicity that the following remarks are focused on Humanism. Mutatis mutandis they apply 
equally to the Reformation. 
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In those terms language is more than a means of communication and nothing like a veil or 
screen dividing us from past or present reality. It rather is the essence of humanity, the practice that 
makes human beings human, a part of human nature. “What we are supplying,” Wittgenstein said, 
“are really remarks on the natural history of human beings” ([8], nr. 415, p. 132e; cf. [10],  
pp. 149–58, 237–87). The natural history he had in mind is not to be confused with what is 
commonly so called. So far from being founded on the distinctions that lend conceptual stability to 
natural history as it is usually understood—distinctions like those between mind and matter, culture 
and nature, language and reality—the natural history of human beings in Wittgenstein’s sense has 
precisely the reverse relation to those conceptual distinctions: it furnishes the ground from which 
they draw their sense. It is analytically prior to all conceptual distinctions. It is therefore a matter of 
neither language nor reality, neither culture nor nature, neither mind nor matter. It is not scientific 
and cannot be based on evidence. It is the history of a form of life whose essence is the ability to 
speak. It is told in the form of grammatical remarks—remarks on language—because “essence is 
expressed in grammar” ([8], nr. 373, p. 123e).99 That makes the natural history of human beings one 
and the same with the history of language. 
That is the kind of history, it seems to me, that Humanism sought to teach. Its subject matter 
was the language (the form of life) in which human beings are agreed and the nature (the essence) 
of human beings as expressed in grammar. Studia humanitatis is not a metaphor. When humanists 
studied grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy, they studied precisely what they 
said they did: humanity. They studied humanity in order to solve their disagreements with antiquity, 
not by rejecting the form of science to which they owed those disagreements, but by staking their 
claim on humanity properly understood, drawing firm boundaries round the terrain where science 
has the right to rule, and learning to distinguish their disagreements with each other from 
disagreements with antiquity.  
On this understanding it is plain nonsense to conceive of Humanism in terms of the distinction 
between content and form. Humanism has no content but matters of form: forms of speech, forms 
of language, forms of life, and forms of humanity.100 It gives knowledge not of things but of their 
essence; not of data but of criteria; not of facts but of their meaning. To identify Humanism with a 
specific doctrine or a specific set of disciplines is to miss its significance.101 To treat Humanism as 
the enemy or the successor of Scholasticism is to misunderstand the character of the distinction 
between the two and to ignore the great respect scholastic forms of knowledge continued to enjoy 
side-by-side Humanism well beyond Renaissance and Reformation (cf. [37–40]). Scholars who 
base their understanding of Humanism, not on the nature of humanity, but on the differences 
                                                 
99. This corroborates the significance Ronald Witt ([26], pp. 6–7, 16–17), attributes to the study of grammar, 
not rhetoric, as the most fundamental humanist endeavor, albeit on entirely different grounds. 
100. For explicit criticisms of misleading applications of the distinction between content and form from 
different points of view see Gray [27] and White [28]. 
101. Hans Baron (1900–88) was right to stress the significance of Humanism, but not to identify it with a 
specific form of politics ([29], cf. [30,31]). Paul Oskar Kristeller (1905–1999) was equally right to point 
out that Humanism focused on the study of classical grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral 
philosophy, but missed an opportunity to spell out why such studies mattered ([32]; cf. [33–35]). Two 
outstanding recent accounts of Italian Humanism have been provided by Witt [26] and Fubini [36]. 
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dividing humanists from other human beings betray a preoccupation with the distinctive qualities 
of scholars that does justice neither to the humanity of scholars nor that of the illiterate.  
Humanism was precisely the right means to come to terms with the disagreements that peaked 
in scholastic thought and proved invulnerable to scholastic means of analysis. If it concerned itself 
with anything specific being said, or the specific language in which it was being said, then only 
because language cannot be used at all, much less used well or studied, except by saying something 
in some language, regardless of whether something is a matter of love or hate, peace or war, art or 
science, ethics or law, politics or religion, philosophy or theology, and regardless of whether the 
language is ancient or modern, classical or vernacular, poetry or prose. Humanism demonstrates 
the clarity with which its proponents understood that their disagreements with each other did not 
turn on the difference between true and false, but differences in language. It held out the hope of 
agreement in a form of life that could be shared by the literate and the illiterate alike, and that 
would let them express their disagreements with the dead with the respect the dead deserve.  
That hope, it seems to me, united humanists with reformers in a cause that makes the differences 
between them seem marginal—until their hope was dashed. It explains why they devoted 
themselves to studying ancient languages and ancient ways of life with a degree of urgency that 
must seem baffling, if not completely incomprehensible, to anyone who does not recognize the 
ability to speak as the essence of humanity. When they said that they were bringing antiquity back 
to life, they were under no illusion that antiquity was something like a corpse that could have been 
resuscitated in the rude sense with which their purpose has sometimes been confused. So far  
from ignoring the differences dividing them from antiquity, they gave those differences much  
greater prominence than anyone had done before. If they did bring antiquity to life, they did so,  
not by forging some kind of magical identity but quite the opposite, by restoring antiquity to the  
standing of one of two different parties in the dialectical relation between the present and the past  
(cf. [41–44]). They understood what the ancients had known and the scholastics had forgotten: that 
the humanity of human beings unites them in the very act by which they take responsibility for 
differences dividing them from each other.  
That strikes me as an outstanding reason to keep referring to the period as Renaissance and 
Reformation. The reason is not simply that Renaissance and Reformation reflect the understanding 
that humanists and reformers had of their place in time. Nor is it simply that Renaissance and 
Reformation flag the respect they had for antiquity. And least of all it is that Renaissance and 
Reformation have the authority of tradition. That early modern history is a newfangled way of 
speaking about the period is no good reason for rejecting it. Renaissance and Reformation 
themselves are terms that were newfangled once. Tradition, as the saying goes, consists of 
innovations that have worked.  
What gives Renaissance and Reformation a great advantage over early modern history is that 
they render a service, not to tradition or the past, but to ourselves. We call ourselves historians and we 
regard our discipline either as one of the humanities or as a social science more closely related to the 
humanities than social sciences like economics and sociology.102 But our practice puts us at odds with 
                                                 
102. At the University of Chicago the Department of History is housed in the Division of the Social Sciences, 
not the Humanities. 
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humanists and reformers in Renaissance and Reformation. It rather makes us cousins of the scholastic 
theologians preceding them. Like our cousins, we are divided into conservatives who claim that our 
knowledge reflects reality because it is in fact reality we know (our via antiqua) and critics who claim 
that reality lies irretrievably beyond our ken because our knowledge merely reflects the categories of 
our understanding (our via moderna). Like our cousins, we have not grasped the role that disagreements 
with the dead play in our form of life and we hold language cheap. We lag behind the humanists 
and the reformers. We have not risen to the challenge our time poses to us as they did rise to theirs.  
As far as I can tell, the turn to early modern history confirms that diagnosis. At best, it replaces 
disagreements historians once had about the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the 
Modern Age with disagreements about the beginning and the end of early modern history. At worst 
it prevents us from taking responsibility for our criteria of judgment and identity. By contrast 
Renaissance and Reformation bring us directly face to face with the significance of disagreements 
with the dead and the significance of grammar for treating those disagreements. Renaissance and 
Reformation do not tell us what that significance might be all by themselves. But they will not let 
us forget the cause uniting humanists and reformers. That makes them very much worth keeping. 
7. Conclusions 
Europe’s relationship to antiquity can serve historians as a criterion with which to tell how 
Europe met the challenge the past gives all human beings all the time. At times Europe was confident 
of having met that challenge. At such times, Europe could well afford to focus its energies on science. 
Scholasticism, Enlightenment, and the nineteenth century come to mind. At other times Europe’s 
confidence was shaken, Europe’s agreements turned into faction, and Europe’s disagreements with 
the dead demanded a kind of knowledge no science has on offer, regardless of whether the science 
is logical, mathematical, physical, or any other kind. At those times, grammar took precedence. 
There may be no time in European history when disagreements with antiquity proved more 
difficult to manage than during Renaissance and Reformation—except perhaps the time when the 
Ottonians restored the Roman Empire and when the Pope, as St. Bernard once put it, transformed 
himself from the successor of St. Peter into the successor of Emperor Constantine.103 And there 
may be no time when grammar was needed more urgently to understand what human beings share, 
what makes them different from each other, and what they are to do about their disagreements with 
the dead—except perhaps the time beginning when Wittgenstein was born.104  
                                                 
103. “In all that belongs to earthly magnificence thou hast succeeded not Peter, but Constantine.” ([45],  
p. 119). 
104. For a succinct statement of the deep opposition in which Wittgenstein found himself to what he 
considered to be the spirit of his times, complete with an expression of a desire to write “to the glory of 
God” that does not seem unlike the desires of humanists and reformers, including his stress on the 
deplorable circumstances thwarting fulfillment of his desire, see the foreword he wrote for his 
Philosophical Remarks in 1930, ([46], p. 7): “This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with 
its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American 
civilization in which all of us stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever 
larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter 
what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery—in its variety; the second at its 
80 
Renaissance and Reformation were probably the last time when disagreements with antiquity 
posed the main challenge to Europe’s agreement in form of life. The antiquity from which we find 
ourselves divided nowadays is no longer that of ancient Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome, but that of 
humanity as a whole, from its pre-hominid beginnings via the spread of Homo sapiens across the 
globe to the invention of urban and rural forms of settlement that used to typify most human life 
until as recently as only two centuries ago. The forms of life we have since then invented differ so 
deeply from all their predecessors that Europe itself is fast receding into antiquity. Our successors 
will have less reason to study ancient Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome than our predecessors did. But 
they will find it just as difficult to tell the difference between their disagreements with each other 
and their disagreements with the dead, and they will still need grammar to maintain their humanity. 
It is a sobering thought that the attention humanists and reformers lavished on language was not 
enough to stop Europe from entering into civil wars that wreaked more havoc with Europe's 
agreement in form of life than anything had done before. On that score scholars who stress the 
differences dividing humanists from other human beings make an important point. Their point is 
proof of the grave difficulties that human beings face in learning how to exercise the faculty of 
speech without destroying the agreement—the humanity—they owe to that very faculty. Today 
those difficulties may well be greater than they have ever been before. That makes for an 
outstanding reason to keep studying the history of, not early modern Europe, but Renaissance  
and Reformation. 
Appendix 
Though not widely used before World War II, early modern, especially in the combination 
medieval and early modern, with a meaning not quite like that under consideration here, but not far 
removed from it either, has sporadically appeared in the title of historical writings since at least 
1869 in such expressions as early modern history, early modern period, early modern times, early 
modern age, and early modern Europe; see [47–53]. Since World War II early modern has 
gradually become as popular as Renaissance and decidedly more popular than Reformation. That, 
at least, is suggested by searching the full text of history journals on JSTOR (excluding external 
links) for the terms Renaissance, Reformation, and early modern, counting their frequency in 
five-year increments from 1945–2009 (inclusive), and examining the results, which I did on 9 July 
2011 for the 262 history journals available on JSTOR on that day.  
Table 1 shows how often each of the three terms Renaissance, Reformation, and early modern 
appeared in the full text of those 262 history journals during a given five-year period from 
1945–2009. It tells us that the frequency of all three terms has been growing steadily since 1945. 
But that merely reflects the steadily increasing number of history journals and articles published 
                                                                                                                                                                 
centre—in its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, 
from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the 
same. I would like to say ‘This book is written to the glory of God,’ but nowadays that would be 
chicanery [Schurkerei], that is, it would not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in good 
will, and in so far as it is not so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it 
condemned. He cannot free it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them.” 
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during those same years. (The mixed picture for 2000–2004 and the sharp drop in 2005–2009 are 
presumably artifacts of the embargo most journals place on the online availability of recent issues.) 
The picture looks quite different if one examines the frequency of the three terms relative to 
each other, as on Chart 1 below. The chart demonstrates a decline in the relative frequency of 
Renaissance starting around 1960 and continuing steadily thereafter (by about a third, from 59% of 
the total in 1960–64 to 40% of the total in 2005–09); a more marked but equally steady decline for 
Reformation from a smaller starting base (by about two fifths, from 36% in 1960–64 to 21% in 
2005–09); and a tenfold increase during the same period for early modern from a tiny starting base 
(from 4% to 39%). 
A few points of historical detail may lend some color to this picture. In 1951, not long after 
World War II, Erich Hassinger [54] made an early and particularly emphatic plea for treating the 
history of Europe from roughly 1300 to the French Revolution as a single period, though without 
using the term early modern; cf. the encouraging response by Fernand Braudel [55]. Hassinger 
followed up in 1959 with a comprehensive account of early modern history in his Werden des 
neuzeitlichen Europa, 1300–1600, the first volume of a three-volume Geschichte der Neuzeit 
edited by Gerhard Ritter ([56], esp. pp. xi–xviii). In 1970, about twenty years later, Eugene Rice 
published his Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460–1559 [57]. This may well be the most 
successful textbook ever written about early modern Europe; see ([58], p. 298). It was at least 
partially responsible for making early modern a standard and widely used instrument in the 
historian's toolkit. Its staying power was confirmed in 1994, almost a quarter century later, when it 
was published in a revised edition co-authored by Anthony Grafton [59]. 
For a sampling of more recent scholarly perspectives on the uses of early modern see 
[58,60–67], and consider the programmatic statements in the Handbook of European History, 
1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation edited by Thomas A. Brady, Jr., 
Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy ([68], vol. 1, pp. xiii–xxiv), where early modern is 
preferred and Renaissance and Reformation are “freed from the great burden of being ‘the turning 
point’ of European history” (p. xxiv), as well as the preface “From the Editors” by Heiko Oberman 
and James Tracy to the first issue of the Journal of Early Modern History ([69], p. 1), where early 
modern is used to designate a period in world history.  
The Society for Renaissance Studies in Britain continues to publish Renaissance Studies, and 
the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at UCLA continues to publish Viator with the 
subtitle Medieval and Renaissance Studies. But the Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 
published since 1971 by Duke University Press was renamed Journal of Medieval and Early 
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Abstract: This article suggests a framework for moving toward a global history of 
voting and democracy that focuses less on the diffusion of European ideas (however 
important those ideas were) than on embedding the history of voting within a 
worldwide history of ideas on sovereignty. The article posits a general framework for 
such a history focusing on a “conundrum of sovereignty” grounding legitimate rule in a 
space imagined as simultaneously within and outside worldly society. Rooted in a 
“secular theology” such ideas shaped in the 19th and 20th centuries the establishment 
of systems of mass voting (including the secret ballot), and the sovereignty of the 
“people” both in Europe and other parts of the world alike, in the process producing an 
image of the individual voter as an “enchanted individual.” The article looks at 
developments within Europe and in India in these terms.105 
Keywords: voting; democracy; sovereignty; elections; people; conundrum; 
Europeanization; India; secret ballot; influence; secular theology; enchanted individual 
 
Introduction 
The world-wide history of elections and democracy has often in recent decades been portrayed 
as a history of diffusion. In his Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human Rights and 
Democracy, John Headley has written a compelling account of the power of universalizing 
European ideas, including democracy, as a global legacy. Europe, in Headley’s framework, 
represents the critical node from which democracy’s underlying ideas were diffused to the world. 
                                                 
105  I gratefully acknowledge the journal’s two anonymous referees’ helpful responses to an earlier draft of  
this paper. 
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That the “spread of democracy” has become in recent years a foreign policy imperative linked to 
the spread of American power and hegemony, a tendency perhaps most dramatically on display in 
America’s invasion of Iraq, is a fact of which Headley is well aware and highly critical. Yet, as 
Headley readily acknowledges, the fact that democratic ideas have sometimes been embedded in a 
history of Euro-American conquest and imperialism, and have a complex and conflicted history 
even in Europe itself, hardly lessens their importance as a legacy to the world. Rather, his argument is 
that the European development of these ideas has been a unique phenomenon, which therefore requires 
that we conceptualize their worldwide influence in terms of their outward spread from the European 
nexus in which they originally developed [1].  
Such a view is hardly entirely new. The search for a global history of voting, with European and 
American transformations at its center, extends back at least as far as Charles Seymour and Donald 
Paige Frary’s multivolume history, How the World Votes: The Story of Democratic Development in 
Elections, published in 1918. Yet many scholars have also been wary of such narratives. Some 
have stressed the variety of traditions of voting and democracy even within Europe itself and its 
overseas offshoots. Thus, in their work on the history of the secret ballot, which has now become 
the UN-endorsed “global norm” for voting, Malcolm and Tom Crook detail the complex and 
conflicted history of this practice in America, Britain, and France alike. Similarly, in his survey of 
“Where and When was Democracy Invented?” John Markoff has found no clear “center” for a 
narrative of the modern history of voting practices. “The history of democracy is profoundly 
polycentric,” he writes, “and an exclusive or even disproportionate focus on the world’s centers of 
wealth and power will miss much.”106 Other scholars have critiqued European diffusionism by 
pointing to the many, little studied traditions of voting and consultative assemblies existing outside 
the framework of European influence, particularly at the local level ([4], pp. 23–45). Perhaps the 
most thoroughgoing critique of diffusionism in this vein was offered by J. M. Blaut in his The 
Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (1993).  
Nevertheless, it is true, as Headley persuasively argues, that European ideas have in fact played 
a critical role in the world-wide history of democracy, and it is vital, as Headley suggests, for 
historians to take this seriously. Whatever the histories of earlier voting practices in some contexts, 
modern electoral practices in most parts of the non-European world have, particularly in their legal 
forms, overtly evoked European voting models, a process that can traced back at least to late 
19th-century Japan. The history of India, which today manages the largest single electoral arena in 
the world, is a case in point. Today’s Indian electoral system owes much in its structure and form 
to the introduction of elections into India by the British as a central element in India’s political 
structure. Indeed, a history of democracy in India that failed to take account of the roots of many of 
Indian democratic forms, processes, and ideas in the subcontinent’s long connection to Great 
Britain, could hardly do justice to the central importance of voting in India’s political system today. 
The political theorizing (and political contradictions) that shaped Britain’s evolving electoral 
system in the 19th century remain in some ways a living legacy in shaping the ongoing evolution of 
India’s 20th-century electoral system.  
                                                 
106  [2], pp. 199–237; [3], p. 689. Interestingly, however, despite Markoff’s emphasis on polycentricism and 
the Crooks’ emphasis on the “global”, in neither of these works is there any serious effort, even in 
invoking the “global,” to move beyond the history of Europe and its overseas colonial offshoots.  
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Yet there are still many fundamental reasons why it would be a distortion to see such 
connections as simply, or even primarily, as one of diffusion. Ideas relating to democracy and 
voting were everywhere closely linked to concrete structures of power, and it thus makes little 
sense to see processes of voting and democracy as products of the diffusion of seemingly 
free-floating ideas that developed in deep contextual interaction with European politics, but which 
then can be imagined to emerge in developed form to influence other parts of the world. Beyond 
this, if ideas relating to democracy are truly to be seen in a world-wide context, then the larger 
human dilemmas within which they have been framed, need to be tackled also against a 
world-wide backdrop. Whatever the distinctive history of democratic ideas in modern Europe, and 
in particular of the idea of the “people’s sovereignty” lying at democracy’s heart, the historical 
significance of European ideas on a global scale is best assessed if the development of popular 
sovereignty is analyzed against the broader backdrop of sovereignty itself as a problem in political 
theory long confronted in societies all around the world. Ideas shaping voting, as an ultimately 
worldwide phenomenon, must be seen, in other words, in Europe and in other parts of the world 
alike, as deeply embedded in larger ideas about the nature of sovereignty and legitimate rule.  
The Global Framing of Sovereignty 
To provide such a global frame for sovereignty, it is useful to begin with the work of Carl 
Schmitt, who argued in the 1920s that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts” ([5], p. 36). This provides an important frame for bringing the 
histories of sovereignty in Europe and in many other parts of the world into mutual conversation, 
for in this framework they can be viewed as variant “theologies of power” or, to use Schmitt’s 
term, “political theologies” [6]. Schmitt’s emphases in fact offer a frame for grounding the more 
particular problems of democracy’s world-wide trajectories in larger questions about the 
relationship of worldly and cosmic power. But for our purposes here, the values of Schmitt’s 
specific theories are still limited, for whatever their potentially universalizing implications, they are 
deeply embedded within the specific history of European Christianity. In order to move toward a 
global history of voting, it is important to step outside Europe before returning to a discussion of 
the influence of European ideas on the world.  
For this, the work of the Sanskritist, J. C. Heesterman, provides a useful starting point. 
Heesterman has given us an overarching explication of the theology of sovereignty in premodern 
India that provides, I would argue, a frame for such a global discussion of sovereignty (and thus, 
ultimately, of the sovereignty of the “people’ in the modern world). At the heart of Heesterman’s 
argument is his notion that kingly sovereignty, whatever its forms, was at its root not a seamless 
ideology, but a “conundrum.” For Heesterman, the “conundrum of the king’s authority” lay 
historically in an irresolvable contradiction, relating to the nature of power in the world, that all 
sovereigns faced: to be effective and legitimate, the king had to somehow be a part of the social 
community he ruled and yet, simultaneously, stand outside it ([7], p. 117). To put this a different 
way, legitimacy hinged on the sovereign’s ability to project himself as the embodiment of the 
community as a unity, an abstract entity standing outside politics, even as he ruled from within the 
community, managing its differences and conflicts in the name of order. 
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This conundrum, as Heesterman argued, ultimately played itself out in India in different ways.  
It was reflected in the tension between kings, whose skills and violence allowed them to maintain 
social order, and brahmans, who were associated with ritual powers linked to cosmic forces outside 
the community. It was reflected in the mythic association of kings with the world “outside” the 
community, the forest, the world beyond civilized settlement, a connection that was re-emphasized 
in ritual cycles, even as the king managed everyday conflict within the worlds of agricultural 
settlement and cities. It was reflected also in the association of kingship with renunciation, always 
in tension with the ongoing social entanglements that actually ensnared an effective king. But 
central to his argument was that whatever forms sovereignty’s manifestations took, these could 
never resolve what was ultimately an insoluble paradox. “The king had to be both part of the 
community and external to it,” Heesterman writes ([7], p. 118). Without this, sovereignty could not 
operate. Critically, he argued, “Indian tradition, instead of trying to solve the problem, 
acknowledge[d] its insolubility” ([7], p. 157). 
This paradox is, of course, framed in Heesterman’s story in distinctively Indian terms, but it 
points toward the relationship of sovereignty to a more universal problem, the question of the 
relationship of divinity to the world as a backdrop for understanding sovereignty—or, to put this 
another way, of the relationship of cosmic powers standing outside human society to the problem 
of legitimate worldly rule. We can thus see this same “conundrum of sovereignty,” though in 
different forms, in multiple contexts. Azfar Moin, for example, has written compellingly with 
respect to the evolution of such ideas in the Muslim Safavid and Mughal empires. However much 
the legitimacy of the sovereign hinged on the management of diverse groups and diverse interests 
within the social/political world, sovereignty was also critically linked for them to sacred 
(particularly sufi and millennial) models of authority that, even if sometimes in tension with sacred 
law, defined touchstones of sovereignty outside the constraints of worldly community [8]. Such 
tensions framed visions of sovereign authority in Europe as well, a fact that has been explicated 
most clearly in Ernst Kantorowicz’s analysis of the doctrine of the “king’s two bodies,” the one 
immanent and mortal, grounded in worldly politics, the other eternal, representing authority’s 
grounding in a cosmic order that framed the collectivity as a unity existing outside time, outside the 
internal politics that divided it [9]. Such visions of sovereignty could be multiplied around the 
world in similar terms. Yet, taking Heesterman’s arguments as a guide, what is noteworthy about 
all these forms of sovereignty was the underlying, almost mystical, insolubility of the conundrum 
that lay at sovereignty’s heart.  
Critically, this paradox also provides a central backdrop for understanding the modern evolution 
of what many would see as Europe’s greatest contribution to the history of sovereignty—and 
certainly to the history of voting and democracy—the idea of the “sovereignty of the people.” 
Edmund Morgan, has thus remarked on the structural significance of the old idea of the “king’s two 
bodies,” in inflecting the defining tensions shaping the emergence of the idea of the sovereign 
“people” in Britain and America ([10], pp. 78–93). Others have traced in considerable detail the 
role of specifically European theological models in influencing competing, intellectual visions of 
sovereignty in Europe, a complex story, on which much has been written, that is well beyond our 
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treatment here. 107  But in relating this story to the larger history of sovereignty—and to 
Heesterman’s conundrum—the key is tracing the transplantation of this conundrum into the 
individual self, which provided the foundation, ultimately, for the imagining of the “people” to be 
sovereign. The vision of the individual as both an active player in the world, and yet, at the very 
same time, as an autonomous moral agent, transcending the bonds of society, was of course one 
with a distinctive European trajectory in religion and political theory. As Headley himself points 
out, the idea of “sacred individuality as a property of the self,” was a key in the development of 
democracy, linked as it was to notions of “human equality, dignity, and reciprocal recognition” 
([1], p. 218). But the most powerful element in the “sacred” here was its secular evocation in terms 
of what we might call in a broader sense an “enchanted” individual self, an image of the self 
defined in its relationship to the world by sovereignty’s insoluble conundrum.108  
The emergence of the idea of the individual’s “enchantment” was in fact only made possible in 
by its association with the large political changes that marked the 19th century as an era of rapid 
political and socio-economic change. Indeed, the individual’s “enchantment” was inextricably 
linked to another powerful idea that marked this era: the association of modernity—and the 
19th-century transformation of the state—with what Max Weber famously called in 1917 the 
“disenchantment of the world.” This too is an idea that has received much historical treatment. The 
world’s “disenchantment” was associated not only with the rise of science, but also with the 
“rationalization, secularization and bureaucratization” that accompanied the rise of the ever more 
intrusive European state ([13], p. 695). But the “disenchantment” of both nature and society, which 
empowered the ever-expanding action of the state upon both, is hard to comprehend unless we also 
imagine its being linked to an “enchanted” individual who stood outside the world, an autonomous 
observer who made sense of the world through reason, and was thus the bearer of an almost 
mystical autonomy.  
To suggest the linking of these processes, it is useful to turn to Foucault’s famous analysis of 
Bentham’s panopticon, an imagined prison with a central guard tower from which all prisoners 
were under perpetual observation. Foucault presents this as a model for a new 19th-century 
structure of discipline, one in which the ubiquitousness of external surveillance prompted the 
internalization of surveillance into the self as a form of self-discipline, increasingly diffused within 
society. But this internalization was always ambiguous, for, as Stefanos Geroulanos writes in 
                                                 
107  The writing on this is, of course, extensive, but one recent effort to provide a framework for 
understanding different visions of sovereignty based on a distinction (using theological terms) between 
“immanent” and “transcendent” theories of sovereignty is Lior Barshack. He thus distinguishes between 
visions of sovereignty derived from the structure of social relations in the here and now, such as is found 
in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes, with transcendent theories, defined by the projected existence of a 
collective, immortal “corporate body,” conceived as existing outside the realm of the present and 
transcending the social, which is the locus of sovereignty. See, [11] and [12]. 
108  The term “enchanted” is one that comes with much baggage, as it has often been used to refer to the 
worlds of magic and wonders that survived the rise of science, and has thus sometimes been also 
associated with an elitist critique of popular “irrationality.” (For a good overview of its historiography, 
see [13].) I use it here precisely to emphasize an image of the self conceived as standing outside the 
world of science and society, like the sacred, yet also conceived of in secular terms rather than overtly 
religious terms.  
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commenting on Foucault’s parable, the effects of the panopticon on the individual derived both 
from the force of external control and observation, and from the hidden nature of the central 
observer in the panopticon who, like God, was unseen, “at once present and absent” ([14], p. 642). 
Viewed from this perspective, the internalization of surveillance into the self of necessity involved 
two contradictory and interlinked aspects; it entailed, on the one hand, the internalization of 
self-discipline (associated with the 19th century expansion of forms of education and social 
control), and, on the other, the incorporation into the individual self of the image of the omniscient 
observer himself, hidden and standing apart from society. If this was the self’s internal governor, 
its internalization also defined the individual’s claims to an “enchanted” autonomy from the social 
world, an image of detached omniscience powerfully reflected in 19th century science, literature 
and history. Though perhaps highly schematized, such a model helps to provide a frame for 
imagining the “enchanted,” sovereign self, as at once, like God, standing apart from the pressures 
of society, and yet at the same time increasingly bound into society’s expanding influences.  
It was from this perspective that the “disenchantment of the world” and the “enchantment” of 
the individual came to be imagined as logically, if paradoxically, linked, a relationship that made 
possible the imagining of the people’s sovereignty in the late 19th century as a living political 
force, defining a collectivity of sovereign individuals who were both the object of the state’s power 
(through its increasingly powerful operation on an objectified “society”) and, at the very same 
time, the source of a sovereign authority controlling and containing the state’s power. And it was 
the individual voter who embodied both sides of this equation, a man of the world defined by his 
sociology, his objectifiable class, identity and interests, and a man imagined at the very same time 
to be endowed with a freedom of will that put him beyond sociology, and thus capable of 
exercising autonomy as sovereignty’s enchanted essence.109 
The tensions in this formulation were of course marked (and played themselves out in much 
writing on the nature of the self in the late 19th century), but with respect to voting they were 
captured most clearly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in controversies surrounding the 
introduction of the secret ballot, which came to represent a symbolic expression of popular 
sovereignty’s conundrum. Though the secret ballot has now become naturalized in popular thinking 
as inseparable from democratic voting, the deep tensions it embodied can be seen in the long 
19th-century debate on the introduction of the secret ballot in England. Though few of these 
debates were cast explicitly in terms of the nature of sovereignty, at their root was a powerful 
undercurrent focused on the tension between the imagined autonomy (and free choice) of the voter, 
on the one hand, and the immanent pressures of society and social influence, on the other. The 
focus of these debates was in fact framed by Sir William Blackstone’s famous reflections in the 
mid-18th century on the dangers of “undue influence” to the very “principles of liberty” that 
underlay the meaning of consent and voting. Since social pressures, and dependence, could 
undercut the autonomy of voters, property qualifications were essential, Blackstone argued, in 
order to exclude from voting those persons who were “under the immediate dominion of others” or 
                                                 
109  Such a vision of the individual as simultaneously within society, and yet defined by an essence setting  
him apart from it, can be found with a variety of nuances in nineteenth- century social theorists. (See,  
for example, [15], pp. 149–63).  
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too poor to have a “will of their own.”110 Blackstone thus laid out a framework in which the 
insoluble tension between individual “free will” and the pressures of social circumstances lay at the 
very heart of voting’s meaning. Though for Blackstone this tension could be addressed by a system 
of voting based on property that excluded those who were, as he put it, “suspected to have no will 
of their own” (which included not only the propertyless, but also women and children, whatever the 
theoretical universality of the “principles of liberty”), his concerns pointed toward the fundamental 
conundrum that would shape law on voting as pressure for the expansion of the franchise increased 
in the 19th century.  
It was this conundrum that in fact provided the context for much of the debate on the secret 
ballot in the 19th century. On one level, of course, the argument for the secret ballot was a 
pragmatic one, focused simply on how to limit the pressures of social influence on voting in a 
practical way. Thus John Stuart Mill argued in favor of the secret ballot in 1850 on the ground that 
votes cast on the basis of social influence, rather than on the dictates of individual “judgment” 
rooted in “conscience”, “virtue”, and “moral obligation,” could only produce “a faithless, a 
prostitute, a pernicious vote” (quoted in [17], p. 52). In such circumstances, secrecy was practically 
necessary to protect the individual’s free judgment. But for many, the secret ballot was not just a 
practical measure; it symbolized, in a sense, the spatial marking of the voter’s core of 
autonomy—the antithesis of everyday socio-political influence—as the key to voting’s meaning. 
“Free agency is the very soul of voting,” George Grote, the philosophical radical and early 
champion of the ballot thus wrote in the 1830s. The great evil of the day,” he continued, in 
describing what was in actual fact an inescapable part of every election, “is that everyone thinks he 
has a right to employ his influence over another” ([18], p. 30). Put in these terms, Grote’s advocacy 
of the secret ballot thus seemed to go beyond simply protecting the voter from overt coercive 
pressure (however important that was) to imagining the secrecy of the ballot, in an enclosed voting 
booth, as a spatial reflection of an individual will that stood conceptually apart from the very idea 
of social influence. The ballot was thus, for the voter “a secret,” as Grote put it, “of his own 
conscience, which no human being can fathom” (quoted in [19], p. 51). Voting was, in other words, 
an act beyond objectification. The demand for the secret ballot, which was finally accepted in 
Britain in 1872, thus underscored that if voting was necessarily an open and highly political 
process (in which influence was both necessary and inevitable), the individual act of voting itself 
was also hidden, internal, standing apart from society’s constitutive social and political bonds. It 
was, in other words, an enactment of sovereignty’s conundrum—an act by “enchanted individuals,” 
who, though embedded in society as an essential concomitant to the political meaning of elections, 
nevertheless somehow stood, in their essence, apart from it.  
Such tensions, of course—even as embodied in the secret ballot—did more to dramatize the 
underlying contradictions in the concept of the people’s sovereignty than to resolve them. In terms 
of the global history of voting, and its grounding in a world-wide history of sovereignty, it is in fact 
important to note that certain key 19th-century developments in voting, such as the spread of the 
                                                 
110  [16], 1, p. 165. Though the emphasis on property-holding was critical to evolving theories of popular 
sovereignty, it is important to note, as Edmund Morgan does, that this does not necessarily mean that in 
actual fact property owners were somehow immune to the pressures of social influence. ([10], pp. 
158–59). 
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secret ballot, actually flew in the face of some of the earlier discourses of popular consent that had 
evolved from the European enlightenment and earlier. In fact, the secret ballot seemed to challenge 
for some a long-emerging vision of the “public” in England as constituted by men, fortified by 
dominion in the private/domestic realm, who could forthrightly speak in public to bring reason to 
bear as a check on the state. This was a vision of a free, open realm of rational discussion as a 
critical form of surveillance over power, a notion of the public sphere, as historically delineated in 
the work of Jurgen Habermas, as a vital framework for popular consent ([20], pp. 237–56; [21], 
16–42; [22]). But even though the voter was, in theory, a bearer of reasoned consent, the secret 
ballot seemed to challenge the transparency of reason. From such a perspective, secret voting could 
be read as subversive of the public square itself, an affront not only to open, reasoned argument as 
the source of public authority, but also a rebuke to enlightenment values (and one in which 
individual autonomy, even in affective or “irrational” form, could potentially be read as more 
important to government by consent than reason). It was this concern that led Mill himself to 
eventually turn against the secret ballot, arguing that it was better if votes, which were a trust of the 
community, were cast openly.111  
Of course, the triumph of the secret ballot in 1872 in some ways put an end to this debate in 
England—as in most European countries, where the secret ballot was adopted during the late 
19th-/early 20th-century era ([3], pp. 674–77; [26], pp. 449–71). But historians have continued to 
debate its significance in terms of the long-term evolution in England—and elsewhere—of 
democratic values.112 While the expansion of the franchise in the late 19th century affirmed an 
image of democratic equality, these years also witnessed, in social reality, an escalation of inequality 
and class conflict ([25], pp. 86–87). Given these pressures, some have seen the introduction of the 
ballot as a practical, institutional mechanism of limiting popular pressures on elite power, precisely 
by framing the individual within the voting booth as removed from direct, public mobilization. 
Others, in contrast have seen voting as an important pedagogical institution, empowering new 
visions in the late 19th century of popular influence over elite government.113 But from our 
perspective here, the secret ballot was most important in crystallizing the paradoxical relationship 
                                                 
111  [23]; [24], pp. 354–78. For a discussion of the secret ballot that is cast in terms of a broader analysis of 
secrecy in England as a marker of those things whose place within the larger structure of liberal values 
was “undecidable,” see [25]. One might also speculatively suggest that this emphasis on autonomy over 
reason also pointed toward many of the tensions in 20th century democracy, including, in some ways, the 
rise of fascism. 
112  The lasting tensions that it has embodied were captured, as late as 1971, in telling comments by 
Jean-Paul Sartre: “The isoloir [voting booth], planted in the middle of the school hall or the council 
chamber, symbolizes all the acts of treason that an individual can commit against the groups with which 
he is involved. It says to everyone: ‘No one can see you; you are responsible only to yourself; you are 
making your decision in complete isolation and, afterwards, you can conceal your verdict or even lie 
about it.” (Quoted in [26], p. 470). 
113  The argument that the secret ballot, and contemporaneous changes in party organization, were associated  
in Britain with a restriction of popular democratic political culture, is made in [27]. A contrary argument, 
focusing on the importance of individual autonomy and choice as a key legal element in the elaboration 
of mass electoral democracy, and also in the spread of democratic values (which was reflected in the 
eventual recognition of the secret ballot), is made powerfully for pre-WWI Germany in [28]. 
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between individual will, social influence, and the workings of democracy, that defined the 
attempted embodiment in 19th- and 20th-century Europe of a vision of the people’s sovereignty in 
mass voting. The grounding of the secret ballot in older religious ideas, in “political theologies,” 
has in fact been the subject of considerable debate. But the argument here is that the ballot is best 
seen not simply against the backdrop of a specific European (or Christian) template of religious 
ideas (however important these might be), but in terms of its relationship to a longer and larger 
history focused on sovereignty’s worldwide—and insoluble—conundrums.  
Voting in the World: The Case of India  
This is, of course, even more critical if we are to place the history of voting in Europe in its 
relationship to the broader world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Given the ways that 
voting was inextricably linked to the imagining of power, it is hardly surprising that ideas on 
sovereignty in Europe were also significantly linked to the history of sovereignty in Europe’s 
overseas colonial empires, whose structurings, as historians have increasingly argued, had 
important influences not only on the spread of European ideas, but also on how conceptions of 
power evolved within Europe itself. It is worth remembering in this regard, that the secret, 
state-produced ballot was widely known in the late 19th century as the “Australian ballot,” as it was 
first instituted in Australia in the 1850s ([19], pp. 45–62). But no case in fact illustrates more clearly 
the importance of these interactions in the larger history of voting than the case of India, with its 
long colonial connection to Britain. The eventual, early 20th century introduction of elections into 
India under British rule drew directly, in some respects, on late 19th- and early 20th-century legal 
and political developments relating to mass voting in Britain, including the establishment of the 
secret ballot. But Britain’s India connection in fact influenced significantly evolving conceptions of 
sovereign authority (and thus of voting) on both sides of the colonial connection.  
In tracing the intellectual history of British sovereignty in India, Mithi Mukherjee has in fact 
recently shown how debates on the nature of British imperial sovereignty were, from their late 
18th-century beginnings, closely linked to the debates shaping modern sovereignty at home [29].  
As Mukherjee argues, the bitter conflict in England on the morality of East India Company rule in 
late 18th-century India, in which Edmund Burke played a prominent role, helped to crystallize a 
vision of legitimate sovereignty with two contradictory aspects, which mirrored the conundrums of 
sovereignty we have already discussed. Mukherjee calls these the “colonial” and the “imperial.” 
While the legitimacy of “colonial” authority rested on the state’s ability to operate within the 
fragmented and autocratic realities of Indian society and ideas in order to maintain order (that is, to 
adapt its rule to India’s worldly realities, as the British saw them), the state also grounded its 
legitimacy in an “imperial” association with universalizing principles of “natural law,” which 
defined for it a critical, self-defined moral position outside these social realities. These 
contradictory—yet still interlinked—ideas later evolved in the second half of the 19th century, 
under the direct rule of the Crown, to a vision of sovereignty linking the state to an idea she terms 
“justice as equity,” an idea identifying the state’s sovereign legitimacy precisely with its ability to 
act as an impartial arbiter in a society of which it simultaneously was and was not a part.  
Here the conundrums of sovereignty were dramatized in stark form. On the one hand, the state’s 
claims to legitimacy in India lay in its ability to order the subcontinent’s fragmented array of 
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primordial identities (most notably caste and religion), largely through its administration of law and 
through the “disenchanting” sciences of ethnography, census, cadastral surveys, etc. In this way it 
defined itself as a modern state. But it also defined for itself—as a central facet of its claim to 
sovereignty—a place above and outside this society as the executive and judicial arbiter of rights, a 
position that was a product of a distinct, self-projected British imperial identity associated with 
law, impartiality and personal self-control. Whatever its foreignness, this was a framework of 
sovereign legitimacy, echoing older Indian ideas of detached sovereignty, with which, as 
Mukherjee shows, even many early Indian nationalists engaged.114 Though clearly cast in terms in 
some ways quite different from those shaping the evolution of the people’s sovereignty in UK itself 
(particularly with respect to the very different place of the individual in British colonial 
conceptions of an objectified Indian “society”), the structural parallels between the Indian case and 
the precisely contemporary definition of a sovereign authority conceived to be both within—and 
yet standing apart from—society in Britain, are striking.115  
Such structural parallels are particularly critical when we consider the colonial introduction of 
elections into India in the early 20th century (roughly contemporaneous, in fact, with the final 
moves toward universal adult suffrage in Britain in the 1910s and 1920s).116 British introduction of 
elections as an important element of governance into India at the end of WWI, did not represent an 
effort to spread or diffuse European democracy so much as to extend and solidify what Mukherjee 
would have called “colonial” forms of governance. Though the introduction of a significant 
electoral component into colonial rule was certainly in some ways an effort to buy off at this time 
the regime’s increasingly vocal critics, both internally and internationally, the introduction of 
elections was preeminently an effort to discipline “popular” politics, channeling it within controlled 
voting structures, including a very narrow, propertied franchise and a structure of electoral 
constituencies that captured India’s fragmented “colonial” structure, including “separate 
electorates” for minorities. India was still a society defined in British eyes by its deeply ingrained 
structure of primordial loyalties and influences, which could only be ordered by a detached, 
“impartial” sovereign state. Elections thus represented initially the efforts of a colonial state to 
maintain a vision of sovereignty as resting on its Olympian “impartiality,” standing outside India’s 
social divisions.  
                                                 
114  Mukherjee in fact sees the early Indian National Congress’s engagement with this discourse of 
sovereignty linked to “justice as equity” as rooted in their judicial positioning within the empire and in a 
vision of British rule as modeled, in essence, on a court. She does not actually explore, however, the 
connections of these ideas with older Indian ideas of legitimate sovereign authority that might perhaps be 
linked to Hessterman’s conundrum of sovereignty ([29], pp. 105–49).  
115  One key to the intersection of visions of sovereignty in the Empire and in India relates to the role of the 
imperial British monarchy, as the embodiment of a detached vision of sovereignty, or “justice as equity,” 
as Mukherjee puts it. ([29]). Mukherjee sees this as very important in India; for a discussion of the 
connections between empire and the simultaneous transformation of the monarchy in Britain itself, see 
[30]. 
116  There were some local and municipal elections in India in the late 19th century, and very limited Council 
elections as well, but it was only with the 1919 reforms that elections assumed an important place in the 
overall structure of British rule. 
97 
But, whatever British intentions in introducing elections, an expanded system of voting in  
India carried with it (in the structure of the secret ballot and in election laws designed to protect  
the autonomy of the individual voter) the germ of a structural vision of popular sovereignty, that  
came to have a profound impact as it intersected with Indian ideas about the nature of legitimate 
sovereign authority. In practice, the Indian National Congress, now led by M. K. Gandhi 
(1869–1948), initially decided to boycott the first set of provincial elections in 1920, seeing them 
(not incorrectly) as simply an effort by the British to shore up the foundations of their rule. But as 
Congress soon began to contest colonial elections, Gandhi’s ideas came to play a major role in 
grounding a vision of popular sovereignty firmly in an Indian context.  
The development of Gandhi’s ideas suggests, in fact, the critical intersection of colonial ideas 
with older Indian ideas embodying sovereignty’s conundrums. The colonial vision of legitimate 
sovereign authority, standing apart from society, now found reflection in Gandhi’s popularization, 
within India’s movement for self-rule (swaraj), of a sovereign, Indian national self, defined by 
personal non-violence and self-restraint and guided independently of society by the inner light of 
Satya, or Truth. As a frame for a vision of the “people,” detached from India’s social divisions, 
Gandhi, in effect, turned the colonial vision of impartial “justice as equity” against the colonial 
state itself. Yet, at the same time, Gandhi linked this reversal to older Indian ideas of renunciation 
as a foundation for sovereign authority. For Gandhi, the sannyasin (or renouncer), who remained 
active in the political world, in fact became the idealized model for a vision of the Indian “people”, 
composed of men and women who now carried an “enchanted” internal essence into the 
“disenchanted” external world of colonial politics and state authority:  
If the sanyasins of old did not seem to bother their heads about the political life of society [Gandhi 
wrote], it was because society was differently constructed. But politics properly so-called rule every 
detail of our lives today. …A sanyasin, having attained swaraj [self-rule] in his own person, is the fittest 
to show us the way. A sanyasin is in the world, but he is not of the world…([31], pp. 376–77). 
It would be hard to find a clearer statement of the image of the “enchanted individual,” living 
within society yet standing outside it—here cast in distinctive Indian terms, but tracking the 
conundrums of sovereignty that were playing themselves out in European democracy as well.  
These late colonial developments provided the critical backdrop for the emergence of electoral 
democracy in India after its 1947 independence, and for the establishment of an electoral system 
based on universal adult suffrage that made India, at the time of its first general election in 1952, at 
a stroke the largest arena of mass democratic voting in the world. In many respects, the structuring 
of India’s voting drew heavily on British models—and British electoral practice and law—brought 
to India in the late colonial era. Yet at the same time, its system of voting—and of popular 
sovereignty—was hardly a simple product of “Europeanization,” but of complex interactions 
between very old Indian ideas about sovereignty, ongoing contradictions in European ideas about 
popular sovereignty, and the distinctive forms of sovereignty that had marked the colonial structure.  
These interactions have played out in myriad ways, but they can be briefly traced here in the 
history of legal structures and in the history of constitutional ideas. Like the sovereign king, the 
sovereign Indian “people” were imagined in the Indian constitution as simultaneously bound to 
worldly “society,” with all its divisions and hierarchies, and as external to it, defined as a unity by 
98 
the ineffable capacity for freedom of the individual, two poles held together in contradiction.  
The image of the free individual voter, separated from society, was asserted, even for illiterate 
voters, through a technology of secret voting based on electoral symbols. But the vision of Indian 
society as marked by extraordinarily high levels of social dependence, coercion and primordial 
identification (a view of Indian “society” shared by many of the high-caste drafters of India’s 
constitution with India’s earlier British rulers) cast the contradictions shaping the enchanted 
individual voter in India’s system in unusually stark terms. Strict electoral laws were thus viewed 
as necessary in India, targeting the dangers of “undue influence” on the individual voter on a large 
scale. The structure of this law came from Britain (with its own underlying vision of a tension 
between “undue influence” and voter autonomy), but the sweeping character of the law went well 
beyond most European precedent. It prohibited appeals for votes on the basis of a candidate’s 
“religion, race, caste, community or language,” and even targeted the “the use of, or appeal to, 
national symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem” that might compromise the 
freedom of individual rational authority.117 Such rules were all the subject of many court cases in 
the years after mass elections began in India. But noteworthy about India’s system, in a broader 
worldwide context, was the deep ongoing tension between the actual politics of elections, in which 
the pressures of caste, religion, and patronage in popular electioneering remained extremely 
powerful, and a structure of law that put the autonomy of the enchanted individual at its theoretical 
heart, however limited its actual reach in transforming elections. It is in fact tempting to see  
India’s electoral structure as designed precisely to keep the two poles of sovereignty’s conundrum  
in tension, thus in practical effect acknowledging, in Heesterman’s terms, its fundamental  
insolubility ([32], pp. 406–27). 
This is also evident in the extraordinary role of India’s national Election Commission in 
administering elections in India, an institution that had no precedent in British electoral practice. 
The critical fiction of the Election Commission is that it manages the most contentious political 
arenas in India (its national and state elections) and yet somehow claims to exist outside politics. It 
thus embodies a vision of law-bound, procedural democracy standing apart from the actual political 
conflict that represents the nuts and bolts of electoral competition. Though the Election 
Commission’s position in Indian politics has been the subject of controversy over the years, the 
Commission has in recent decades underscored its position as standing apart from everyday politics 
by issuing what it calls a “Model Code of Conduct” for candidates in elections, which is not 
technically justiciable, but which is highly publicized by the Election Commission and has gained 
an important foothold in the national imagination. This hardly prevents, of course, a multitude of 
violations of the code by candidates. But the issuing of the Code, which is sometimes interpreted in 
highly moralistic terms, suggests the secular theology lying underneath it. As one supporter thus 
wrote in the 1990s to T. N. Seshan, the then chief Election Commissioner (who publicized the 
Model Code as never before), the position of the Chief Election Commissioner in enforcing the 
code had become reminiscent of that of Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita, who declared: 
“Dharmasamsthapanarthaya, sambhavami yuge yuge [to uphold dharma, I shall incarnate in every 
                                                 
117  Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 123 (3), as amended. For a table of these and other 
provisions relating to “corrupt practices” in Indian elections, see the Election Commission of India 
website: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/CurrentElections/Table-MCC.pdf. 
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age]” (quoted in [33], p. 253). Here the Election Commission was conceptualized, in effect,  
as an emanation of divinity on earth (an avatar), there to make sure that in the midst of social 
pressure and worldly corruption the sovereign voice of the people could be heard. Yet lest one take 
too literally the religious language of such a comment, it is critical to note that the expansion of the 
EC’s authority occurred in the early 1990s against the backdrop of an Indian Supreme Court 
decision underscoring the foundational importance of secularism to the “basic structure” of the 
Indian constitution.118 Indeed, Seshan himself was quite active in seeking to limit the scope of 
religious rhetoric in election campaigns. Rather, it is tempting to see such comments as evidence of 
a continuing, secularized “theology of power” that underlies voting. The EC’s central role lies in 
managing one of the most complex social—and intensely political—events in the world, India’s 
massive general elections. And yet even as its success lies in deep engagement with society, its 
authority hinges on its simultaneous claims to be external, to stand outside this social world. 
Indeed, at the heart of Indian elections we can also see the same tensions we saw in Europe in 
defining the individual sovereign self. It was, of course, Gandhi who was most responsible during 
the independence movement for popularizing a vision of a new Indian self that was defined by the 
operation of internal self-control and self-discipline, guided by Satya. This was a vision that was, 
as some have argued, in some ways lost in the structuring of the Indian constitution, with its many 
foreign borrowings and strong statist vision, reflecting far more the ideas of Jawaharlal Nehru  
(1889–1964) and B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956), than those of Gandhi. But the structure of mass 
voting in India nevertheless continues to embody in critical respects a Gandhian vision of the self, 
cast as the site of the irresolvable tension between an enchanted autonomy and the pressures of a 
social world deeply structured by dependence and influence.119 This was personally manifested for 
Gandhi, as we have already noted, in a kind of this-worldly asceticism, a style that, while still 
having popular appeal in India, has lost a good deal of its force in Indian politics since 1947. But 
the structure of Indian elections in the 21st century still bears the powerful imprint of this idea, 
particularly in the contrast between India’s fragmented and bitterly contested electoral politics on 
the ground, and its seemingly self-denying submission to an extraordinarily rule-bound vision of 
procedural democracy.  
From such a perspective, the Indian Constitution itself can be read for all its institutional and 
statist borrowings, as a form of “self-binding,” as Sanjay Palshikar puts it, that draws legitimacy 
from the image of the self-controlled, sovereign individual ([35], p. 213].120 This has represented a 
powerful vision constituting an image of the Indian “people” as a whole, their imagined unity 
standing in opposition both to the social pressures of interest and identity pressing on the  
social individual, and to the “disenchanted” power of the bureaucratized, highly objectifying, 
                                                 
118  The case was S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), AIR 1994 SC 1918. 
119  For an argument stressing the importance of Gandhi’s thinking to the constitution, in spite of the 
rejection by the constituent assembly of many of his specific ideas, particularly about the place of the 
village in constitutional structure, see [34], pp. 59–78. The idea of a self-disciplined individual as central 
to India’s constitutional order was, in fact, deeply internalized by Nehru as well. 
120  Palshikar notes Hobbes’ rejection of this self-binding idea, based on the idea that a “binding promise 
cannot be performed by one party alone.” But arguably, this was precisely what constituted the case for 
Indian constitutionalism as viewed within a Gandhian framework. 
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developmental Indian state. In practice, of course, forms of electoral corruption, including 
vote-buying, are widespread. But the countervailing existence of a legal framework embodying the 
image of the autonomous voter, widely viewed as central to the very legitimacy of elections in 
India, reflects, in a sense, the ongoing—and insoluble—tension in the Indian operation of the 
conundrum of sovereignty itself.  
In sum, the power of this vision of the sovereignty of the people can be explained neither 
through a history of diffusion from Europe nor by a search simply for democracy’s indigenous 
Indian roots. Rather it is an idea best framed by the larger worldwide conundrums of sovereignty 
itself—now embedded in the sovereignty of the Indian “people.”  
Afterthought 
There is, of course, a significant danger of distortion in trying to force multiple, variant systems 
of voting, and variant democratic histories into a common, overarching comparative frame. But 
such framings allow us to point to commonalities and differences as we examine democracy, which 
are essential to any move toward a worldwide history of voting. 
A telling example for such a framework lies in the meanings embedded in the powerful phrase, 
“We, the people,” which opens both the American and Indian constitutions. As the phrase suggests, 
the importance of the American model in shaping certain aspects of the Indian constitution is 
unmistakable; in both cases the meanings attached to the “people” can also be traced back to 
Europe. Historians and philosophers have in fact devoted considerable attention to the meanings of 
the “people” as conjured up in the American constitution (and the American revolution), 
particularly in comparison with both earlier and later popular revolutions in Europe [10,36,37]. 
And yet when cast against the Indian case—and the larger worldwide history of the conundrum of 
sovereignty—the distinctive invocation of the “people” in the American constitution’s preamble 
takes on distinctive meanings. In the American case, the “people” are seemingly mobilized in the 
constitution’s opening phrase to be a unidirectional source of authority, the active font of 
legitimacy for a constitution that the people themselves directly “ordain and establish.” The 
“people” seemingly express their mystical unity in the very act of creating the Constitution. In the 
Indian constitution, on the other hand, the “people” are simultaneously the subject and the object of 
constitutional authority; they “adopt, enact, and give” the Constitution, as the Preamble declares, 
“to ourselves.”121 As both the givers and receivers, in other words, the “people,” as conjured in the 
opening of the Indian constitution, project simultaneously their two contradictory capacities, as the 
enchanted independent source of the constitution’s power, and, at the very same time, as a receiver 
bound in dependence by the gift. The deep-seated, insoluble tension defining the sovereign citizen, 
trapped between social forces and an imagined autonomy, is here, in a sense, writ large.  
Such phrasing also points to the importance of comparative frames, going well beyond the 
simple diffusion of ideas, for a global history of voting. Some would argue that if there was a check 
                                                 
121  Italics added. This precise language in fact appeared earlier in the preamble of the Irish constitution of 
1937. But the very different world from which this was adapted is suggested by the fact that in the text of 
the Irish constitution, the phrase “We, the people of Eire” was preceded by: “In the Name of the Most 
Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and 
States must be referred…”  
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to unitary popular sovereignty in the US constitution, it was seemingly rooted less in the 
conundrum of the sovereign individual, as both controlled and controlling, both autonomous and 
subject to influence, than in the paradoxical relationship between the federal system and the states, 
whose relationship itself defined a sovereign conundrum. 122  If the “people” ordained the 
constitution, it was the states themselves, after all, and not the people, who ratified the document. 
But the differences between the two cases can perhaps best be read in ongoing differences in 
election law—and in processes of voting. While in Indian election law, the “enchanted individual” 
has been seen as continuously threatened by the force of influence in society, and thus requiring 
legal protections that allow the autonomous self to be heard, in American election law, the 
individual is more often seen as defining his/her autonomy through self-assertion in worldly 
politics itself, and thus needing far fewer legal protections. The threats to the individual’s 
autonomy come far less from society than from the state itself. Indeed, if individual assertion is 
converted into a vision of sovereign authority existing outside the world, this is perhaps more 
commonly achieved in popular American thinking through market models, where it is an “invisible 
hand” (a secularized hand of divinity?), operating simultaneously both within and outside social 
relations, that seemingly converts self-interested social action and conflict into a unitary vision of 
the “people,” somehow transcending the social.123 In such a frame, the paradox of autonomy and 
control has raised a very different set of questions from those shaping the meanings of voting in 
India—though it can perhaps still be read in terms of the conundrum of a sovereign voice that 
stands both within the community, and outside it, at the same time.  
To posit such a contrast between the “people” in the US and Indian cases, is no doubt highly 
speculative, and is merely a suggestion for exploration. But if we are to see this within a larger 
global history of voting, it is important to see here also the underlying paradox of the people’s 
sovereignty in comparative operation, not simply as part of the long-term story of the 
“Europeanization” of the world, but part of a larger story about the nature of sovereignty itself, in 
which Europe and the rest of the world alike have been embedded. It is only then that we can begin 
to move towards a truly global history of voting. 
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Building on his long career as a distinguished historian of early modern Europe, John Miles 
Headley has recently turned his gaze to the influence of Europe in the larger world. In The 
Europeanization of the World, Headley makes an insistent case for the uniqueness of European 
values—particularly human rights and democracy—and argues that these values are Europe’s most 
precious gifts to the larger world [1]. Without seeking to diminish the remarkable intellectual and 
cultural achievements of European peoples, this presentation will suggest a more nuanced view of 
relations between Europe and the larger world. Human rights and democracy mean different things 
to different peoples in different contexts at different times, and there have in fact been numerous 
expressions of both in societies beyond Europe. Furthermore, European theorists of human rights 
and democracy themselves drew inspiration from sources beyond Europe. To the extent that  
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the Europeanization of the world is a persuasive idea, it is possible only because of a prior 
globalization of Europe. 
In light of Headley’s career as a distinguished historian of the Protestant and Catholic 
Reformations, it will be appropriate to begin this discussion with a scriptural text. The passage  
I have chosen comes from the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter 1, verses 9 and 10: “The thing that hath 
been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no 
new thing under the sun. Is there anything whereof it may be said, See, this is new? It hath been 
already of old time, which was before us” (AV). The words of the Preacher suggest the advisability 
of caution—second thoughts—to anyone making expansive claims for uniqueness and novelty in 
world history. Yet uniqueness is one of the defining characteristics of Headley’s Europe. The terms 
“unique,” “uniquely,” and “uniqueness” make at least fifty appearances in his book, with all but 
five of these referring to the alleged distinctiveness of European values. 
Headley’s basic argument is simple and straightforward. Europe (or sometimes, more 
ambiguously, “the West”) invented and developed two principles of universal significance: the idea 
of a common humanity, which underlies values of human rights and toleration, and the 
normalization of political dissent, which serves as the foundation of a free press and constitutional 
democracy. Both principles built on intellectual foundations stretching back as far as Socrates and 
the ancient Stoics, Headley argues, but both of them achieved distinctive formulations in the early 
modern era. The notion of a common humanity emerged in the sixteenth century, as European 
mariners visited all parts of the world that were accessible through the seas, prompting the 
construction of the notion that humanity is a single biological and moral community. The 
acceptance of political dissent began to take on institutional form in the seventeenth century with 
the emergence of party politics, constitutions, and concepts of popular sovereignty. Headley holds 
that both principles—the idea of a common humanity and the normalization of political 
dissent—underwent continuous and sustained development during the period 1500 to 1800. He 
readily acknowledges that similar moments occurred in other societies, albeit briefly and 
intermittently—in the work of Mencius and Akbar, for example—but he maintains that there was 
no sustained development or institutionalization of human rights or democracy in other lands. He 
harbors no illusions about the moral superiority of Europe. He acknowledges clearly and repeatedly 
that Europeans have perpetrated horrible atrocities both on fellow Europeans and on other peoples. 
Yet he holds also that Europe has been the target of undue criticism, and he maintains firmly that 
the European values of human rights and democracy merit respect and appreciation as gifts to 
humanity. This one-paragraph summary cannot do justice to the depth, subtlety, and sophistication 
of Headley’s analysis, but I hope it at least represents fairly the major arguments of his book. 
One peculiarity of Headley’s book on The Europeanization of the World is that it actually has 
little to say about the world beyond Europe. The principal task of the book is to trace the 
intellectual history of the ideas of human rights and democracy in European context. Headley 
accomplishes this task in most impressive fashion: indeed, his book represents a tour de force of 
conventional intellectual history by patiently following strands of ideas from ancient through 
medieval to early modern times, tracing their influence on successive generations of thinkers, and 
recounting their gradual assemblage into the modern ideas of human rights and democracy. If this 
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sounds like a whiggish approach, it is. But it also represents a sensitive and detailed review of two 
ideas that have profoundly influenced European and North American historical experience. 
Nevertheless, in light of his expansive title—The Europeanization of the World—it is surprising 
that only on page 193 (out of 218 pages of text) does Headley raise the question: “But what of the 
world beyond Europe?” It is even more surprising that the following pages have more to say about 
European views on the world beyond Europe than about the world beyond Europe itself. Headley’s 
book actually deals with the Europeanization of Europe, not at all with the Europeanization of the 
world, which would presumably involve the widespread adoption of European human rights values 
and democracy in the larger world.124 Judging from the topics and issues that Headley chooses to 
discuss, the Europeanization of the world would seem to be a future prospect—a development that 
might eventually take place, and a development that will be able to draw on pre-existing cultural 
elements in the world’s various societies (e.g., the work of Mencius and Akbar) as well as 
European constructs—but it is not a development that has already taken place and that accordingly 
might be susceptible to historical review and analysis. 
The recognition that Headley’s book deals with the Europeanization of Europe rather than the 
Europeanization of the world suggests a question: What if we take the larger world more seriously 
and examine developments in the larger world on their own terms, rather than relying exclusively 
on European constructions of the larger world? Historians once considered Europe a unique site of 
exceptional traits, including reason, enterprise, innovation, creativity, organizational talent, rule of 
law, and risk-taking behavior, and they even held that the European demographic regime was 
unique in that Europeans practiced birth control and sought to limit population expansion more 
than other peoples. As scholars have looked beyond Europe and conducted serious research in 
other parts of the world, however, they have exposed these vague notions about Europe’s supposed 
uniqueness as speculative myths, misunderstandings, or self-congratulatory conceits that bear 
limited resemblance to historical reality as historians have best been able to construe it. Most of 
these conceits represent the residue of Hegelian ideology as professional historians absorbed it in 
the nineteenth century. Only since about 1950 have historians and area studies experts undertaken 
the herculean effort that has generated better and more reliable knowledge about the larger world. 
In the context of the vast library of scholarship they have produced on the world beyond Europe, it 
has become clear that Europe was far less unique, in any meaningful sense of the term, than earlier 
generations of historians supposed. 
What about the issues of human rights and democracy? When considered in global context, will 
they melt away under the harsh, unblinking glare of historical analysis like the other supposedly 
unique traits of European peoples? In their favor, the ideas of human rights and democracy have a 
higher degree of specificity than the earlier-cited list of vague qualities frequently attributed to 
Europe. Certainly no historian will ever discover a premodern Asian analogue to Locke’s Second 
                                                 
124  In Headley’s case, this term would mean something different from the earlier “Europeanization of 
Europe” discussed by Robert Bartlett who believed it meant the spread of Christian cultural elements, 
administrative practices, and institutionalized education from the core European region of the former 
Carolingian empire to more peripheral regions ([2], pp. 269–91). Yet if Headley were to frame his 
argument in terms of an Europeanization of Europe rather than the world, the process he describes might 
well seem to be an extension or deepening of Bartlett’s Europeanization. 
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Treatise of Civil Government or an ancient African equivalent of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, just as none will ever discover the European correspondent to the Confucian Analects 
or the Bhagavad Gita. The specific features of cultural traditions are obviously unique to the 
peoples who created them. It would be pointless to expect peoples of other societies and cultural 
traditions to formulate doctrines of human rights or democracy that are precise parallels of 
European doctrines. This kind of uniqueness is undoubtedly important: it is the kind of uniqueness 
that makes history possible, since unique developments and experiences are the very stuff and 
matter of historical analysis. In this sense of the term, every society, every individual is unique, and 
nobody will even begin to doubt that that is true.  
Headley’s uniqueness, however, is altogether different in character. When he discusses the 
uniqueness of European values, he has in mind something more like exceptionalism rather than the 
everyday uniqueness that historians routinely deal with in their work. His conception of European 
uniqueness implies the claim that European agents elaborated particular values that are so wholly 
unlike and so fundamentally different from those found anywhere else that they had no proper 
counterparts in the larger world and hence are not even comparable to values elaborated in the 
world beyond Europe. Consideration of European uniqueness in Headley’s strong sense of the term 
requires attention to two questions about historical developments in the world beyond Europe: 
First, whether societies beyond Europe may have developed some functional equivalents of human 
rights and democracy that served similar purposes, even if they did not achieve the same 
formulations that they did at European hands? And second, whether the European formulations of 
human rights and democracy may have drawn on influences and inspirations from the world 
beyond Europe? In both cases, I respond that the answer to these questions is Yes. 
Democracy and efforts to promote democracy have obviously loomed large in world affairs over 
the past quarter-century. It is a disappointment that historians have had little to say about 
democracy, leaving the task largely to political scientists, philosophers, and legal scholars. Headley 
is one among the few, the proud, the brave among historians who have taken up the challenge of 
analyzing democracy in historical context. This task is difficult for several reasons: there is no 
objective standard to measure what does or does not count as democracy; since the twentieth 
century, the term democracy has figured so prominently in ideological disputes that its very use 
raises different assumptions in different minds; like any other concept laden with moral 
implications, democracy does not lend itself to the kind of precise analysis that is possible for 
measures of wheat, jugs of wine, bolts of cloth, and other items studied by historians of the 
material world; and moreover, perhaps most importantly, democracy is a word with deep emotional 
power that brings visions of hope to some while striking fear in the hearts of others and prompting 
very different assumptions and historical analyses in all cases. That does not mean that historians 
should not analyze democracy in historical context. Quite the contrary: as a profoundly influential 
historical phenomenon, democracy is far too important to leave to the tender mercies of political 
scientists, philosophers, and lawyers (with all due respect to these distinguished scholars for the 
contributions that they have been able to make from their own vantage points). 
When thinking about democracy in global historical context, it is or should be clear that it will 
have different characteristics at different times and in different places. Bicameral legislatures with 
regular schedules of full, free, fair, and unobstructed elections were rare features anywhere in the 
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world before the twentieth century. If these were the criteria for democracy, no part of the USA 
was democratic before passage of the Nineteenth Amendment guaranteeing women’s suffrage in 
1920, and some regions would not qualify as democratic until after the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Granting that bicameral legislatures with regular schedules of full, free, fair, 
and unobstructed elections are absolutely wonderful and admirable institutions, we clearly need 
more flexible criteria if we want to hold a fruitful conversation about democracy on a cross-cultural 
and global basis. What kinds of institutions and practices might qualify as functional equivalents of 
contemporary democracy? 
Amartya Sen has considered this question in especially illuminating fashion. Following John 
Rawls in particular among others, Sen views democracy less as a matter of establishing specific 
institutions or even voting than of exercising public reason and making a place for individuals to 
participate in public decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods. “Public reasoning,” he 
explains, “includes the opportunity for citizens to participate in political discussions and to 
influence public choice. Balloting can be seen as only one of the ways—albeit a very important 
way—to make public discussions effective, when the opportunity to vote is combined with the 
opportunity to speak and listen, without fear” ([3], p. 14). By this standard, democracy in some 
form or another is by no means the exclusive preserve of Europe and its North American offshoots. 
Athens and Rome were certainly early laboratories of democracy, but Sen argues persuasively that 
India also has long been a site for the exercise of public reason. From the time of the ancient 
Himalayan republics through the early Buddhist councils and the imperial courts of Ashoka and 
Akbar to the present day—for the better part of three millennia—south Asia has been a forum for 
the exercise of public reason. Nor was India the only such forum. Sen argues that the Buddhist 
values that emanated from ancient India inspired similar practices in other lands where Buddhism 
found a large following. He cites the case of the Japanese Buddhist Prince Shotoku, to mention 
only one example among many, who in the early seventh century implemented a constitution 
providing that “Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They 
should be discussed with many” ([3], pp. 81–82). 
Historians Steven Muhlberger and Phil Paine adopted a similar approach in their exploratory 
sketch of “Democracy’s Place in World History” [4]. Focusing their attention on local rather than 
royal, imperial, or national levels of organization, Muhlberger and Paine argue that over the long 
run of history politics has been mostly a local affair, that councils and assemblies organized on a 
village or kinship basis have tended to most of the governmental and decision-making matters that 
impinge directly on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, and that these councils and assemblies 
have operated in large measure on democratic or quasi-democratic principles to the extent that 
discussion, consultation, debate, negotiation, and often voting informed public decisions. The 
authors adduce cases from China, India, sub-Saharan Africa, and native societies in North America 
to substantiate their argument that local practice has depended on a kind of rough, de facto 
democracy in much of the world beyond Europe. 
The kind of democracy that Sen, Muhlberger, and Paine have in mind is clearly not the 
equivalent of contemporary democracy, nor did it confer the kind of protections that individuals 
properly expect from contemporary democracy (at least when it functions well). Unlike de facto 
democracies in other parts of the world, contemporary democracy rooted in Europe benefits from 
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deep intellectual traditions and powerful institutions that inform and sustain this strain of 
government, and one of the merits of Headley’s book is precisely to sort out the lineages of these 
intellectual traditions.  
Yet the works of Sen, Muhlberger, and Paine help to make two points clear. First, when talking 
about the world, it is crucial for historians to resist temptations to restrict their horizons to story 
lines that are familiar from European experience. It is essential for them to go further and undertake 
the difficult work of actually investigating historical reality in the larger world, just as professional 
historians from Leopold von Ranke forward have compiled remarkable histories of Europe and its 
American offshoots. Second, if they are going to talk about democracy in global context, it is 
essential for historians to recognize the fact that democracy will take different shapes and sport 
different colors in different societies. To take one cultural expression as the Ideal Type of 
Democracy, or as the standard against which all the others get measured and inevitably found 
wanting, is tantamount to a foreclosure on any opportunity for investigation, analysis, discussion, 
or debate about the nature and history of democracy itself.125 When historians venture from 
Europe into the larger world, it is essential that they open their minds to the reality that different 
peoples in different societies have different rationalities that do not necessarily benefit from being 
judged against European standards. By this light, European peoples elaborated a remarkable and 
admirable strain of democracy, but that does not necessarily mean that democracy per se is a purely 
European gift to the world. Rather, it will be more helpful to think of democracy—like agriculture, 
perhaps—as an ever-changing and constantly evolving product of multiple independent inventions 
by different peoples in different world regions at different times and under different sets of 
circumstances. 
Even in cases of multiple independent inventions, there is abundant scope for different 
individual traditions to influence the development of others. Indeed, this is the prospect that 
Headley’s book envisions with respect to European values of human rights and democracy in the 
larger world. Here I would like to suggest that outside influences played a role in the development 
of some values in Europe itself. When it came to democracy, of course, Europeans were able to 
build on distinctive elements from classical antiquity and the medieval era. When it came to 
toleration and human rights, however, ancient and medieval experience offered them much less 
positive or constructive guidance. Thus, where their own cultural and intellectual tradition was 
lacking, European theorists of toleration and human rights drew inspiration from other wells. One 
source was the purely practical experimentation with a limited religious toleration that Dutch 
authorities tried in the interests of maintaining public order in their own multi-confessional 
environment [6]. Another was the kind of everyday practice of tolerance that members of 
communities often extended to their fellows as recently outlined by Stuart B. Schwartz [7]. Yet 
another, which will be my focus here, was the long-institutionalized practice of religious toleration 
in the world of Islam, which European peoples learned about through the reports of travelers who 
commented on customs and conditions in the lands they visited. None of these sources of 
                                                 
125  Donald Treadgold takes exactly this approach. While claiming to deal with “the history of freedom on a 
world scale within a single pair of covers,” he devotes his attention almost exclusively to Europe and 
North America, and he takes European conceptions of freedom as the de facto standards of freedom 
(including democracy and human rights) ([5], p. 2). 
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inspiration has figured prominently in conventional approaches to intellectual history, which quite 
simply has not gotten us very far in understanding the influences that helped to bring about policies 
of religious toleration. Yet these sources are essential for a proper historical understanding of 
religious toleration and human rights. Analysis of these sources of inspiration and their influences 
on emerging theories of toleration calls for the exploration of historical sources that intellectual 
historians have not previously taken into consideration. 
Historians have of course long recognized that European scholars avidly consumed the works of 
Muslim philosophers and scientists during the middle ages, particularly in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. There has been less attention to the possibility of any continuing influence in 
early modern times. As conventionally practiced, intellectual history has made limited contribution 
thus far to the understanding of this issue. The task is not simply a matter of tracing the genealogy 
and the handling of individual ideas through a series of European intellectual agents—the forte of 
conventional intellectual history—but rather of spotting influences that arrived by unusual routes 
and that European theorists might well have intentionally obscured. 
A case in point comes from recent studies of a philosophical novel by Ibn Tufayl and its 
influence in early modern Europe. Ibn Tufayl was a twelfth-century physician and political advisor 
at the court of the Almohad Sultan Abu Ya’qub Yusuf of Morocco and Spain. He was a companion 
of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) whom he in fact invited to reside at the sultan’s court. About 1160 or 1170 
Ibn Tufayl wrote his novel Hayy Ibn Yaqzan—the name means “living son of the wakeful”—a boy 
abandoned as an infant who grew up on a tropical island with no other human inhabitants. Nursed 
through youth by a kindly doe gazelle, Hayy discovered on his own how to control fire, build 
shelter, domesticate animals, and invent tools. Later, on the basis of nothing more experimentation 
and reason, he became a physician, astronomer, and philosopher. Thus he was eventually able to 
reason his way to an understanding of the world and even to the existence of God. In the last pages 
of the novel Hayy encountered a wise hermit, who introduced him to the outside world. But Hayy 
found it profoundly unappealing because its inhabitants led their lives on the basis of doctrine and 
dogma instead of reason and experimentation, so he soon abandoned human society and returned to 
his island [8]. 
The story of Hayy caught the attention of free thinkers in Europe from the fourteenth century. 
Moses of Narbonne made a Hebrew translation in 1349, and Pico della Mirandola made a Latin 
translation on the basis of Moses’s Hebrew in the late fifteenth century. During the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, Ibn Tufayl’s influence soared. In 1671 Edward Pococke the younger—son of 
Edward Pococke, the first Laudian professor of Arabic at Oxford University—published the first 
Latin translation (which he had prepared under his father’s supervision) directly from Ibn Tufayl’s 
Arabic under the title Philosophus autodidactus. Translations into Dutch, English, French, and 
other languages followed shortly thereafter, and Ibn Tufayl’s book became quite the rage in 
England as well as the Continent. It is likely that the story of Hayy was the model or inspiration or 
point of departure for Daniel Defoe’s account of Robinson Crusoe, and Ibn Tufayl’s influence is 
clearly traceable in Spinoza, Leibniz, Pope, Bayle, and Diderot, among others ([9], pp. 628–31; [10]). 
Was Ibn Tufayl’s novel also a source of inspiration for John Locke’s Essay on Human 
Understanding? There is no absolute documentary proof, but G.A. Russell has advanced a 
powerful and persuasive argument on this point. She points out that before 1671, Locke’s interests 
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included political and social but not epistemological or psychological issues. In 1671, however, he 
began the initial work on the treatise that eventually appeared in 1690 as the first edition of the 
Essay on Human Understanding. From 1652 to 1667 Locke lived principally at Oxford, where he 
was an outspoken admirer and a very close personal friend of Edward Pococke the elder as well as 
a tutor (1660–1661) to Edward Pococke the younger. Although Locke’s library does not seem to 
have included a copy of Ibn Tufayl in Pococke’s Latin translation, it is quite literally inconceivable 
that he was unaware of the book at precisely the time he began his own epistemological work. It 
certainly would be a remarkable coincidence—a little too much coincidence for my own 
comfort—that just at the moment his close friends produced a Latin translation of Ibn Tufayl’s 
novel, Locke began to think totally independently about the human mind as a tabula rasa that 
progressed to understanding on the basis of sense experience and reason ([11], 224–65; [12]).126 
The prospect that an obscure medieval Muslim philosopher might have sparked a foundational 
idea in a luminary such as John Locke is a notion that nobody would have even wasted time 
contemplating only a few years ago. Yet now it seems all but certain that Ibn Tufayl did indeed 
strike a chord with Locke and provide him with the kernel of an idea that he later developed in his 
own way and according to his own genius. Is it possible that additional influences came from the 
Muslim world or elsewhere to spark ideas among European thinkers who then worked them into 
formulations that have become familiar to us as human rights theory? More broadly, to what extent 
might peoples beyond Europe have contributed to the development of modern thought about 
human rights? 
Throughout the early modern era—from the earliest fourteenth-century ventures to the  
nearby Atlantic islands and fifteenth-century soundings in west Africa through sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century explorations in the Americas and Asia to eighteenth-century reconnoitering of 
the Pacific Ocean basin—an avalanche of information about the larger world poured into Europe. 
Merchants, missionaries, conquerors, settlers, and other travelers deluged European readers with 
their reportage on previously undescribed lands and peoples. Among the many strange and 
outlandish customs reported in this body of literature was the practice of religious toleration 
already observed for almost a thousand years in Muslim lands. We know for a fact that many of 
these travel accounts made their way to the notice of influential readers—including John Locke 
among others. 
An early example of this reportage came from the accounts of three men who were some of the 
earliest Englishmen to travel extensively in Mughal India: Sir Thomas Roe, Edward Terry, and 
Thomas Coryat. Roe was the first English resident ambassador to India, serving as emissary of 
King James I to the Mughal court from 1615 to 1619. Terry was Roe’s chaplain for most of his 
time in India. Coryat was a writer and traveler—neither merchant nor emissary—who spent five 
years (1612 to 1617) visiting various Muslim lands with an eye toward writing an account to 
follow up on his popular description of his earlier travels through Europe, Coryat’s Crudities. 
                                                 
126  Although lacking the translation of Ibn Tufayl, Locke’s library lacked the translation of Ibn Tufayl,  
but included three commentaries by Edward Pococke the elder on the books of Hosea, Joel, and Micah in  
the Hebrew Bible ([13], p. 212). Locke of course made no mention of Ibn Tufayl in his famous essay, but  
he illustrated his point with several references to conditions in the Muslim world ([14], pp. 71–72, 94,  
657, 708). 
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These three were some of the earliest Englishmen who had the opportunity to spend considerable 
time in India and observe the Mughal court and society from perspectives outside the trade 
factories of the East India Company. They knew each other well and sometimes traveled together 
as they followed the Mughal court. All three portrayed the current emperor, Jahangir, as fair and 
generous of spirit, while characterizing his father and predecessor, Akbar, in similar terms. All 
three also commented specifically and with a notable degree of wonder on the policy of religious 
toleration that prevailed in Mughal India. 
During the course of his embassy, Roe addressed at least two letters to George Abbot, 
Archbishop of Canterbury and brother of Roe’s friend Sir Maurice Abbot, who was 
Deputy-Governor of the East India Company. In one notable letter of 30 October 1616, Roe 
focused his attention on religious affairs in the Mughal Empire. He reported (mistakenly) that 
Timur and his descendants introduced Islam to India “but imposed it vpon none by law of 
Conquest, leauing consciences at liberty.” He noted that alongside “strict Mahometans” (Sunni), 
there were others who were followers of Ali (Shiites) as well as numerous other sectarians 
following their own preferred prophets (presumably Sufis). Thus he characterized Islam as “a 
mingled religion, not vpright with their great Prophett.” But that was just the Muslim population of 
India. The “Gentilles” population was even more diverse, including some who would drink wine, 
others who would eat swine, some who worshipped beasts, a few who would not even swat away 
the insects that attacked them, and many who refused to associate with certain  
others on the basis of their rank. The whole he characterized as “a Confusion.” The confusion only  
became more complex after Akbar sponsored the presence of Roman Catholic missionaries and  
debates between Hindu, Muslim, and Christian representatives. Akbar even permitted conversion 
to Christianity, a policy continued by Jahangir, whom Roe characterized as “Content with all 
religions” and respectful toward every sect. Roe himself never doubted the truth of Christianity in 
the form of his own inherited Anglican confession, and he did not refrain from offering up 
numerous barbs about the aims and work of the Roman Catholic delegation in India. Yet he also 
made available to his readers a mostly fair (albeit sometimes inaccurate) characterization of a 
powerful and prosperous society that consciously followed a policy of religious toleration ([15], 2, 
pp. 308–19). 
Thomas Coryat died in India and so was unable to compose the account of travels through 
Muslim lands that he hoped to provide, but several letters survive from his days in India. They 
confirm and build upon the image of India advanced by Roe. Coryat confirmed Jahangir’s 
friendliness to Christians, noting that the Mughal emperor referred to Jesus as “Great Prophet 
Jesus.” He related a story about Akbar to emphasize his tolerance and fair-mindedness: After 
certain Portuguese had tied a copy of the Quran around a dog’s neck and chased it around the city 
of Agra, Akbar’s dear mother reportedly suggested that he retaliate by tying a copy of the Bible 
around another dog’s neck and chasing it through the streets of Hormuz. “But hee denyed her 
request, saying that, if it were ill in the Portugals to doe so to the Alcoran, being it became not a 
King to requite ill with ill, for that the contempt of any religion was the contempt of God, and he 
would not be revenged upon an innocent booke.” Coryat also recounted his own quite amazing 
experience. After a Muslim insulted him by calling him an infidel, Coryat replied with a lengthy 
impromptu oration in which he publicly denounced Muhammad as a false prophet, the Quran as the 
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work of a Byzantine monk named George, Muslim prayers as offenses before God, and the Muslim 
paradise as “a filthy quagmire … full of stincking dung-hills,” among other broad slurs. Not one to 
restrain himself in the manner of Akbar, Coryat at least recognized both the riskiness of his action 
and his good judgment in choosing the Mughal realm as the venue for his denunciations: “If I had 
spoken thus much in Turky or Persia against Mahomet, they would have rosted me upon a spit; but 
in the Mogols dominions a Christian may speake much more freely then hee can in any other 
Mahometan country in the world” ([16], pp. 246, 271, 273, 278). 
Coryat placed his trading of insults in the prominent commercial city of Multan (modern-day 
western Pakistan, south of Lahore), while Edward Terry attributed a similar confrontation to him at 
Agra, the Mughal capital south of Delhi. There, according to Terry, Coryat took offense at the 
proclamation that there is no God but God and that Muhammad is the prophet of God. “Which 
words Master Coryat often hearing in Agra, upon a certaine time got up into a turret, over against 
the priest, and contradicted him thus in a loude voice: la Alla, illa Alla, Hazaret-Eesa Ebn-Alla: No 
God but one God, and Christ the sonne of God; and further added that Mahomet was an imposter; 
which bold attempt in many other places of Asia, where Mahomet is more zealously professed, had 
forfetted his life with as much torture as tyrannie could invent. But here every man hath libertie to 
professe his owne religion freely and, for any restriction I ever observed, to dispute against theirs 
with impunitie.” Elsewhere chaplain Terry affirmed that in the Mughal realm “All religions are 
tolerated, and their priests in good esteeme, My selfe often received from the Mogoll himself the 
appellation of Father, with other many gracious words, with place amongst his best nobles.”127 
The accounts of Roe, Coryat, and Terry were only three among thousands of travel reports that 
reached Europe during the early modern era. Why pay so much attention to this trio? Although 
their names are obscure today, the works of all three men reached audiences of influential readers. 
Samuel Purchas included excerpts from all three men’s works in his collections of travel accounts, 
Purchas, his Pilgrimage and its successor volumes, which were of course wildly popular in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Locke’s library included a copy of Purchas as well as a 
separate copy of Terry’s book ([13], pp. 216, 245).128 Quite apart from Purchas, Coryat’s letters 
and Terry’s report appeared independently in seventeenth-century editions, and Roe’s journal in an 
eighteenth-century edition. Coryat’s letters made the rounds at the Mermaid Tavern near St. Paul’s 
Cathedral. He was a regular at the Friday Street Club there—a group with an illustrious 
membership, including Ben Jonson, John Donne, Inigo Jones, Sir Robert Cotton, Samuel Purchas, 
and John Selden, the most outspoken Englishman advocating religious toleration in the early 
seventeenth century. (Coryat addressed two of his letters from India to Laurence Whitaker, “the 
High Seneschall of the Right Worshipfull Fraternitie of Sireniacal Gentlemen, that meet the first 
Fridaie of every moneth at the signe of the Mere-Maide in Bread-streete in London,” for 
transmission to his friends at the tavern ([16], pp. 241–52, 256–58). So far as I can see, Selden did 
not make use of any intelligence about the Muslim world in making his own case for religious 
                                                 
127  See Terry’s account of his experiences in India, which was composed probably about 1620 or 1621, 
reprinted in [16], quoting from pp. 315 and 331. 
128  Locke also possessed copies of works by other prominent travelers, such as François Bernier and Paul 
Rycaut, who reported on the world of Islam. It is quite clear that he valued information about conditions 
in the Islamic empires. 
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toleration. Yet his fundamentally Erastian approach had as its aim a regime of managing public 
order that was not at all unlike the system that Akbar and Jahangir supervised in Mughal  
south Asia.129 
Eventually, however, information about religious toleration in Muslim lands quite clearly made  
its way into works by some of the most prominent architects of toleration theories. By the late 
seventeenth century, it was commonplace for European theorists to compare Muslim policies of 
toleration favorably against Christian intolerance ([18], pp. 393–95). To mention only two 
particular luminaries, John Locke and Pierre Bayle both went to considerable lengths to learn about 
conditions in the Islamic world, and they both took a noticeable and particular delight in pointing 
out that Muslims, Jews, and Christians of all confessions—Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, 
Calvinist, Arminian, and others—were free to practice their faiths openly in Muslim lands while 
Christian European lands restricted religious freedom to a narrow range of confessions at best. As 
Locke proposed in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), “let us suppose two churches, the one 
of Arminians, the other of Calvinists, residing in the City of Constantinople. Will any one say, that 
either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty, as 
we see practised elsewhere, because of their differing from it in some doctrines or ceremonies; 
whilst the Turks in the meanwhile silently stand by, and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty 
Christians thus rage against Christians?” ([19], pp. 224–25).130 In his entry on “Mahomet” in  
Le Dictionnaire historique et critique (begun in 1695), Bayle compared Christianity and Islam with 
respect to toleration: “The Mahometans, according to the principles of their faith, are obliged to 
employ violence, to destroy other religions, and yet they tolerate them now, and have done so for 
many ages. The Christians have no order, but to preach, and instruct; and yet, time out of mind, 
they destroy, with fire and sword, those who are not of their religion.” Indeed, Bayle attributed the 
very survival of Orthodox Christianity to its good fortune to have fallen under Muslim domination: 
“It may be affirmed for a certain truth, That if the western princes had been lords of Asia, instead 
of the Saracens and Turks, there would be now no remnant of the Greek church, and they would 
not have tolerated Mahometism, as these Infidels have tolerated Christianity” ([21], pp. 38–39, 
349–50). 
Could the European value of religious toleration have emerged in the absence of the Muslim 
example of toleration? Yes, undoubtedly. Persecuted souls like Sebastian Castellio put out the call 
for toleration evidently without benefit of knowledge about conditions in the Muslim world, and 
the Dutch example suggests that purely practical considerations of social stability might well have 
pushed European peoples in the direction of toleration even if they didn’t particularly like the idea 
and even though there was limited foundation in European tradition to build upon. The historical 
record is so full of contingency and unpredictable chance developments that it would not be wise to 
preclude the possibility that a European theory of toleration might have arisen on the basis of 
                                                 
129  Selden’s table talk is full of comments to the effect that there can be no objective determination as to 
which religion is better than the others, so that the state must serve as referee and ensure that harmony 
prevails in a society hosting multiple religious communities ([17], pp. 9, 79, 161–67). 
130  In his second, third, and fourth letters on toleration, Locke continued to invoke the example of Muslims 
[20]. On purely religious grounds he argued the futility of persecution, explaining that every religion and 
every church is orthodox unto itself, but heretical in the eyes of others. 
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purely indigenous elements. Counter-factual considerations to the contrary notwithstanding, in the 
event, the Muslim example did indeed play a role in the gradual emergence of toleration theories 
during the early modern era and the European Enlightenment [18].131 
But the Enlightenment was by no means the end of influence from beyond Europe on human 
rights doctrine. To the contrary, advocates from African, Latin American, and especially Asian 
lands played crucial roles in bringing about the crowning achievement of the human rights 
movement—adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the United 
Nations on 10 December 1948. Conventional treatments present the UDHR as the result of 
European and North American initiative inspired by the political values of the Enlightenment and 
the democratic revolutions [27]. Yet a minor spate of recent studies has demonstrated convincingly 
that Asian, African, and Latin American lobbyists pushed for human rights conventions much 
faster than their European and North American counterparts. 
Adoption of the UDHR did not represent the first (or last) international consideration of human 
rights issues. Well before adoption of the UDHR, the First Universal Races Congress (1911), the 
Paris Peace Conference (1919), and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), among others, all 
heard calls for human rights under the rubrics of racial equality and self-determination of peoples 
as well as civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. In all cases, European and North 
American representatives resisted efforts by Asian, African, and Latin American delegates to 
advance policies of racial equality and self-determination. Intellectual and diplomatic foot-dragging 
on these issues continued well into the 1960s. Adoption of the UDHR was both necessary and 
possible in 1948 precisely because European and North American representatives had successfully 
stalled the recognition of human rights values on multiple occasions beforehand [28–30]. 
Who were the advocates for human rights before adoption of the UDHR, and what causes did  
they promote? Recent scholarship has emphasized two issues—freedom of movement and  
racial equality—as prominent aims of human rights advocates outside Europe. Japanese and  
especially Chinese activists asserted their “common human rights” from the 1870s, as discriminatory 
immigration laws restricted their mobility in violation of international treaties and sometimes even 
imperial policies. Racial equality, which implied equality of nations in the international order, was 
a goal dear to the hearts of Japanese and Chinese peoples in the era of the unequal treaties during 
the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Japanese delegates to the Paris Peach Conference 
lobbied famously but unsuccessfully with Chinese support for the League of Nations to embrace 
racial equality as a founding principle. Chinese were perhaps even more active in the promotion of 
international racial equality, especially after Japan managed to escape the burdens of the unequal 
treaties following victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895. Their argumentation was 
eclectic, drawing influence sometimes from Christianity, Enlightenment theories, and international 
law, but also relying on the long tradition of Chinese civilization and the Confucian principles of 
reciprocity and mutual respect, while also reflecting the practical grievances of communities 
inconvenienced by human rights violations [31,32]. Thus Chinese advocacy of human rights was 
emphatically not a borrowed or derivative discourse. Rather, as two scholars have put it, 
                                                 
131  Apart from Marshall’s very brief notice [18], existing historical scholarship on religious toleration 
[22–26] totally ignores extra-European influences.  
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“discussion of rights in China has long been motivated by indigenous concerns, rather than 
imposed from without, and it has been interpretive and critical, rather than passive and imitative” 
([32], p. xiii). More broadly, in the words of the best contemporary historian of human rights: “The 
historical origins of powerful visions capable of shaping world events and attitudes like those of 
international human rights are rarely simple. Instead, they emerge in complicated and interrelated 
ways from the influence of many forces, personalities, and conditions in different times and diverse 
settings, each flowing in its own unique way like tributaries into an ever larger and mightier river” 
([28], p. 4). 
Indeed, neither democracy nor human rights is an exclusively European invention. Functional 
equivalents have long been prominent in the world beyond Europe, and peoples from the larger 
world have made their own contributions to the recognition of democracy and human rights as we 
understand them today in the international community. In this presentation I have mentioned only a 
few routes by which knowledge and influence flowed from the larger world into Europe and North 
America, and I have mentioned only a few individuals from the world beyond Europe who 
contributed to the formulation of contemporary values. This is the case because only recently have 
historians even begun to consider it worth their while to investigate expressions of democracy and 
human rights beyond European and North American horizons. We simply do not yet have the 
foundation in basic research to present a fully fleshed account of democracy and human rights in 
all world regions. 
European and North American peoples have been conspicuous in their own efforts on behalf of 
democracy and human rights, and I have absolutely no wish to minimize or disparage their 
contributions. But the time has come, in the interests of clear historical understanding unclouded by 
Eurocentric mythologies, to take the larger world seriously, to scour global archives just as 
assiduously as historians have examined the European record over the past two centuries, and to 
follow as clearly as Headley has done for Europeans the contributions that peoples beyond Europe 
have made to the development of democracy and human rights. 
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